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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

By HAJO HOLBORN

THE prospect of a European federation has aroused great enthusiasm in the United States, but at the same time the difficulties encountered in its realization have generated a host of frustrations. It is not unusual, after five years of costly effort, to hear that the moment of crisis has arrived; that we must either push ruthlessly toward the goal, or abandon not only integration but possibly assistance to Europe as well. Perhaps these are the only alternatives that confront the United States. But before we fasten on to them irrevocably, it may be well to ask once more: What is the nature of the area that we are attempting to integrate, and how has our thought on the subject developed? Some appreciation of the recent history and problems of Europe, and of the circumstances that inspired postwar American policy, may help to determine whether or not the range of choice is as narrow as it looks at present to the United States.

I

Since the battle of France in June 1940 Europe has been unable to settle her fate through her own efforts. In fact, Europe has never been an entirely self-contained political system. In the modern era, particularly, colonial expansion, the reliance of European industry on raw materials from overseas, and the acceptance of Russia as a balancing and counterbalancing power in European affairs have made it impossible to conceive of Europe as a strictly separate political unit. As if in recognition of this fact, no attempt was made after World War I by the peace-makers of Paris to bring the European states together into a special European political league or economic union. The European nations were merely joined to the universal League of Nations. But the League was a firm league in name only, for it imposed but small obligations on its members. Moreover, it

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was universal at best in principle, since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had participated in its actual development. It is idle to speculate whether Briand's plan for a European union in 1929 if accepted could have overcome the nationalism which the peace settlement of Paris had unwittingly favored. What is more, nobody can prove that the formation of a European union after World War I might have spared Europe the disasters which a Nazi-dominated Germany brought upon her. One could, of course, take the view that Great Britain and France, with the advantages gained by the treaties of 1919, might have maintained European peace if they had continued close cooperation after 1919.

But if there ever was a chance of consolidating Europe after World War I, it was ignored for all practical purposes. Hitler succeeded in outmaneuvering the victors of 1919 and in the summer of 1940 gained practically complete control of the Continent. In spite of the defeat of her army in Belgium and France, Britain survived the debacle, but after Dunkirk she could never have hoped to break Hitler's hold over the Continent by her own power. Hitler sensed this and began to argue that the British, who he admitted were no political fools, must entertain hopes of support from new quarters if they refused to come to terms with him. In his opinion, the British could only count on bringing the power of the United States or of the Soviet Union into play against Germany. But he judged that, in stark contrast to Russia, the United States did not have the military forces with which to intervene decisively in world events outside the Western hemisphere in any near future. We know now that Hitler was always doubtful about the chances of a sea-borne invasion of England and also sceptical about the effect that a conquest of Gibraltar might have had on the final outcome of the war. As early as the last days of July 1940, he had seemingly set his mind upon the attack on Russia as the surest way of winning supreme victory.[1]

It is difficult, and not a little frightening, to imagine what

[1] Cf., most recently, Helmuth Greiner, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung, 1939-1943*, Wiesbaden, 1951.

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would have happened if Hitler had offered the continental nations, whom he had not only vanquished physically but also completely confounded in their traditional moral beliefs, a fair partnership in European affairs or at least a decent administration. But his "New Order of Europe" was nothing more than a brutal scheme for the ruthless exploitation of the material and human resources of the Continent and his "crusade for the West" a ferocious design for German colonial conquest in the East. Hitler's plans envisaged for the German and Latin nations at best the position of second-class citizens, while the Russian and non-Russian Slavs were destined for total serfdom. This macabre unification of Europe, gruesome memories of which still haunt millions of Europeans, lasted less than five years. It ended in the ruin of Germany and the restoration of national states in Europe. Yet the revival of the old nations was not, and could not have been after 1940, the work of these nations themselves, as had been largely true in the age of Napoleon and to a great extent also in World War I. It was the achievement of the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American alliance.

Hitler was quite right when he considered popular revolution under conditions of totalitarian government and modern technological warfare as negligible irritants and thought that only the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union could change the fate of Europe. He underestimated the American power potential, the possible speed of its mobilization, and the effectiveness with which it could be applied in any part of the globe. But he was correct in assuming that considerable time would be required to overcome the military unpreparedness of the United States. Where he erred most seriously was in his calculations of Soviet power. Russia broke the back of Germany's military might, and even as late as 1944 the invasion of France would not have been possible as a major strategic campaign if the Russians had not pinned down the bulk of the *Wehrmacht* after killing and wounding millions of Germans during three long years. The United States and Britain could expect to appear on the Continent only if Russia did not succumb to the German onslaught and if a minimum of strategic

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coordination between the West and Russia was maintained. This brutal fact explains the compromises which were made with regard to Europe at the wartime conferences of Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta. Without excluding criticism of certain details of these diplomatic deals, the conclusion is inescapable that they only spelled out the existing balance of forces. Thus, as a consequence of the war, the Soviet Union could annex and occupy a quarter or a third of the old Europe, while only the remainder could be liberated and re-established under Western auspices. Ever since, the political future of the Continent has depended on two great powers in Europe, but not of Europe.

II

During World War II and the early postwar years neither the Soviet Union nor the United States nor, for that matter, Britain promoted a future European union or federation. It is necessary to point out that the Soviet Union then and ever since has opposed any attempts at federating states within its orbit or adjacent to it and has seen in them mere efforts to limit and exclude the influence of Moscow. In England and, in an even more academic fashion, in the United States, a mild interest was displayed in a Balkan and a Danubian federation, but no important diplomatic action followed from it.

Shortly after Stalingrad and on the eve of the Anglo-American operations against Italy, Winston Churchill made a bold sketch of the steps to be taken after the defeat of Italy and Germany by Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.[2] He envisaged that under the United Nations there should come into being both a Council of Asia and a Council of Europe. Churchill confessed that the unification of Europe was a "stupendous business" and that he could hardly expect to see in his own lifetime the fulfillment of "the largest common measure of the integrated life of Europe that is possible without destroying the individual characteristics and traditions of its many ancient

[2] W. S. Churchill, broadcast from London, March 21, 1943, in *International Conciliation*, No. 391, June 1943; W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, IV: *The Hinge of Fate*, Boston, 1950, pp. 800ff.; L. W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, Boston, 1948, II, pp. 407ff.

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and historical races." What Churchill as "a good European" considered feasible and essential to the revival of "the fertile genius" and the "true greatness of Europe" was the creation of federations of the small European nations and some confederate institutions for all of Europe, or, as he put it, "the whole making a council of states and groups of states." But he added at once that the "glory of Europe" could not rise again without the "cordial and concerted agreement and direct participation of Britain, the United States and Russia."

Churchill's statement of March 1943 came closer than any other pronouncement by Allied statesmen to the formulation of a specific program for a new European order. But it was admittedly tentative, a study project rather than an accepted policy. The Prime Minister failed to arouse President Roosevelt's interest in any special European organization and, because of Stalin's opposition to the idea, understandably did not dare to press it further. American political thinking during the war tended to anticipate simply that Britain in due course would resume a dominant position in European affairs, particularly in the Mediterranean, but also in the rest of Europe. As a matter of fact, many American statesmen felt some apprehension that the British might became too demanding with regard to Russia and that the chief task of the United States in the postwar period would be to mediate between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt's attitude at Yalta clearly showed the impact of such ideas.

American policy vis-à-vis France followed a tortuous course, but this was due in part to the easy assumption that France, once liberated, would quickly recover internal cohesion and a significant posture in international affairs. In this belief, the United States insisted on making France a member of the group of Big Five powers. Because of Russian opposition France did not participate in the Potsdam Conference, but she was included in the Security Council of the United Nations, in the Council of Foreign Ministers entrusted with the preparation of the peace treaties, and in the Allied Control Council over Germany, which was to serve as the test tube of future West-East cooperation.

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In other words, American policy-makers gave no serious thought to European unification during the war, since they were confident that the various nations of Europe would revive after the defeat of Germany and be able to exist in relative independence if Germany was kept disarmed and demilitarized. They realized that the Eastern European states would have to accommodate themselves to some extent to their mighty eastern neighbor, while the Western European nations would require American support in varying measure. However, the tension between East and West that had been inherited from an unhappy past was to be warded off, not by defensive arrangements among the Western and the Western European nations, but by direct negotiations between the United States and the USSR. Britain and France, who were expected eventually to take over the guardianship of Western Europe, were to be full partners in the framing of a final peace settlement.

This pattern of a future world order that was accepted by American policy-thinking involved the rebirth of the old independent national states. Individually they were to join the new world-wide league, the United Nations, and the two major European powers, Britain and France, were to represent Europe on the new high councils of world governance, the UN Security Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers. Other global agencies, such as UNRRA, the International Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, were to be organized in a similar way.

It would be trite to dwell on the misreading of future Russian intentions which was implicit in these American concepts. The lack of any constructive long-range program with regard to Germany was equally serious. That this country, in spite of its utter defeat, was bound to remain one of the elemental factors of any European order, irrespective of the future development of Western-Russian relations, was learned only as American foreign policy and military government began to grapple with the administration of Germany and the rehabilitation of the rest of Europe. It would be difficult to define exactly the extent to which the policy of the United States in the post-hostilities

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period and immediate postwar years could have actively furthered the establishment of close European cooperation. But, certainly, United States policy in those years was not primarily guided by such an aim and undoubtedly contributed unwittingly to the renascence of many of the old forces upon which European nationalism had rested.

The rehabilitation of the European nations meant in American eyes not only the restoration of the individual state sovereignties but also the restitution of the prewar social order. Little attention was paid either to the social causes of the weakness of Europe in the 1930's or to the changed social climate of a Europe that had gone through the common experience of despoliation, famine, collaboration, and resistance under the Nazi heel. American policy favored certain cleansing operations, particularly the Fascist *epuria* in Italy and a very comprehensive denazification in Germany, but they were confined to the political field, were poorly conceived, and in any event were soon relaxed and finally scuttled. The melancholy history of these American efforts is perhaps most poignantly illustrated by the Krupp case, in which as a consequence of this transitory American policy the heir to the biggest industrial fortune in Germany rose within a few years from the state of a condemned and jailed war criminal to that of a major industrial and financial tycoon.

The United States was in no position to champion social revolution. On the other hand, she need not have appeared to frown upon drastic social reforms which were initiated by strong popular demand and accomplished through democratic procedures, as was true in Britain and, in a less ambitious manner, in most other Western European countries. American policymakers, unable to draw a clear distinction between Democratic Socialism and totalitarian Communism, were naturally worried by the participation of Communists in the popular-front governments of the post-hostilities period. They were preoccupied also with an understandable desire for rapid resumption of full production in order to permit an early termination of American financial assistance to Europe, an outcome that might have been delayed by elaborate social experiments. And from 1949 on, the

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urgent need for armaments made maximum production and strategic position even more exclusively the controlling objectives of American policy. The attitude toward other schools of democratic thought hardened, and the criteria of democracy and even of United Nations membership were practically disregarded where an overriding military interest seemed to exist, as in recent American-Spanish relations.

III

The growing awareness of the strength of the Soviet Union and of the inflexibility of Russian foreign policy, as well as of the difficulties involved in re-establishing the internal and external security of the Western European nations, brought on a new evolution of American policy. The Marshall Plan had been an attempt to strengthen the foundations of Europe's economy and social structure in such a way as to make her immune to internal subversion. After 1949 the United States proceeded to build up Europe's defenses within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Changes in the American occupation policy of Germany went hand in hand with the transformation of the general European policy of the United States. At the time of the Marshall Plan, American efforts had centered on the restoration of a healthy and self-supporting German economy as an essential part of a strong European economy. The Korean War of 1950 made it appear desirable to mobilize Western Germany for the military defense of the Continent, which necessitated the early restoration of sovereignty and full political partnership to the Federal Republic.

During this reorientation of American foreign policy over the last five or six years the creation of a European union or federation has become an ever more ardently sought-after goal of American policy. The idea of European unity appeals to American thinking. In simple analogy to the course of American history from relative separation in colonial days through confederate forms to a federal system, any rise to prosperity and self-sufficient power is viewed largely as the result of a federative process. America, therefore, can serve as a model for other

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nations and continents in this as in other respects—for example, in her peaceful blending of a variety of European racial elements into a happy and unified citizenship. The achievements of American democratic federalism are, indeed, a possession of which Americans can feel proud. It is, however, doubtful whether they can easily be repeated or even approximated by twentieth-century Europe.

The American political system came into existence in the preindustrial era when the scope of government activities was limited. For a long time, the new federal authority imposed relatively small burdens. The American colonies, though diversified in character, never had an individual existence as independent national states. Their political and cultural traditions were not dissimilar. Strong forces making for unity existed and were to act as the mold of a growing nation. On the other hand, the United States was born in an age that preceded nationalism in its modern belligerent form. American democratic faith was grounded in the universal principles of eighteenth-century philosophy. The power to amalgamate new and foreign masses was enhanced by the liberality of American political ideals. Unusual preconditions were thereby created to absorb into the existing trend of American life the thirty-four million Europeans who emigrated to the United States during the nineteenth century.

Still, the favorable setting would not have sufficed to bring about these results if there had not existed unusually great opportunities as well. As a matter of fact, the American federal system broke down in the Civil War, next to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 the bloodiest war fought between 1815 and 1914. It can be argued that this war was not as inevitable as it seemed to its contemporaries, but there can be no question that the ultimate formation of the modern American nation took place only in the age of the industrial revolution after the Civil War. The American federal system proved its worth as a powerful and adaptable force of integration, but it did so mainly by demonstrating its capacity for successful management of the grandiose opportunities that the settlement and exploitation of a vast and virgin continent offered. The historic task could be

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solved only by the attraction of immigrants and by the availability of capital for investment and development. The mass of immigrants, most of whom were poor and downtrodden, brought little beyond their personal ability to the western shores, but simultaneously European capital flowed freely to America and made the building of a new nation possible.

To ascribe the growth of the modern American nation and its power to the federal system of the original colonies is an unwarranted simplification of very complex events. Unique natural opportunities, historical preconditions, and national and international historical circumstances combined to produce the unification of the United States. It is consequently misleading to set the American experience up as a model that could be followed easily by the European nations, who have had more than a thousand years not only of continuous interrelation and even far-reaching cultural unity, but of political division as well. Moreover, Europe has never formed a clear-cut geographical unit. No sharp lines separate Europe from the Near East or Russia, and Europeans have gone to other continents and called new Western nations into being. The reasons for the dissipation of a unified European strength over the centuries are too manifold to be listed. Suffice it to say that Europe's national diversity was for ages a sign not only of the weakness but also of the strength of her civilization. An historical analysis based solely on political factors would be inadequate, and to assign special responsibility for the division of Europe to one or the other nation, as is frequently done in America, would be even more misleading. "England," John Foster Dulles, for example, wrote in 1950, "made it her policy to keep the Continent divided so that she could be the balance of power."[3] Apparently Mr. Dulles did not deplore the fact that Britain thwarted the "forcible unification efforts" of Napoleon, William II, and Hitler, but only that the defeat of these attempts at forcible unification was never followed by earnest endeavors to create European unity peacefully. And the lack of European unity, Mr. Dulles argued, has been a continuous temptation to willful men to

[3] John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1950, p. 214.

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unite the Continent by violent means, as is the case again today with the Soviet Union's drive for the conquest of all of Europe.

Yet it is difficult to visualize how British persuasion could have brought together in a single fold the conservative regimes of Central and East Europe and the liberal West in the course of the nineteenth century. Britain did not create the national and social conflicts on the Continent. So far as her policy was actually directed by balance-of-power concepts, which was not always the case, it was throughout the century chiefly concerned with gaining sufficient power to offset Russia's influence in Europe and her expansion in the Middle East. Not until the turn of the century did the German threat begin to dominate the actions of British diplomacy. In certain respects, present-day American foreign policy can be judged as having assumed the task of balancing the power of an expanding Russia that Britain performed during the last century. It is a new role, this deep involvement in European affairs, for a nation who could not have achieved her independence and enjoyed an existence undisturbed for more than a full century had it not been for the political disunity of Europe.

IV

No facile parallels and easy lessons can be drawn from a comparison of the histories of Europe and America. The effort to do so could even blur our analysis of the situation that we are called upon to resolve. Novel forces have made their appearance in our world, which at least in a strategic sense has become a single world, although it is at the same time rent asunder by the most intense conflicts. Undoubtedly, considerations of greatest historic import compel us to take the problem of the regrouping of states very seriously. With regard to Europe, the issue was first raised on the economic level with the conception and administration of the Marshall Plan. American funds could not be used for developing simultaneously in various countries industries which would compete for the same small market, nor could dollar aid be employed where European resources were available. Some highly constructive agencies, such as the Organization for

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European Economic Cooperation, established in 1948, and the European Payment Union of 1950, have sprung from the Marshall Plan and have proved of great effectiveness in the development of national and inter-European economic life.[4] But if now, after the Marshall Plan operations have been brought to a successful conclusion, we look into the future even beyond the present rearmament phase, we must assume that Europe's ultimate goal should be the doubling of her 1938 production. In view of the growing economy of the Soviet empire, the achievement of a target close to such a figure is probably needed to assure Europe's internal and external security. This undoubtedly requires in due course the creation of a single market, a reasonable coordination of investment activities, and the development of outside markets and sources of raw materials. What exactly is demanded for these purposes in the way of inter-European organization beyond OEEC and EPU remains debatable, the more so since the task is obviously one transcending European boundaries, however one may define them.

The second major consideration that speaks for the regrouping of states and nations in our age was well expressed by General Eisenhower in his first annual report as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. "The concept of the maintenance of national military forces by states of small geographical extent has already become outdated. The logic of larger groups and association is becoming increasingly impelling." The statement is irrefutable, but its continuation is equally valid: ". . . the resultant task is to reconcile the demands for association into larger groupings with the deep and spiritual ties to nationhood and sovereignty."[5] The form that such larger association and higher loyalty might take remains undefined. As a matter of fact, Gen-

[4] On the economic development of Europe, cf. Howard S. Ellis, *The Economics of Freedom: The Progress and Future of Aid to Europe*, New York, 1950; William Diebold, *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, New York, 1952; Robert Triffin, *Monetary Reconstruction in Europe*, New York, 1952 (*International Conciliation*, No. 482); United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, Geneva, 1953 (UN Publication 1953.II.E.4).

[5] *First Annual Report to the Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Paris, April 2, 1952.

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eral Eisenhower was speaking then about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rather than about Europe.

Great uncertainty has existed, and continues to exist, with regard to the geographical dimensions of the many federative schemes for Europe. Broadly speaking, three major groups of federative agencies can be distinguished: (1) The organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, comprising all the continental Western European states with the exception of Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and Spain.[6] To the continental, are allied the "sea-borne" states, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and Iceland, and also the Near Eastern countries of Greece and Turkey. (2) The wider European coalition which stems from the Marshall Plan organizations and the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Here the United States and Canada are not official members, while Austria and Germany are. (3) The smaller European association, often called "Little Europe," that comprises France, Italy, Germany, and the three Benelux countries. Its chief organization is the Schuman Plan organization, the Coal and Steel Community (CSC), and the projected European Defense Community (EDC). There are also under consideration a transportation pool, a health community, and a customs union.[7]

Some confusion can be noticed in American expectations about European integration, particularly with regard to the avenues along which it is supposed to advance. All evidence seems to indicate that the prevailing sentiment in the United States precludes for the time being further implementation of NATO. There is no serious desire for withdrawal from the organization, but much hope that American financial contributions to NATO can be drastically curbed, once the initial rearmament has been accomplished, and also that American forces stationed in Europe can be diminished in the not too distant future. The further integration of the European states is considered the best means

[6] Through the Balkan pact of February 28, 1953, between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, the latter state has been indirectly tied to NATO. An agreement between the US government and Spain on naval bases has also brought Spain closer to NATO.

[7] Some of these organizations are discussed by John Goormaghtigh, *European Integration*, New York, 1953 (*International Conciliation*, No. 488).

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of insuring such a result at an early moment. It has been said that, among our Congressional lawmakers at least, pressure for European integration has grown at the same pace as the endeavor to limit American foreign commitments and protect the sovereignty of the nation.[8]

American efforts for the promotion of a closer union of Europe, therefore, have centered around "Greater" and "Little" Europe. A strong inclination has been shown to cajole and push Britain into a European union of some sort. In June 1952 General Eisenhower tried in a speech in London to arouse British enthusiasm for active participation in European unification. But British foreign policy was not swayed by this notable attempt or by others less notable.

On January 22, 1948, Ernest Bevin made an important policy statement in the House of Commons that was announced as representing the result of a fundamental re-examination of British policy vis-à-vis Europe. This speech of the late Foreign Secretary was most warmly applauded by both front and opposition benches and was, indeed, well received by the majority of the British people. Bevin contended that British foreign policy since the war had been built around three principles: opposition to the domination of Europe by a single power, rejection of balance-of-power concepts, and establishment of cooperation among the Big Four powers, who were to support the free development of all the individual small nations. Events since 1945 had proved that four-power cooperation had broken down and with the extension of absolute Russian control over the Eastern European states the time had arrived when the free nations of Western Europe should draw together. Bevin demanded "a consolidation of Western Europe."

[8] Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1951*, New York, 1952, p. 360. The preamble of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 stated that one of its purposes was "to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe."—In November 1951 a delegation of both houses of Congress held discussions with members of the European Consultative Assembly. Cf. *Conference of Strasbourg Between Delegations of the United States of America and of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe*, Official Record of Debates, Strasbourg, November 19-23, 1951 (issued by the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe); and *The Union of Europe: Its Progress, Problems, Prospects, and Place in the Western World*, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Senate, Document No. 90, Washington, D.C., 1952,

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What was meant by this formula was not exactly clear. Bevin said that any Western union "must primarily be a fusion derived from the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand. . . . It is more of a brotherhood and less of a rigid system." The new British policy led immediately to the Brussels pact of March 17, 1948, between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. The fifty-year treaty stressed again the general defense of the "common heritage" of democracy, personal freedom, and political liberty. It also envisaged coordination of economic policies and closer cultural interchange, but was essentially concerned with mutual military aid in case of an armed attack in Europe. But even in this respect the Brussels pact, which was heartily welcomed by Washington, was a declaration rather than a practical achievement, since the five nations had little military power at their disposal, in terms of either mobilized manpower or industrial war production. The "Western Union" of the Brussels pact served altogether only as a preparatory move toward NATO.

Moreover, British policy since 1948 has avoided taking any steps in the European movement that would lead from mere confederation to actual federation. Its thesis has been that federation would become possible only by a slow process of creating, step by step, common organs for individual functions of communal administration. But, even assuming that such organs would accumulate fast, for which no evidence exists, they are all conceived as technical agencies which would remain dependent for all major political direction upon the unanimous consent of the sovereign governments. The advance made during World War II in merging the governmental activities of two or more nations was something without historical precedent in coalition warfare. Even so, the "Combined" boards created by the United States and Great Britain, in some cases together with Canada, were executive agencies operating under directives of sovereign governments which had harmonized their policies in the fields entrusted to these organs. Under the Brussels pact these valuable experiences of World War II were revived for European cooperation, and the important agencies of the West-

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ern Union were soon thereafter absorbed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The last event is, at least for the purposes of our present argument, less important than the general British attitude toward European integration. Britain has been willing to establish confederate institutions for concrete functions on which a free agreement among European governments can be reached. Yet she has shown herself firmly opposed to the creation of a European union or United States of Europe. This decision was most forcefully expressed in May 1950 in a statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party[9] that was accepted in substance by all the British parties: "The European peoples do not want a supra-national authority to impose agreements. They need an international machinery to carry out agreements which are reached without compulsion." The British government under Winston Churchill, as much as under Clement Attlee, has resisted all attempts to transform the Strasbourg Council of Europe from a forum of debate into a federal council with the authority to formulate policy. Britain has also refused to join as a full member in those agencies of Little Europe which, like the Coal and Steel Community or the projected European Defense Community, are endowed with supra-national authority.

Behind British policy there is in the first place the conviction that British ties with the Commonwealth and the colonies are closer than those with the Continent. Nobody has forgotten the events of 1940 and the fact that Britain survived because she could fall back on the support of her empire. British commerce and the sources of her main raw materials are chiefly with non-European countries. Britain's position as the leader of the sterling bloc is a continuous reminder of the world-wide interests of England, and prompts her demand for the solution of the

[9] *European Unity. A Statement by the National Executive Committee of the British Labour Party*, published by the Labour Party, Transport House, London, 1950. A discussion of the attitudes of the two British parties toward European integration is contained in "The Socialist Parties and European Unity: A British Labour Party View," *The World To-day*, VI (October 1950), pp. 415-23; and "European Unity: A Conservative Party View," *ibid.*, VII (January 1951), pp. 21-30.

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basic problems of European defense and economy within a wider framework of international cooperation. Furthermore, Britain is not prepared to participate in a federation of which the United States would not also become a partner.

With Britain firmly set against a "Greater Europe" federation, Little Europe is left as the only area in which European integration can possibly proceed from mere association to federation. In the establishment of Monnet's CSC, the Schuman Plan organization, the most important single step toward the creation of a supra-national authority has been taken. An estimate of what the French call the "integrationist" potentialities of CSC is not easily formed. The opinion is widespread that the merger of directive powers over a vital segment of the industries of six nations will prove contagious to other industries. But experience in this regard is lacking. In a period of excessive supply of coal and steel the other industries would set the tune, and the CSC could act like a cartel to limit output and preserve high prices. In order to avoid such a development and keep CSC a constructive force, it will be necessary to adopt a policy of steadily expanding the European economy. But, as has already been said, this requires the cooperation not only of Britain and the sterling bloc but also of the United States. The creation of some federal institutions in Europe cannot be considered an ideal in itself if it is not made an integral part of a more comprehensive plan for the solution of the world's present ills.

The same interrelation of closer and wider association appears in the projected European Defense Community. As of the early summer of 1953, it is uncertain whether or not the EDC treaties will be ratified. Apparently we must expect much delay before their final acceptance. If they should fall through, even more precious time would be lost, after which a separate German army would have to be called into being under NATO. But whatever the course of events, it is even now quite clear that the problem of a European six-nation army cannot be separated from the defensive needs of a wider Europe or even of the whole Western world. The plan for a joint European army was originally conceived by M. Monnet as a means of making the idea of

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German rearmament, which was suddenly and somewhat clumsily pressed by the United States in September 1950, more palatable to the French. As the CSC was to bring the hard core of Germany's industrial war-potential into a common European trust, so military controls were to be internationalized through EDC, preferably to the accompaniment of distinct limitations upon the growth of German military power. But the original French plan presented by Defense Minister Pleven in October 1950 underwent many changes before it was finally embodied in the EDC treaty that was signed in May 1952. All the alterations tended to strengthen Germany's role in the European army.

Ever since, France has shown great reluctance to proceed with the ratification of the EDC treaty. French hesitation has had many causes, some of which point to the general difficulties of a European union at the present moment. One of them is the instability of French democracy combined with the lack of popular confidence in the future value of German assurances of peaceful intentions, a combination that raises endless obstacles in the way of a foreign policy looking toward the acceptance of Germany in a European community. Recent demonstrations of German sentiment have not helped to allay French fears about a resurrection of nationalism and militarism on the other side of the Rhine; and these, together with the weakening of the political center in France, have given the critics of the EDC fresh strength. France is gravely concerned lest the creation of German divisions and a supporting air force within a European army lead to German predominance within the six-nation organization. The EDC treaty would give France the right to veto the building of German forces beyond the level of her own contribution to the European army, but France is not convinced that she could by herself prevail in such a ruling against a refractory Germany. Moreover, France has to police a colonial empire and to fight a costly Asiatic war that absorbs a disproportionately large amount of her military and financial resources, which thereby become unavailable in Europe.

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French governments have been trying to persuade Britain to join the EDC or, short of this, to strengthen the ties between French and British military forces on the Continent. They have also demanded greater freedom in the sovereign use of the French contingents of a European army for service in French overseas territories. Finally, French ministers are anxious to gain greater American assistance for the war in Indo-China. Disregarding here all the diplomatic and parliamentary maneuvering that beclouds the scene, the accession of Britain to the EDC appears as an entirely unrealistic hope. It is even difficult to see what Britain could promise France in terms of an alliance beyond what is contained in the Dunkirk treaty of 1947, the Brussels pact of 1948, and the NATO treaty of 1949. Still, since Britain intends to cooperate closely with France in Europe and shares some of her misgivings about the possible dangers of the internal German situation, another formula of support could be found. There is also some leeway left for interpreting the EDC treaty in such a way as to give France a freer hand in the defense of her overseas territories.

But, obviously, if France reserves her authority over her units in the European army in too exclusive a manner, the intended supra-national European authority would become nothing but a device for the unilateral control of Germany. Yet, even short of this breaking point, it must be expected that the more the national character of the French component is emphasized, the more the German group will assume the character of a German army. It will be up to France to decide how far she will go in this respect. But whatever her decision may be regarding the EDC, her over-all military needs cannot be met by the creation of a federal European army as such. They call rather for simultaneous cooperation in a wider coalition like NATO or, so far as Indo-China is concerned, in a global defense system of the free world.

In German perspective, the situation appears in a similar light. If a European army comes into being and German forces are raised for service, Germany cannot be excluded for very long

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from NATO.[10] NATO makes all the major decisions on the financing, arming, supply, and strategy of the Western defense forces. The German Federal Republic will undoubtedly demand guarantees that her own troops will not be used exclusively as a reservoir of manpower for the Western armies, but will be employed to protect from the earliest possible moment West German lands against the Russians, who are poised twenty-eight miles from Hamburg and ninety miles from Mainz. Strategic logic will make such German claims almost irresistible. Apart from the demand for manpower, the strongest argument in favor of German rearmament lies in the fact that no effective defense of Western Europe can be erected along static lines, whether they be the Meuse, Rhine, Weser, or Elbe rivers. What is required more than anything else is depth of space for the kind of mobile military maneuver that only an active membership of Germany in the Western alliance can provide.

The problems of German rearmament are exceedingly complex and thornier than is indicated here, where they are being judged only under the aspect of European integration. But the conclusion seems inescapable that the projected European army, if it comes to life, will be nothing final in form and character. Its future will be largely determined by forces and events in a wider sphere of international association. Any expectation that the creation of federal institutions will relieve American foreign policy of an active and intimate participation in European affairs is entirely fallacious. Whatever plan is adopted to strengthen inter-European unity, it can become truly significant only to the extent that the European movement is backed by the evolution of a common policy in the West. Only in such a setting will the European peoples gain the feeling that by fresh association and regrouping they can achieve full security and a new era of expansion of economic productivity comparable to the industrial revolution in nineteenth-century Europe or, for that matter, to the accelerating economic growth of the Soviet

[10] This is also the opinion of the "Chatham House Study Group" that presented the valuable report, *Atlantic Alliance: NATO's Role in the Free World*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1952.

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Union and its orbit.[11] Such a hopeful sentiment could engender popular loyalties to supra-national ideals and make the old faith in nations wither.

V

Paradoxically enough, one could call the United States today the biggest of all the European powers. The six American divisions in Germany, Austria, and Trieste constitute the largest mobile Western force deployed on the Continent. The US Sixth Fleet is the strongest concentration of armed strength in European waters, as the US air forces are in the European sky. In addition, each of these arms could be equipped with ready atomic weapons on short notice. Whatever military safety Western Europe possesses at the present moment and in the near future rests very largely on the United States. Since 1945, the United States has also invested $29 billion in the economic recovery and social stability of Europe. The absentee power from the other side of the Atlantic is omnipresent in every aspect of European life. Small wonder that this unnatural situation has produced great tensions. The belief that these strains can be overcome merely by better public relations work is hardly justified.

Unquestionably, there exists a dire need for an active American information service, and what has been done in this respect so far could stand considerable improvement. The overwhelming mass of Europeans hold a strange image of the United States, and greater knowledge and understanding of American matters would be mutually beneficial. Up to now, American propaganda activities have placed emphasis upon quantity instead of quality. But the most serious cause of the vagaries and ineffectiveness of American public affairs activities lies in misapprehension of the function of propaganda. Propaganda can be successful only if directed by a clear national policy and coordinated in its execution with other acts and operations of the government.

[11] The secretariat of the Economic Commission for Europe in its study of the post-war economic development of Europe (*Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, p. 50) concludes: "There are indications that if the present rates of expansion are maintained, by the end of this decade production and consumption of major industrial raw materials in the Soviet Union will be equal or superior to that in the seven most industrialized countries of western Europe" (i.e., "Little Europe" plus Great Britain).

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Europeans entertain many suspicions about American foreign policy and no attempt will be made here to examine their objective validity. Obviously, they are often distortions, and practically always expressions of confusion; certainly they contain little evidence of a charitable attitude of mind. What arouses fear among Europeans is the volatile character of American policy, which interferes with the easy growth of a strong and steady confidence. The struggle of American domestic forces, which seems rather enigmatic to Europeans, in their opinion injects a note of capriciousness into United States foreign policy. Every major step in international affairs taken by the United States during the past forty years is depicted as having been a forced reaction to a threat posed by another power, first by the Germany of William II, then by the Axis powers, recently by the Soviets. In each case, most Europeans would be inclined to argue, Americans did not display any particular prevision and then reacted to the challenge with an emotional fervor that disregarded realistic politics.

The general wisdom of American foreign policy and its capacity for a long-sustained cooperative effort are continually questioned by Europeans. Few Europeans entertain serious doubts that the United States is capable of great altruism. It is the lack of rationality and continuity in United States policy that is disconcerting to the Europeans, and certain events are apt to aggravate Europe's concern about America's intentions and capacities. The expectations that the United States cherished during the war as to relations between the West and the Soviet Union were actually shared by most European allies. Nevertheless, the sudden and radical change of American sentiment, though not without parallels in Europe, appeared extravagant and lacking in regard for the situation of the European states. They felt that defense against Communism was as much an internal social problem as an external military one, and that consequently definite limits should be placed upon the diversion of national income to armaments. Uneasiness was also caused by the switch that the United States demanded from her European allies in their relationships with Germany, which a little while

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before had been called the foremost enemy of all the national and civil liberties of Europe.

Probably even greater anxiety has been produced by the vehement character of American declarations against the Soviet Union. Even those who agree with the reorientation of American policy are frightened by the violent expressions of American hostility, for in the present state of military imbalance Russian conquest of the Continent is entirely possible, and probably only the charred ruins of the historic Europe could ever be liberated. American policy and attitude have appeared wittingly or unwittingly to ride roughshod over vital European interests and sentiments. At their worst, they have seemed to treat the Western European nations as expendable pawns in an American-Soviet feud carried on over the heads of all other nations. The sense of partnership in the Western world has been offended and neutralism strengthened.

Neutralism outside of the Communist Party has in all probability somewhat receded, but strong reservations about the domineering influence of the United States on the international and domestic policies of the European states have hardly subsided. The movement toward European integration, so far as it has popular support in Europe, has derived some of its momentum from the desire to protect what are considered the supreme moral and cultural values of Europe in contrast to those of America. Americans often make hasty and ill-considered references to the atheism of the old Europe. But to many Europeans America, with her devotion to dollar-hunting, worldly comforts, and simultaneous serfdom to a soulless technology, is the incarnation of materialism. They would argue that America has certain liberties, but that these are blunted by the standardization of all forms of expression and by the relentless power of an organized mass opinion that silences the voice of the individual. The conclusion drawn is that there may be democracy in America, but not of the liberal type that would create a climate of true individualism. America is not totalitarian, it is felt, but she is swayed by passions which reveal that she is not as different from Russia as she declares herself to be.

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Gabriel Marcel, one of the most eminent living French philosophers, recently echoed this opinion, widely held in Europe, in the following remark: "Even if in the present conflict we have to place ourselves on the side of the United States . . . still that does not authorize us to say in a simple and straightforward way that the United States is the champion of Christian civilization; for after all, from many points of view, the 'way of life' practised across the Atlantic is very far from conformity to the demands of the Gospels. All that one can say . . . is that on the American side freedom, in spite of everything, does retain opportunities which in the other camp, for an indefinite period, appear to be completely lost."[12]

What is characteristic of the European attitude toward American civilization in this statement of a Catholic thinker is not the implied protest against a facile identification of the American and Christian way, which might equally well have come from an American Christian, but the belief that America and Russia are only relatively different and that both pose a threat to the past heritage and present aspirations of Europe. The cold and frequently hostile criticism of America expressed by educated Europeans cannot be examined here for whatever elements of truth it may contain. Yet it is relevant to our discussion of policy that this critical attitude is most pronounced among European intellectuals. When they throw up their hands in despair over the outpourings of the mass media of American publicity, they are as a rule blithely forgetful that the greater sophistication which Europeans have achieved in some fields of cultural endeavor has been the result of keeping higher education the privilege of relatively small groups. The deep cleavages between educated people and the masses, as well as many of the other religious and political divisions of Europe, are closely connected with this aspect of the history of European education. As a matter of fact, the masses in Europe show no squeamishness about desiring many of the fruits of American civilization. Their fears about American policy stem, as we shall see later, from other sources.

[12] Gabriel Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society*, Chicago, 1953.

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The anti-Americanism of the educated classes in Europe can be overcome not by propaganda, but only by a recurrent meeting of the best minds on both sides of the Atlantic. In such conversation the United States will gain as greatly as Europe. Indeed, American foreign policy even now should declare clearly that one of its interests in a free Europe lies in the preservation of the kind of discussion and mutual criticism beyond national boundaries that will strengthen all those bent on cultural advancement. In the process it would become evident that, as in the military, political, and economic spheres, so in the cultural sphere Europe cannot maintain itself as an autarchic continent.

So far as European resentment against America at present spurs efforts for greater European unity, it does not have to frighten us. Anything that lowers the parochial barriers within Europe, some of which are higher than those between Europe and America, must be welcomed. What should remain a concern of American policy is that anti-American feeling in Europe might lead to a lukewarm position on the part of important groups whose active cooperation is needed in the East-West struggle. An increase in Communist sympathies is not imminent among European intellectuals, but their passivity and indifference could be the source of considerable danger.

The contemplation of cultural affairs immediately leads to an appreciation of the imperative need for a close study of the social scene of Europe. American foreign policy in Europe has concentrated on the rise of production and in recent years on armaments. It has shown comparatively little interest in the internal social reforms of the European countries. American foreign aid and occupation administrators have naturally been in close contact with the social problems of Europe and championed certain changes. But wherever the latter seemed to interfere with the rapid restoration of production, a conservative line has been taken. Within limits, this course of action or lack of action, though not necessarily the wisest, may have been inevitable.

Still, American foreign policy has thereby become suspect in the eyes of the democratic labor movement of Europe and has

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had to rely for practical support chiefly on the center and right-of-center groups among the European parties. It may be driven to move even further to the right if the center groups are weakening, as has happened already in France and Italy. Germany presents a somewhat different picture. "Neo-Nazism" is no immediate threat, though it should be watched. At this moment, the transformation of the Free Democrats, the second largest party in Chancellor Adenauer's coalition, into a nationalist party deserves most attention. If Mr. Adenauer's own party, the Christian Democrats, should lose strength in the coming election, the pull toward the right in the present German government could become rather pronounced. On the other hand, the German Social Democratic party will remain a powerful force. It is not likely ever to win a full majority by itself, but there is always the possibility that it will again become the largest German party, as it was from 1912 to 1932.

Democratic socialism is strongest in the Scandinavian countries, where it is firmly entrenched in government, as it is in Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Austria. Wherever it has got real strength, the Communist movement has become enfeebled. The democratic labor movement in Europe has proved itself so far the most powerful opponent of Communism, particularly among the industrial workers' class. The Cominform accordingly regards the Social Democrats as its worst enemies. It is a serious matter that Americans adopt a reserved attitude toward the European labor movement, while European Social Democrats show great distrust of American foreign policy.

Americans find it difficult to understand European socialism. In the United States the labor movement has concentrated on the abolition of those conditions which withheld from workers a fair share in the profits of economic progress. Its struggle, begun under a democratic political system and favored by the opportunities of a rapidly growing economy, has centered on the economic position of workers and has been generally conducted in a reformist spirit. The European labor movement, by contrast, arose on a continent where the industrial revolution undermined feudalism, but where the new bourgeoisie,

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sometimes alone, as in England, sometimes in alliance with the old feudal classes, as in Germany, continued many of the inegalitarian practices of the former society. Property, in particular, became the prerequisite of education and political power, while the latter in turn were used to shield economic privilege. These historical circumstances go far to explain why the European labor movement became a political movement and also was not contented like American labor with restrictions on the economic use of property, but viewed private property as the corrupting evil of society, to be abolished altogether by any means.[13]

The democratic labor movement of Europe outgrew its revolutionary mood long ago, but has retained some of its socialistic aims. The general practice of European labor is otherwise hardly distinguishable from that of the American social movement. The promotion of general welfare, social security, and a wider distribution of income has produced greater results in America than in Europe. "In its social and economic policy Western Europe as a whole would stand to the right of the U.S.A., not between America and Russia," said the official declaration of the British Labour Party in 1950. Ever since 1931, America has pursued more advanced social policies than most of the European countries.[14]

Turning to the remaining socialistic ideals of the European labor movement, one may doubt whether their realization would change the existing economic system in a fundamental way. The nationalization of certain key industries, as accomplished by the Labour government in England after 1945, or the drive of the German Social Democrats for "co-determination," i.e., equal partnership of entrepreneurs and workers in the management of industries, would leave these economies essentially "free-market economies." The real situation is at present somewhat confused by governmental controls, which seem "socialistic" but are the

[13] Cf. Adolf F. Sturmthal, "Workers' Control: Freedom and Authority in the Plant," *Freedom and Authority in Our Time*, ed. by L. Bryson, L. Finkelstein, R. M. McIver, R. McKeon, New York, 1953, pp. 53ff.; and idem, "Democratic Socialism in Europe," *World Politics*, III (October 1950), pp. 88ff.

[14] See note 9 above. Cf. also the discussion of the wider ramifications of the problems involved by Klaus Knorr, "The European Welfare State in the Atlantic System," *World Politics*, III (July 1951), pp. 417ff.

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result of actual economic shortages. These policies have little to do with socialism and, incidentally, can be used for very unsocial purposes. "France to-day," wrote the liberal *Manchester Guardian* in December 1951,[15] "like most western 'liberal' societies, is that contradiction in aims—a controlled economy run for the benefit mainly of the independent employers, peasants, or businessmen at the salaried consumers' expense."

Yet European democratic socialism, even where it has realized most of its aims, as in Britain, finds itself in a bewildered state. Socialistic measures—and the word "socialism" is used here in a strictly literal sense—have shown some effectiveness in prohibiting the exploitation of positions of economic power by European capitalists for anti-democratic and anti-social ends. But nationalization of industries has not yielded the main fruit which nineteenth-century socialism expected as a result of the establishment of common ownership, the proud consciousness of human freedom. Nationalization means to the individual worker but the replacement of one board of managers by another. It does not change the nature and circumstances of his job or his attitude toward work. Nowhere has workers' output risen as a result of the introduction of new property relationships. Obviously, the European democratic labor movement is confronted with the necessity of adjusting its ideological and moral foundation to its modern experiences.

American policy-makers must never lose sight of the different social history and present social structure of the two continents. But, remembering the American experience, they should view the class-struggle of Europe objectively and not be deceived by the glib talk about free enterprise used by European employers or by the socialist vocabulary of European labor. Neither language is an adequate expression of the real intentions of their policies. There can be no question that the European democratic labor movement could be wrecked. It carries the brunt of the furious battle with Russian Communism and could not survive for long if American democratic sympathies were entirely lost. However, the disintegration of the European labor movement would not strengthen the political center-groups, but would

[15] *Manchester Guardian* (weekly edition), December 13, 1951.

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swell the ranks of the Communists and, in reverse, spark Fascist trends on the right. A sound policy for building Western democracy cannot afford to waste the accumulated strength of democratic labor in Europe.

The issue has a direct bearing on European integration. In a European union, democratic socialism would become for any foreseeable future a minority between a Communist party and strong center and rightist groups. Even in a coalition with the center its bargaining power would be limited, since the center could always threaten to go to the right. The position of the Social Democrats would be further weakened because their supporters would have to carry the main burden of the lower standard of living that would follow, at the very least in the initial period, from the merger with countries of small productivity and overpopulation. The opposition of labor to a European union, particularly in Little Europe, would become less antagonistic if it could be demonstrated that the relatively high welfare of the industrially advanced nations would not be impaired in the long run by integration. But this would depend on the development of economic programs which, as we have already seen, must be more than European in authorship and execution.

The achievement of substantial progress toward closer European integration is possible only within the framework of a constructive and active policy aimed at intimate cooperation of all democratic nations. Once that occurs, we may also hope to develop the strong democratic basis for a European movement that has not appeared up to the present time. It may be true that some of the opposition to European integration is not as uncompromising as it pretends to be, but on the other hand no popular enthusiasm is discernible even in those groups whose leaders are committed to the creation of a United Europe. In such a tepid atmosphere statesmen have had to move with great caution. They have succeeded in establishing a large number of useful functional or sectional common agencies, but they have come nowhere near to a United Europe.

The dour de Gaulle has spoken sneeringly of that "imbroglio of pools," and there is danger that the plain citizens of the

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European countries may not see the wood of unity for the trees of alphabetical letter-agencies. Their loyalties cannot be lured away from the customary national governments to novel institutions which savor of impersonal technocracy. A consolidation of the commissions and organizations into a single European structure, such as is now being undertaken by the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, will make possible the focusing of popular attention on the whole movement and offer it for democratic debate. The European constitution that is likely to find the support of a majority of governments and peoples at the present moment will have to recognize that Greater Europe can be joined only in a coalition, for which the name of a European Confederation may be somewhat presumptuous. Even the organization of the smaller circle, Little Europe, within such a confederation will have to assume largely "confederate" forms, though, as in CSC and the projected EDC, the beginnings of supra-national authorities can be made.[16] Beyond this stage, European integration must be advanced by a democratic rally of the European nations themselves.

The United States will naturally continue to play a powerful role in the future development of Europe. The circumstances and exigencies of the present world situation allow no other course. No doubt America has every right to expect from Europe a full contribution to the defense of the free world. But a United States of Europe is still only a dream, and even a European federation could be realized in the near future only by disregarding both the practical and moral realities of a continent that is also tied to a greater world. It would be unwise for America to take European integration as an isolated ideal whose outward achievement could by itself create a new spirit and add new strength to the free world. Actually, American foreign policy can carry forward the cause of European integration beyond a preparatory state only to the extent to which it solves the fundamental problems of the free world.

[16] Cf. *Ad hoc* Assembly Instructed to Work out a Draft Treaty Setting up a European Political Community, *Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community, Information and Official Documents of the Constitutional Committee, October 1952-April 1953*, published by the Secretariat of the Constitutional Committee, Paris, 1953.

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STRUGGLE VS. HARMONY:
Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China*

By ARTHUR F. WRIGHT

TRADITIONAL China was characterized by a remarkable homogeneity of mores, institutions, and values. In this it resembled the simpler societies in which, as MacIver has pointed out, the institutions are in broad accord with the mores, and one system of values prevails, being reaffirmed in every aspect of life. During the past hundred years, China's perdurable synthesis of doctrines and institutions has been slowly but certainly undermined. While the impact of the Western powers and Western technology forced the modification of Chinese institutions, the subtle penetration of Western ideas altered or destroyed every long-accepted value. The past century of China's history can be seen as a continuous struggle to regain its ancient homogeneity. That century is marked by repeated attempts to create groups of modified institutions to meet the challenge of Western power, together with groups of modified values which, it was hoped, would support the new institutions and check the spread of divisive Western ideas. These efforts failed, and with each failure more and more traditional institutions and values were abandoned as incapable of existing in amalgam with Western elements. In this process, different social groups reacted differently to the persisting appeal of the old and the attraction of the new and, in so reacting, further undermined the old synthesis of values and institutions.

Chinese Communists, in their bid for power, played upon Chinese longings for a community-wide synthesis of values and institutions; they suggested that Marxism-Leninism alone offered a basis on which such a synthesis could be created. They reinforced this appeal by claiming for a Communist order the

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same universality that Chinese had for centuries claimed for their Confucian synthesis of institutions and values. Yet for a Chinese to respond to these appeals meant the rejection of every time-honored value of Chinese society and the institutions with which they were associated. The Chinese Communist consolidation of power has brought with it the overthrow of the traditional social order centering on the family; it has brought a large-scale redistribution of status, a large number of new institutions both social and governmental. To justify and sanction this complex of radical innovations, the Communists have simultaneously attacked older values and the survivals of older institutions and have sought to inculcate new values which will support the new system.

It may throw some light on this process to consider the Communist effort to replace a value that was central to China's traditional order—Harmony—with a value that is essential to all Communist systems—Struggle. I shall deal first with the traditional value as a tenet of Confucian faith and as an ingredient of various attempted ideological syntheses in pre-Communist China. I shall then attempt to analyze the value of struggle as it is propounded in Chinese Communist writings, showing the various ways in which it is rationalized and promoted as a new, central, social and political value.

Obviously, we cannot isolate either of these competing values or their symbols from the context of symbolized values of which they are each a part. Thus, for example, the traditional value of harmony is expressed in various behavioral norms—care for "face," reliance on a sense of humor, esteem for compromise as a means of resolving conflicts of interests, etc. Struggle, on the other hand, must be understood in the context of Marxist-Leninist attitudes and thought. It is inseparably bound up with the idea of class status and class struggle; it is essential to a dialectical view of human history and human affairs; it is closely related to the messianic vision of the Communist, who sees himself as fighting a war for the liberation of mankind.

A classic statement of the value of harmony is found in the

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Confucian canonical treatise, *The Doctrine of the Mean*. This statement has been called "a summary of the Confucian doctrine," and its words have been graven on the minds and hearts of educated Chinese for many centuries:

> While there are not stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of EQUILIBRIUM. When these feelings have been stirred and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of HARMONY. This EQUILIBRIUM is the great root [from which grow all the human actions] in the world, and this HARMONY is the universal path [which they all should pursue]. Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish.[1]

Note that in this statement harmony (*ho*) and equilibrium (*chung*) are regarded as the great norms of both the natural and the human worlds. Nature, in Chinese thought, was not an environment which man forcibly subdued, but an organism of whose governing principle man should become aware so that he might live in harmony with it. No Chinese artist or writer could share or even comprehend the pre-Romantic Western antipathy to nature; they would have been astounded at the view, expressed as late as the eighteenth century, that mountains were "effroyables, païennes, diaboliques."[2] Nature was seen as animated by a harmonious and harmonizing energy; man could learn from nature not only how to live serenely with nature but also how to live in harmony with himself and his fellow men.

For the individual, a harmonious adjustment to social mores and institutions was held to be the ultimate in self-cultivation, and, at the same time, a contribution to the goal of a harmonious society.

> No lure is greater than to possess what others want,
> No disaster greater than not to be content with what one has,
> No presage of evil greater than that men should be wanting to get more.
> Truly: "He who has once known the contentment that comes simply through being content, will never again be otherwise than contented."[3]

[1] James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Oxford, 1893, I, pp. 384-85.
[2] Walter Kirchner, "Mind, Mountain, and History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XI (October 1950), p. 429.
[3] Arthur Waley, *The Way and Its Power*, London, 1949, ch. XLVI, p. 199.

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In poetry, in folk tales, in histories and essays, in drama and the novel, the value of harmony in social relations has been ceaselessly reiterated. And this value is expressed, as it is sustained, by a willingness to compromise, by the proper display of humility, by a concern for the status and reputation of others, by a reluctance to enter into doctrinal or legal controversies. Abundant evidence of the pervasiveness and importance of the value of harmony in traditional China is to be found in the recurrence of the symbols of harmony in innumerable era names, place names, personal names, street, palace, temple, and studio names throughout Chinese history.

Sun Yat-sen was one of the many thinkers and reformers who attempted to make China a strong modern power, yet preserve many of her traditional values. He writes:

> But since our domination by alien races and since the invasion of foreign culture which has spread its influence all over China, a group intoxicated with the new culture have begun to reject the old morality, saying that the former makes the latter unnecessary. They do not understand that we ought to preserve what is good in our past and throw away only the bad.[4]

In the same text he exhorts his people to adhere to China's old moral values. He explains these one by one, and finally says:

> China has one more splendid virtue—the love of Harmony and Peace. . . . The intense love of peace which the Chinese have had these thousands of years has been a natural disposition. In individual relationships great stress has been laid upon "humility and deference." . . . China's ancient virtues of Loyalty, Filial Devotion, Kindness, Love, Faithfulness, and such are in their very nature superior to foreign virtues, but in the moral quality of Peace we will further surpass the people of other lands. This special characteristic is the spirit of our nation and we must not only cherish it but cause it to shine with greater luster; then our national standing will be restored.[5]

There are, in Dr. Sun's prescriptions and programs, serious contradictions between many of the values he thought should be cherished and the changed institutions he held to be necessary to China's salvation. Was it consistent, or possible, for example, to cling to the value of Harmony and Peace—a value which by

[4] *San Min Chu I, The Three Principles of the People*, trans. by Frank W. Price, Shanghai, 1927, p. 126.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

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its nature contributed to the age-long *stability* of Chinese society—when his institutional program called for militant, rapid, and far-reaching change? This type of contradiction between institutional and value prescriptions characterizes the programs of innumerable thinkers and leaders of modern China and has contributed to their failures.

Chiang Kai-shek was concerned, once he had brought the Kuomintang to power, to consolidate his position. He set up a priority of problems which his regime would deal with in an ordained sequence. He held that for the solution of problems of first priority, it was necessary to have a degree of stability, which would "give him time" to deal with China's problems. To accomplish this, he re-emphasized many of the values that, in centuries past, had contributed to the stability of the Chinese empire. The New Life Movement which he promoted aimed to reinculcate certain ancient Confucian virtues so as to counteract the corrupting influence of imported Western values, to the end that society might be reconstructed on the model of the ideally harmonious family with the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang *in loco parentis*. It is noteworthy that in Chiang's reinterpretation of the Confucian heritage and of Sun Yat-sen-ism, he stressed discipline and order, organized effort, government under law, and gave little attention to the virtue of "harmony" stressed by Sun. This change in emphasis might be interpreted as part of Chiang's general effort to create an order in which harmony was not to be achieved by the individual's effort to adjust to society but by a common submission of the individual to law and constituted authority. Yet, in the years of Kuomintang hegemony, traditional values had been so thoroughly undermined by Western thought and by Westernized institutions that Chiang's attempt to make tactical use of such values was a complete failure.

It was against a background of its rivals' repeated failures to bring about a synthesis of values and institutions that the Communist Party rose to power. It is significant that Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party, should have been the first to renounce Chinese institutions and values in

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their entirety. He reacted against the group of values centering on the value of harmony—which he felt impaired China's ability to adjust to the modern world—and embraced the nineteenth-century European cult of the dynamic, going so far as to declare that "war is to society what movement is to the body." In taking his stand he cried, "The Oriental peoples may regard all this as madness, but in what condition do all these Oriental people, with their love of peace, quiet and harmony, now find themselves?"[6]

In the years following the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 Marxist-Leninist ideas had an ever-widening influence on the intellectuals. Just as, a generation before, the ideas and terminology of Darwin and Huxley had become the common coin of intellectual discourse, so now "class struggle," "the dialectic," and the Marxist ideas of the "stages" of society pervaded academic and literary discourse. This is not the place to describe the rising tide of Marxist thought, but we should note that it resulted in a further attrition of traditional values and won the support of some, the consent of others, to the subsequent effort of the Chinese Communist Party to impose its synthesis of institutions and values on the Chinese people as a whole. We shall now turn to a consideration of that effort, focusing our attention on the attempt to expunge the value of harmony and its associated values and to substitute for it the value of struggle and its coordinates.

That the notion of struggle, the value of struggle, should be important in Chinese Communist ideology is scarcely surprising. The basic idea goes back to Marx and Engels, and Chinese Communist leaders pride themselves on being the heirs and developers of the tradition. Liu Shao-ch'i and the lesser voices of orthodoxy, in writing on struggle, quote continuously from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Yet the writings discussed below would seem to suggest that the Chinese ideologues have given to this notion somewhat different weight and different emphases than their European and Russian predecessors. Two

[6] Benjamin Schwartz, "Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the Acceptance of the Modern West," in "Chinese Reactions to Imported Ideas: A Symposium," edited, with an introduction, by Arthur F. Wright, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XII (January 1951), pp. 65-66.

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emphases in particular appear to be peculiar to Chinese Communist theory. One is that the Chinese notion of struggle is often expressed in less concrete terms than those used, say, by Lenin; it is seldom expressed in the imagery of nineteenth-century natural science, so dear to Marxist writers elsewhere. Another is the way in which struggle is continuously related to individual cultivation and to the individual's social relations.[7]

In his lectures, "On the Training of a Communist Party Member," Liu states:

> The cause of Communism is a long, bitter, arduous but victorious process of struggle. Without such a struggle there can be no Communism. Of course this struggle is not, as some people have said, an "accidental" social phenomenon or something engineered by certain Communists who are "rebellious by nature." On the contrary, it is an inevitable phenomenon in the course of the development of a class society. It is a class struggle which is unavoidable.[8]

And elsewhere he speaks of "the absolute character and the universal character of the struggle."[9] Given the central importance attached to this value, its importance as an "inevitable phenomenon," as "universal," "absolute," "in conformity with the laws of social development," etc., it is held to be a necessary and inevitable factor in many different situations.

We have noted the traditional Chinese attitude of accommodation toward natural phenomena, the effort to find nature's rhythms and live in harmony with them. Liu Shao-ch'i, however, insists on the presence of struggle in this relationship. Be-

[7] These are very tentative suggestions of a qualitative change; the study of such changes in doctrinal emphases might well suggest long-term trends in the development of Communist China, adjustments and shifts of policy for which such changing emphases would be the preparation and justification.

[8] *Lun kung-ch'an-tang-yuan ti hsiu-yang*, first given at Yenan in July 1939. Translation by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, October 1951, from the December 1949 edition of the *Hsin-hua shu-tien*; reprinted in *Current Background* (hereafter *CB*), No. 159 (January 31, 1952), compiled and issued by the American Consulate General, Hongkong, p. 18. Cf. also Boyd Compton, *Mao's China*, Seattle, 1952, pp. 108-55.

[9] *Lun tang-nei tou-cheng*, "On Intra-Party Struggle," first given as lectures, July 2, 1941. Cf. *CB*, No. 105 (August 5, 1951), p. 13; and Compton, *op.cit.*, pp. 188-238. Liu is here echoing Mao Tse-tung's Leninist view that "contradiction is universal, absolute, existing in all processes from beginning to end," and that ". . . as the struggle within the contradiction is present everywhere, we say the struggle within the contradiction is unconditional, absolute." Cf. "On Contradiction," allegedly first written in August 1937, reprinted with fanfare in the *Jen Min Jih Pao*, April 1, 1952; cf. *CB*, No. 202 (August 15, 1952), pp. 9, 26.

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ginning with a quotation from the *Short Course*, he goes on to say:

> Thus the struggle carried on by men against nature (*yü tzu-jan chieh chin-hsing tou-cheng*) for production is social in character. It is a struggle of men as social beings against nature. It is in this ceaseless struggle against nature that human beings have been continuously changing nature and simultaneously themselves and have changed their relations with one another.[10]

This attitude toward nature means the repudiation of the traditional Chinese view, with its stress on harmonious adjustment—a view which the ideas of Darwin and Spencer had already undermined.[11]

Class struggle as the dominant motif in human relations and the dynamic in the growth of society is of course insisted upon by all the ideologues. A high degree of class consciousness, commitment to the proletariat in the class struggle, and proficiency in "class analysis" of every human situation are demanded of all true believers. It need hardly be said that to accept this complex of ideas means the utter repudiation of the old Chinese ideal of two mutually supporting and mutually dependent classes—the governors and the governed—dwelling in harmony and in a common commitment to state and culture.

The Party, as the enlightened leadership group, must continually purify itself by struggle. This theme forms the basis for the prolix and authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Intra-Party Struggle," wherein he justifies struggle, lays down rules of the game for conducting struggle, and criticizes types of struggle which are unacceptable. He holds that intra-party struggle is absolutely necessary and that "Any idea of trying to avoid intra-Party struggle or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is totally wrong."[12] This stricture, of course, is directed against the age-old Chinese preoccupation with harmonious personal relations,

[10] "On Intra-Party Struggle," *CB*, No. 105, p. 3.

[11] Chinese thinkers, from very early times, had a concept of the oscillation of positive and negative forces in natural phenomena, and were thus not committed to any notion of a static universe. To relate this "dialectic" to that of the Marxists would involve a lengthy discussion not appropriate to this article.

[12] Cf. *CB*, No. 105, p. 5; and Compton, *op.cit.*, pp. 188-238.

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particularly within a common interest group. The discourse urges again and again that combative support of or attack on a principle is a good in itself—an attitude utterly alien to traditional China.

Among the growing number of indoctrination techniques, psychological devices for enforcing orthodoxy, and organizations for "re-education," the so-called "struggle meeting" has a key role.[13] Its official name is "education meeting," but the popular term finds justification in Liu Shao-ch'i's dictum, "Struggle is a kind of education, and education is a kind of struggle."[14] These meetings are carried on continuously by all social and occupational groups, and the Party uses them to enforce conformity through group pressure and to detect the slightest reservations which any participant might have. Denunciation, confession of sins against the Party or against the "people," with promises of atonement, are part of the program of each meeting; the atmosphere is charged with emotional tensions and pervaded by a fanatical revivalistic spirit. Many participants break under the strain, and it is not surprising to have one informant say that he would rather be shot than go through another "struggle meeting."[15]

This type of meeting brings Chinese together in a new kind of intra-personal relationship where conflict and controversy—not mutual accommodation—are dominant. It is meant to destroy forever the older Chinese ideals of organized education, such as the love of learning, the quiet orderly development of ideas between a master and pupil standing to one another as father to son, and the persistent synthetic bias which sought rather to reconcile two conflicting authorities than to rule one out on logical grounds.

Having set up this and other devices, the Communists maintain that "education" can only come through such group activity. Nevertheless, they do have something to say about the individ-

[13] For a good journalistic account, using interviews, of some of these techniques, see Edward Hunter, *Brain-washing in Red China*, New York, 1951.

[14] "On Intra-Party Struggle," *CB*, No. 105, p. 14.

[15] "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," in *Far Eastern Notes*, No. 1, April 21, 1952.

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ual's own cultivation. Superficially, this might seem like some concession to the age-old Chinese preoccupation with self-culture, with the attainment of adjustment and serenity through study and contemplation. But we find that even this phase of man's activity is little more than a private colloquy with the same themes, the same ends, as the "struggle meeting." Artists and writers, whose work is necessarily personal, are exhorted to take part in the struggles of the masses and to practice "self-struggle."[16]

Inner cultivation is of course ideological cultivation, and this is seen as ". . . in the main a struggle in our minds between the ideology of the proletariat and other ideologies; a struggle in our minds between the Communist outlook on life and the Communist world outlook on the one hand, and all other outlooks on life and world outlooks on the other; and a struggle between two concepts: the personal interests and aims of Party members and the interests and aims of the Party and of the people."[17] Thus, on the level of group education and on the plane of personal cultivation, "struggle" is descriptive of prescribed practices and is a major thematic component of what is studied.

These are some of the frontal attacks on an older value and its attendant attitudes. These are direct efforts to implant the newer value. But the new leaders of China have also sought to break down a wide range of attitudes and behavior patterns in which the value of harmony has been expressed.

A humorous attitude toward many of life's problems has contributed to the Chinese ability to endure hardship and to live harmoniously with their fellows. But no fanatical orthodoxy has long tolerated humor, and the Chinese Communists seek to eliminate it. The jester who was traditionally a part of the *yang-ko* folk dance has been ordered abolished, and this festive dance, stripped of its humorist, has been turned into a propaganda device and rechristened the "struggle *yang-ko*."[18]

[16] Ting Ling (Stalin Prize Winner), "The Better to Serve the People," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, May 24, 1952; *CB*, No. 203 (August 15, 1952), p. 43.
[17] "On the Training of a Communist Party Member," *CB*, No. 159, p. 14.
[18] Cf. Hunter, *op.cit.*, pp. 284-85.

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Lau Shaw, whose widely known novels were characterized by robust humor and delicate irony, has become a spokesman for the new orthodoxy. In a speech before a Communist Party rally of artists and writers, he said: ". . . that unprincipled humor which encourages people to treat everything in a light-hearted manner is actually harmful to the people in that it promotes inaction and the attempt to get through by compromise."[19] The penchant for compromise which has eased Chinese social relations for many centuries thus stands condemned by Lau Shaw. It is castigated by every spokesman for the new ideology. Here is Mao's criticism of this long-prevalent Chinese attitude in his description of the manifestations of the heresy of liberalism:

> Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or, failing to make any clear decision, speaking about the error in allusions in order to preserve harmony and unity; as a result, the group is harmed as well as the individual.[20]

It is tragi-comic to see in an apologetic statement by a Chinese Christian favorable stress on just this characteristic attitude which the Communists are seeking to wipe out: "Moreover, while foreigners are inclined to make distinctions [referring to Christian sectarianism], Chinese are used to compromise."[21] This statement is of further interest, in that it shows how a Chinese Christian, seeking a way out of the conflict between his religion and Communist values, is driven to an attempt to reconcile the two. The ground which he finds for this reconciliation is the common ideal of a community of values and institutions so appealing to the Chinese. He stresses the "social and unifying" character of Christianity: "As far back as in Judaism . . . the highest hope was the coming of a solidly united ideal society. The Hebrew prophets lived and died for this hope."[22]

[19] New China News Agency translation of his speech of November 24, 1951; *CB*, No. 156 (February 5, 1952) p. 31.

[20] "In Opposition to Liberalism," in Compton, *op.cit.*, pp. 184-85.

[21] Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," *Hsin Kuan-ch'a*, 1, No. 8, October 10, 1950; cf. *CB*, No. 40 (December 15, 1950), p. 3.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

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The Party may, for tactical reasons, overlook the heretical implications of such syncretic expressions, but the "line" is unambiguous:

> We must utilize the positive spirit of Marxism to defeat negative liberalism. A Communist Party member should be straight-forward, loyal, and positive; he should consider the interests of the revolution as the primary concern in his life, sacrifice individual interests, and, no matter where or when, uphold correct principles and struggle untiringly against all incorrect thoughts and actions. . . .[23]

Compromise is but one mode of preserving harmony in personal relations. It is based on a respect for another's view, a regard for his *amour-propre*—or "face." This attitude, too, is roundly castigated by the Communists as ameliorating the harshness of struggle.

> That such an attitude and such habits described as liberalist exist is proved by the fact that we do not criticise and fight against all erroneous ideologies, but are satisfied to exist side by side with it, and even echo it; that we do not relish criticism, but try to refute it on various pretexts; that in the mutual relations of literary and art workers we stress friendship and "face" and do not establish the correct relation according to a principle; that we vulgarise the serious ideological struggle.[24]

In addition to frontal attacks on older values, attacks on related attitudes and behavior, and efforts to implant the new value of struggle, the Communists have used another group of arguments to justify and rationalize their insistence on the value of struggle. This involves, on the one hand, an appeal to the traditional Chinese sentiment that what is good for China—its civilization, its values—is not something parochial, suitable for the Chinese alone, but capable of universal acceptance and application. On the other hand, it involves an appeal to long-standing utopian dreams of an ultimate good society. These appeals are obviously interrelated, because it is the Communist utopia whose universality is insisted on.

Now, both these appeals are meant to ameliorate the tension and the psychological dislocation which have come from the

[23] Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," in Compton, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

[24] Chou Yang, "The Practice of Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Chinese Art and Literature," a speech of November 24, 1951; cf. *CB*, No. 156 (February 5, 1952), p. 16.

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attempt to uproot old values and attitudes and implant new and antithetical ones. They promise that the abandonment of harmony for struggle *now* will bring a state of universal harmony in the distant future. They amount to using the strong appeal of the value they are seeking to uproot, to strengthen the case for uprooting it.

Mao Tse-tung, in his *Dictatorship of the People's Democracy*, uses for the Communist world order—the goal for which all struggle takes place—the term *Ta-t'ung ching-yü*. This term was used by the last of the great Confucian reformers, K'ang Yu-wei (1858-1927), to denote the ultimate, universal Confucian-Western utopia which he described in his famous *Ta-t'ung shu* (Book of the Great Harmony). And the lineaments of the two utopias—the one of Confucian, the other of Communist provenance—are remarkably similar. K'ang pictures an age in which national rivalries no longer exist and class, racial, and sexual inequalities have been abolished, an age in which the legal and political institutions which create and preserve tension and inequality will disappear and all people will find happiness and fulfillment.[25]

Mao Tse-tung comments on K'ang's vision and says: "K'ang Yu-wei wrote the book 'Universal Harmony' but he did not, and could not, find the path to it. . . . The only path to universal harmony lies through a people's republic led by the working class."[26] Later in the same treatise, Mao says: ". . . China, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, can develop steadily from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a New Democratic into a Socialist and, eventually, Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony."[27]

Elsewhere Mao holds forth the hope for the abolition of all state systems in much the same terms as Marx had used, with, it

[25] Cf. Alfred Forke, *Geschichte der neueren chinesischen philosophie*, Hamburg, 1938, pp. 575-97.

[26] *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, 3d ed., Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1950.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

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should be noted, a similar vagueness.[28] It is Liu Shao-ch'i, however, who elaborates the most detailed and alluring picture of the ultimate utopia toward which all struggle is directed:

> There will be no oppressed and exploited people, no darkness, ignorance, backwardness, etc. In such a society all human beings will become unselfish and intelligent Communists with a high level of culture and technique. The spirit of mutual assistance and mutual love will prevail among mankind. There will be no such irrational things as mutual deception, mutual antagonism, mutual slaughter and war. Such a society will, of course, be the best, the most beautiful and the most advanced society in the history of mankind.[29]

These are the outlines of one aspect of a fanatical and organized attempt to remake the Chinese value system. In estimating the chances for its success, one should see it as part of a concerted plan of internal psychological warfare—a plan that neglects no trick or stratagem to change men's minds, motives, and attitudes. There are ominous signs that this massive effort is achieving results. To the extent that it does, it will increase the difficulty of finding a common ground for resolving the conflicts between China and the Western world. More serious in the long run would be the implication from such success that a people's most enduring and cherished values can be deliberately and systematically destroyed by organized totalitarian pressure.

[28] Cf. "On Contradiction," *CB*, No. 202 (August 15, 1952), p. 23. Marx, though not consistent in his expressed views, says, at one point: "The abolition of the state has meaning only for Communists, as the necessary result of the abolition of classes, with which the necessity of the organized force of one class for the suppression of other classes falls away of itself." Quoted in Solomon Bloom, "The 'Withering Away' of the State," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VII (January 1946), p. 114.

[29] "On the Training of a Communist Party Member," *CB*, No. 159, p. 19.

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STALIN AS AN INTELLECTUAL*

By NATHAN LEITES

DURING Stalin's lifetime Soviet writing, with his encouragement, presented him as a master theoretician, without a living peer. The more recent tendency on the part of his successors to reduce reference to this and others of his roles has not amounted to a denial of the earlier theme of intellectual greatness. It may therefore be of some importance, even after his death, to investigate Stalin's theoretical writings, not only to clarify his function and accomplishments as an intellectual, but also to gain further insight into Bolshevik and Soviet patterns of thought. A particularly interesting subject for such an investigation is Stalin's last and most widely heralded theoretical writing, the article, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R."

Well-timed to remind the Soviet world of Stalin's undiminished leadership despite his reduced role at the Nineteenth Party Congress, the article appeared in the October 1952 issue of *Bol'shevik*.[1] It had a peculiar history. Having been requested by the "Central Committee" to help in the preparation of an official economics textbook, a number of Soviet economists had by November 1951 prepared a draft and held a discussion of it, which resulted in various documents proposing revisions of the draft. The first section of Stalin's article, dated February 1, 1952, begins as follows:

> I have received all the documents on the economics discussion held in connection with the evaluation of the draft of a textbook of political economy. . . . I consider it necessary to make the following observations on all of these documents and on the draft of the textbook (p. 1).

These "Remarks on Economic Questions Connected with the November Discussion of 1951" were in their turn circulated among economists, some of whom wrote letters to Stalin and re-

* The author is indebted to Hans Speier, Victor Hunt, Paul Kecskemeti, Melville Ruggles, and Raymond Garthoff for their comments and criticisms.

1 Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," *Bol'shevik*, No. 18 (October 1952). All quotations in this paper are taken from the translation in the Special Supplement to the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, October 18, 1952, with page references indicated in the text.

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ceived answers from him. Three such answers (to A. I. Notkin, dated April 21, 1952; to L. D. Yaroshenko, dated May 22, 1952; and to A. V. Sanina and V. G. Venzher, dated September 28, 1952) form the rest of his article.

This subsequent publication of communications and even of "debates" between Stalin and technocrats of a medium level is itself a very interesting phenomenon. In 1950 the same procedure was used in Stalin's "theoretical" writings on linguistics, and in 1947 in his letter on military affairs to a professional military historian. These incidents open up speculation as to the extent of such communications and the degree to which Stalin was involved in them. While we cannot definitely assume the existence of other unpublished Stalin writings of this nature, it is indeed possible that they may exist, and that Stalin may have intervened in such matters more than is commonly supposed.

I

To Stalin (although he was of course not fully aware of this) the links between a scientific term and the objects it designates, as well as its links with other terms, are not conventional, but almost as real as the world itself. Words, for him, somehow possess "magical" power, even in scientific discourse. For example, take Stalin's reply to Notkin's criticism of his "Remarks." Stalin had narrowly circumscribed the sphere within which the "law of value" operates in the contemporary Soviet economy, and Notkin had objected that (in Stalin's paraphrase) "the law of value exercises a regulatory effect on the prices of 'the means of production' . . . [namely] raw materials—cotton, for instance." Stalin replies:

> . . . in the given case agriculture produces not "means of production," but one of the means of production—raw materials. One cannot play with the words "means of production" (*sredstva proizvodstva*). When Marxists speak of production of the means of production they mean primarily production of tools of production (*orudii proizvodstva*). . . . To equate part of the means of production (the raw materials) with the means of production, including the tools of production, is to sin against Marxism, because Marxism proceeds from the determinative role of the tools of production as compared with all other means of

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> production. Everybody knows that raw materials in themselves cannot produce tools of production; . . . on the other hand, no raw material can be produced without tools of production (p. 11).

In this incredible passage Stalin treats what pretends to be scientific language as one would treat a ceremonial formula. He conveys the feeling that the straightforward use of a general term (means of production) might "destroy" a top priority of Soviet economic policy, namely, that given to the production of tools of production. Notkin simply designates a member (raw materials) of a class (means of production) by the name of that class (means of production). He does not add that there is another member (tools of production) of the same class which is in certain respects (given the system of priorities of Soviet economic policy) much more important than the member he deals with. For he deals with this member (raw materials) with a view to a particular question: to which kind of goods does the "law of value" apply in the Soviet economy? And this would make it irrelevant to do what Stalin demands, namely, to mention another member (tools of production) of the same class (means of production) and to recall how much more important, in certain respects, that latter member is. For Stalin, this logically appropriate silence[2] appears to have a negative, "destructive" effect, since Stalin, in characteristic Bolshevik fashion,[3] denies the possibility of a stable intermediate position between full acceptance of a proposition (in this case, of the properties of "tools of production") and its complete rejection. Moreover, by stressing this distinction, Stalin is able to emphasize the difference between capitalism and Soviet socialism (and, conversely, Notkin blurs the distinction, and hence the difference, between economic systems).

Or take Stalin's reaction to the views of Yaroshenko (another of his correspondents) about the relation between "productive

[2] Cf. Nathan Leites and Elsa Bernaut, *The Ritual of Liquidation*, RAND Research Memorandum RM-977 (forthcoming publication by The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill.), ch. 21, on Bolshevik attitudes toward "silence."

[3] Cf. Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, RAND Report R-239 (forthcoming publication by The Free Press), ch. 18, sections 3 and 4, and Leites and Bernaut, *op.cit.*, chs. 4, 10, and 13, on Bolshevik disbelief in the stability of intermediate positions.

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forces" and "production relations" under socialism. The first term, *Produktivkräfte*, was used by Marx to designate the resources and technology available to a society; by the second, *Produktionsverhältnisse*, he designated the social relations among the members of society engaged in economic activity. Stalin notes with displeasure Yaroshenko's affirmation that under socialism "production relations constitute part of the . . . productive forces." Later in this article we will discuss this affirmation as an expression of Yaroshenko's technocratic bent. We may add that it is, to be sure, both unorthodox Marxism in text and unintelligible in meaning. But Stalin is concerned only with the violation of orthodoxy—which is quite obvious to anybody conversant with Marxist formulae—and proceeds to utilize it in a fashion which again shows his profound belief in the "magic" of words. He recalls a famous passage from Marx, according to which the sum total of "production relations" constitutes the "economic structure" of society, its "real base" or, in Stalin's paraphrase, its "economic base." Stalin continues:

> This means that . . . every social formation . . . has its economic base, consisting of the sum total of . . . production relations. The question arises, what *happens* to the economic base of the socialist system in Comrade Yaroshenko's interpretation? As we have seen, Comrade Yaroshenko has . . . *liquidated* production relations under socialism as . . . [an] independent matter and lumped the little that remained of them with the . . . productive forces. One asks: *Has* the socialist system its own economic base? Evidently the socialist system is *left without* its economic base, since production relations have disappeared under socialism as a more or less independent force.
>
> Consequently, here is the socialist system without its economic base. This is a funny state of affairs.
>
> Is it possible to have a social order without an economic base? . . . Marxism holds that such social systems don't happen (p. 14; italics mine).

To Stalin, then, Yaroshenko's prediction that under "socialism" "production relations" will constitute part of the "productive forces" means that "production relations" will be annihilated by incorporation. That is, Yaroshenko's elimination of the term "production relations" in a proposed theory of socialism signifies to Stalin, somehow, the (theoretical) destruction of the

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"economic base" of socialism,[4] inasmuch as Marx defines the term "economic base" with the help of the term "production relations." To be sure, Stalin is not entirely convinced of the correctness of this line of reasoning (which makes Yaroshenko appear to be a supreme "wrecker"), as he uses his argument at the same time for a *reductio ad absurdum* (which makes Yaroshenko appear a rather harmless fool). But this second line, too, equates the elimination of a term with the disappearance of its referent. It is probable that Stalin's discussion in both its variants is consciously motivated by a determination to "liquidate" Yaroshenko intellectually. But it is also very likely that Stalin does not regard the modes of reasoning he uses as just plain silly, which would be the judgment of Western empirical scientists.[5]

As words are of such intrinsic importance to Stalin, and as they have, apparently, "true" rather than conventionally assigned definitions, it becomes a central intellectual operation to distinguish between words—that is, to classify objects—rather than to discover the conditions and consequences of events. Again and again, as in the past,[6] Stalin constructs intellectually by creating distinctions (classes of objects) and destroys intellectually by charging others with having failed to make, or to apply, the proper distinctions.[7] Thus, according to Stalin, some econo-

[4] Stalin's process of identifying the omission or elimination of a term with the destruction of the object to which it refers is not, of course, fully conscious. And Stalin is probably deliberately using verbal trickery. But there is almost always more to any manifest content than mere fabrication, and the choice of content of verbal trickery in a way reflects its author's obscure beliefs.

[5] In similar fashion, Stalin reifies the Marxist term "expanded reproduction," i.e., an expanding economy. He affirms that one of the "basic preliminary conditions" for the "transition to communism" is the "constant growth of all social production," and that this in turn requires "preponderant growth of production of means of production." This, in turn, "is necessary not only because it [the producers' goods industry] must provide equipment for its own enterprises and for enterprises of all other branches of the economy as well, but also because without it, it is altogether impossible to have expanded reproduction" (p. 14). Stalin overlooks, first, that the last reason is both necessary and sufficient; and, second, that the first two reasons are, together, identical with the last: by an expanding economy ("expanded reproduction") one means (except in the case of certain technological changes) an economy with expanded equipment in whatever branches the economy is expanding.

[6] Cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 4, section 3.

[7] Cf. *ibid.*, ch. 11, section 1, for discussion of the relation of this device to the fantasy of communism as the abolition of distinctions.

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mists "are confusing scientific laws . . . with laws promulgated by governments. . . . These two kinds of laws cannot be confused at all" (p. 1). It is quite true that a distinction of categories is necessary to scientific thought, but it is not sufficient by itself. Yet Stalin seems to assume that the entire field of intellectual endeavor can be exhausted merely by making distinctions; he does not recognize this as merely a preliminary operation. In his discussion, Stalin compounds this unconscious error by a combative, polemical (and unfair) attribution to Yaroshenko of very elementary equivocation in terms, in order to "annihilate" him intellectually. Thus, in this instance, the "distinction" made by Stalin (which Yaroshenko is ridiculed for not making) is simply not germane to the question at issue.

In discussing those economists who are in favor of the abolition of "commodity production" in the Soviet Union (cf. pp. 23-25), Stalin mentions that they cite in their favor a passage of Engels: "Once society takes over the means of production, commodity production will be abolished. . . ." Stalin immediately proceeds to make a distinction: "Engels' formula . . . contains no indication whether it refers to society's taking over *all* the means of production or only part of them . . ." (p. 3).

The rest of his argument is based on (or, rather, is tautological in relation to) this distinction. It is in the same fashion that Stalin discusses the assertion of some economists that the present structure of Soviet economy creates tendencies toward the restoration of capitalism (cf. p. 27):

> It is said that commodity production . . . necessarily will lead to capitalism under any circumstances whatsoever. Not always and not under all conditions! Commodity production must not be confused with capitalist production. They are two different things (p. 3).
>
> . . . those comrades are entirely wrong who say that since socialist society does not liquidate the commodity forms of production, all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism . . . must also be reestablished in our country. These comrades confuse commodity production with capitalist production . . . (p. 4).

Or take Stalin's polemic against Yaroshenko who, according to Stalin, "reduces the problems of political economy of socialism

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to problems of rational organization of productive forces, . . . of planning the national economy, etc. [*sic*]":

> . . . he is utterly wrong. The problems of rational organization of productive forces, of planning the national economy, and so on, do not constitute the subject of political economy (*politicheskaia ekonomia*), but the subject of the economic policy (*khozaistvennaia politika*) of the directing agencies. These are two distinct areas which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko confused these two different things and went astray. Political economy studies the laws of development of . . . production relations. Economic policy draws practical conclusions therefrom. . . . To burden political economy with problems of economic policy is to nullify it as a science (p. 16).

Again, the incorrect use of terms induces "disaster"—first in theory, then in practice. Thus Stalin may fear that, in Yaroshenko's perspective, Soviet planners (and ultimately the leadership) will be made to appear omnipotent—and hence more responsible for chronic shortages than they really are. If there remain "economic" restraints and limitations upon action even under socialism, the regime will have good alibis. Hence we must emphasize these constraints in our teaching about Soviet economy, and we can do this only by using "political economy."

Discussing his correspondents Sanina and Venzher, Stalin mentions a proposal of theirs on agricultural policy:

> Citing Stalin's statement that the means of production are not to be sold even to the collective farms, the authors of the proposal question Stalin's thesis, maintaining that the state . . . does sell . . . to the collective farms, such means of production as minor equipment—scythes, sickles, small motors, and so on. They reason that if the state sells these means of production to the collective farms it could also sell them all the other means of production, such as the Machine and Tractor Stations' machinery (p. 19).

In replying, Stalin alludes in a relatively straightforward fashion to the vast difference in economic and political consequences of the two arrangements envisaged; but, in order to clinch his argument, he again talks about words:

> . . . when Stalin spoke of not selling the means of production to collective farms, he had in mind not small equipment but the basic means of agricultural production—the M.T.S. machinery and the land. The authors are playing with the words "means of production" and confusing two different things without noticing that they end up being muddled (*ibid.*).

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That Stalin is incapable of seeing the difference between classifications and propositions (indicating the conditions and consequences of the occurrence of events belonging to certain classes) becomes clear when he discusses Marx's "theory of reproduction" set forth in the second volume of *Das Kapital*. For the purposes of his analysis, Marx distinguishes between the production of means of production and that of means of consumption; Stalin speaks about this classification as the "division" of social production into these two sectors, and calls this "division" a "basic proposition of Marx's theory of reproduction."

If words are so important, merely rendering the meaning explicit becomes an operation hardly distinguishable from the establishment of a statement about relationships between events. In fact, all the further "basic propositions" of Marx's theory of reproduction which Stalin names follow directly from the definitions of the terms used and from the assumptions made in this theory, as a more detailed analysis would show.[8]

"As is well known" (to use a favorite Bolshevik phrase), Stalin minds truisms overweighted by explicitness and repetition no more than he does tautologies. In prescribing the final shape of the textbook on economics whose on-going production occasioned his article, he says:

> . . . what is required is a textbook which could serve as a handbook of revolutionary youth. . . . It should not be too voluminous, since too large a textbook cannot be a handbook, and it would be difficult to assimilate—to master. But it should contain all that is basic . . . (p. 10).

A rather extreme case in point is Stalin's lengthy discussion to the effect that only the "essential" and not "all" the differences between city and country and between mental and manual "labor" will disappear in communism. Stalin writes:

> Some comrades assert that in time not only the essential distinction between industry and agriculture, between manual and mental labor, will disappear, but that *any* difference between them will also disappear. . . . Elimination of the essential difference between industry and agriculture cannot lead to elimination of all distinction between the two. Some

[8] Stalin speaks of "the thesis of the predominant growth of production of the means of production under augmented reproduction"; "the thesis of the surplus product as the only source of accumulation;" "the thesis of accumulation as the only source of augmented reproduction" (p. 17).

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> sort of difference (*kakoe-to razlichie*), albeit nonessential, undoubtedly will remain, in view of the difference in working conditions in industry and agriculture. Even in industry conditions of work are not the same . . . in its various branches; the working conditions of coal miners, for example, differ from those of the workers of a mechanized shoe factory, the working conditions of ore miners differ from those of machine-building workers. If this is correct, even more so is the fact that a certain difference (*izvestnoe razlichie*) between industry and agriculture must remain.
>
> The same applies to the difference between mental and manual labor. . . . some sort of a difference . . . will remain, if only because the working conditions of the managing personnel of enterprises are not the same as those of the workers (p. 6).

In a way which epitomizes certain long-term trends in the Western world, Stalin reduces Marx's obscure and solemn philosophical prophecy of the restitution of man's plenitude to the lucid affirmation that, whatever the social order, hours spent working in a coal mine will not be exactly identical to hours spent working in a shoe factory. For instance, in the first case one is working underground; in the second, one may still be aboveground.

Tautologies are used as "evidence" for empirical hypotheses, as in the case of Stalin's treatment of "the question of the material condition of the working class in the capitalist countries":

> When we speak of the material situation of the working class, we usually . . . do not take account of the . . . unemployed. [That we should, is a truism.] Is such an attitude to the question of the material situation of the working class correct? I think it is wrong. If there exists a reserve army of unemployed . . . [they] cannot fail to be included in the working class, but if they are included in the working class, their plight cannot fail to influence the material situation of those workers engaged in production. [According to the preceding sentences, the "influence" would occur by definition rather than by causation.] I think, therefore, that in characterizing the material situation of the working class in the capitalist countries one should take into account the situation of the reserve army of unemployed [a statement which is tautological in relation to the definition of "working class" given above] (p. 9).

The defects in Stalin's logic are accompanied by a good deal of ignorance and distortion in his substantive Marxism. This is shown in startling fashion when he discusses the view of some economists that "the law of the average profit norm" is the

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"basic economic law" of "contemporary capitalism." (This search for such a single law is not traditional in Marxism; it expresses the Stalinist desire for simplification and—to apply a Marxist hypothesis—"reflects" the autocratic nature of the Soviet regime.) What these Soviet economists presumably have in mind is a part of the third volume of *Das Kapital*. There Marx shows that in view of the different distribution of total cost between wages and other costs in different industries, there is a tendency toward different rates of profit in them; but that the mechanism of free competition tends to establish an average rate of profit throughout the economy. "Average" is thus for Marx, in this context, a term referring entirely to differences between various industries; Marx's definition of "the average rate of profit" carries no implication as to its absolute magnitude. (In a related proposition, Marx affirms that the "average rate of profit" tends to decline through time.) Stalin, however, shows that he has never read or understood, has forgotten or distorted in memory, the third volume of *Das Kapital* and the many discussions of these points in Marxist literature. For he takes the word "average" as it appears in the term "average rate of profit" in the sense of an absolute magnitude which is neither high nor low. That is, instead of using the term "average" in a neutral quantitative sense, he uses it in an emotional and moral sense. Substantively, he apparently means to speak of devices used by capitalists (imperialistic competition, in this "highest stage in the development of capitalism") in an effort to ward off (or, to the Marxist, to postpone) the tendency of the profit rate to decline. But this is so stated as to appear to mean that capitalists are greedy for "maximum" exploitable profit. He says:

> Present-day capitalism, monopoly capitalism, cannot be satisfied by an average (*sredni*) profit which, besides, shows a tendency to decline. . . . Present-day monopoly capital demands not an average profit but a maximum profit. . . .
>
> Average profit is the lowest limit of profitability below which capitalist production becomes impossible. . . . it would be ludicrous to assume that the magnates of present-day monopoly capitalism, when they seize colonies, enslave peoples and foment wars, are seeking to guarantee themselves merely an average profit. No, it is not average profit, and

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not superprofit, which "as a rule" is merely a certain increase over average profit, but it is maximum (*maksimal'naia*) profit which is the motive power of monopoly capitalism (p. 8).[9]

It is consonant with the illiteracy which Stalin shows in the passages quoted that his own formulation of the "basic economic law of capitalism" shows a further decline from the earlier Marxist tradition of phrasing central propositions of economics in more or less neutral and technical fashion. This is Stalin's discovery:

> The main features and demands of the basic economic law of present-day capitalism could be formulated roughly as follows: to secure the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of a given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbing of the peoples of other countries . . . and finally through wars and the militarization of the national economy which are used to guarantee the highest profits (p. 8).

If Bukharin had read this passage in the mid-1930's without any indication of its origin, he would probably have guessed that it was taken from an elementary course of instruction intended for candidates for Party membership in a backward region of the Soviet Union. And surely, whatever the precise character of his reaction, he would have responded very similarly to Stalin's parallel discovery about "socialism" (characteristically worded in parallel fashion):

> The essential characteristics and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism might be formulated roughly as follows: to assure maximum satisfaction of the constantly growing material and cultural requirements of all of society through the constant growth and improvement of socialist production on the basis of the highest technology (p. 9).

We see here again Stalin's predilection for pleonasms and repetition. Perhaps he believes this method is justified by his desire

[9] Stalin's central mistake makes him miss the connection by virtue of which a Marxist could say that the transition to "monopoly capitalism" qualified the theorem of the establishment of an average rate of profit: the mechanism by which this comes about, in Marx's presentation, is free competition. One may also note that Stalin introduces two almost undefined terms, "maximum profit" and "superprofit." He treats the latter—by the locution "as a rule"—as if it were well defined, but the content of his allusion shows that is not so. The conspicuous role in this passage of words of contemporary Communist mass propaganda, as distinct from terms of Marxist economics, is commented upon below.

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to create a formula which will be usable both on the level of "theory" and of "agitation"—a demonstration of the disappearance of differences between these levels in Stalinism. In the first of these quotations, for example, Stalin speaks of "capitalist profit," although in Marxism profit is defined for capitalism only. Further, according to Marxism, any "profit," not just "maximum" profit, is based on exploitation. The relation of "robbing"—a term used for the economic aspects of capitalist acts in "other countries"—to the three previous synonyms, which are used for the domestic economic activities of capitalists, is not clear; or, rather, it is clear that all four terms have the same referent. While the entire passage is intended as an enumeration of devices used to attain "maximum profits," this term is repeated at the end of the last-named device ("militarization of the national economy"), with the elegant substitution of *naivishchaia* (highest) for *maksimal'naia* (maximum). The second quotation equally displays tautologies, pleonasms, and truisms; it could have ended with the word "society" without being any poorer in meaning.

Malenkov's reaction to the enunciation of these "laws" is not surprising: "Comrade Stalin's discovery . . . is a tremendous contribution to Marxian political economy . . . "; it "deals a devastating blow to all apologists of capitalism. . . ." And, "Comrade Stalin's theoretical discoveries are of world-historic significance" (p. 8).[10] Malenkov even goes so far as to acclaim as a "discovery" of Stalin's what Stalin himself presents as a basic point of "historical materialism," explicitly stated by Marx in the famous preface to *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (1859), a preface which Stalin himself quotes in part. There Marx affirms that the relation between *Produktivkräfte* and *Produktionsverhältnisse* is a basic factor in society. He points out how the latter, in a "class society," will first "enter into a relation of contradic-

[10] This and subsequent quotations from Malenkov's speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress are taken from *Bol'shevik*, No. 19 (October 1952), pp. 58-59.

The degree of adulation of Stalin displayed by a Malenkov (a member of the top group) was, however, smaller than that adopted by a Mikoyan (a member of the next lower group). A detailed analysis would probably show the persistence of the pattern discussed in the article by Nathan Leites, Elsa Bernaut, and Raymond Garthoff, "Politburo Images of Stalin," *World Politics*, III (April 1951), *passim*.

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tion to the former," and then become adapted to them (through "revolution"). It is this very well-known point which Stalin calls "the economic law of the obligatory conformity (*obiazatelnoi sootvetstvie*) of production relations to the character of the productive forces" (p. 2), and which Malenkov dares to say that Stalin "discovered."

We have discussed Stalin's emphatic criticism of those who allegedly "confuse" laws of science and of government. In this connection, it seems significant that in formulating Marx's point about the relation between "productive forces" and "production relations" Stalin stresses the validity of this alleged law of science by using a term which is unusual in such a context and whose associations are overwhelmingly governmental: "obligatory." Malenkov may have reacted to an obscure awareness of this when he added in the context just quoted another term which is unambiguously science-oriented: he attributes to Stalin the discovery of the "objective economic law of the obligatory conformity. . . ."[11]

While Stalin's intellectual level seems to have reached a new low in this article, his adherence to certain basic Bolshevik beliefs seems quite unshaken.

As we shall note later, Stalin opposes those economists who demand an immediate elimination of the remaining sector of "commodity production" in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he emphatically affirms the necessity of ultimately going to yet further extremes of central control, and of starting to move now. While he does not say that the present, as it were, intermediate, situation is acutely unstable, he affirms that it is less desirable than a yet further extension of direct state regulation. In place of the present "two basic production sectors," the "State-public form" in industry and the "collective farm form" in agriculture, a "single united sector" must be established (p. 4); that is, "it is essential . . . to raise collective farm property to the level of property of the public as a whole" (p. 14). And,

[11] *Ibid.* Thus Stalin's emphasis on the point that scientific laws "cover processes independently of people's will" appears here particularly clearly as a (no doubt largely unconscious) maneuver in the Bolshevik fight against fantasies of omnipotence. (Cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 1, section 4.)

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in connection with this, "it is essential . . . to replace commodity turnover (*tovarnoe obrashchenie*) with a system of exchange of goods (*produktoobmen*) . . ." (p. 14), for "commodity turnover is incompatible with the prospect of transition from socialism to communism" (p. 19).

The two projected developments are interrelated:

> In order to raise the level of collective farm property to the level of public property it is necessary to take surplus collective farm production out of the system of commodity turnover and include it in the system of product exchange between state industry and the collective farms . . . so that the collective farms would receive for their products not only [*sic*] money but primarily articles they need (p. 20).

This change should be introduced—and here Stalin expresses the Bolshevik opposition to both procrastination[12] and precipitance[13]—

> . . . without particular haste . . . [but] steadily, unwaveringly, without hesitation, step by step reducing the sphere of operation of commodity turnover and increasing the sphere of operation of product exchange (*ibid.*).

The determination to achieve these changes seems in part related to the conception of "communism" as excluding anything less than "public" property of all goods other than consumer goods,[14] and as abolishing the use of money:[15]

> . . . we Marxists base ourselves on the well-known Marxist thesis that the transition from socialism to communism and [*sic*] the communist principle of distribution of goods according to needs exclude any commodity turnover (*tovarny obmen*) . . . (pp. 19-20).

But Stalin appears to have another acknowledged motive (which he, surely, does not distinguish from the one just named) in asking for the changes which we have described: he feels the need to abolish what at least on the surface seem to be limitations on the control of the central organs of the regime over the

[12] Cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 6, section 4.

[13] Cf. *ibid.*, ch. 4, section 2.

[14] Stalin's adherence to the Marxist view of property as the central variable in social life is expressed when he discusses the still persisting "differences" between city and countryside in the Soviet Union (p. 6).

[15] Malenkov repeats and stresses Stalin's point (against the economists who oppose it) that in communism "money economy" will disappear, and says that the view that "commodity circulation (*tovarnoe obrashchenie*) will persist under communism has nothing in common with Marxism" (p. 8).

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economic life of the Soviet Union. Thus he describes the terminal state to be attained as one

> . . . when, in place of the [present] two basic production sectors [state industry and the collective farms], one comprehensive [*vseobemliushchy*; literally, all-embracing] sector appears, with the right to distribute all the consumers' goods produced . . . (p. 4).

More explicitly, he discloses that

> . . . it is essential . . . to raise collective farm property to the level of property of the public as a whole . . . and to replace commodity turnover with a system of exchange of goods . . . so that the central authority (*tsentral'naia vlast'*) or some other social-economic central agency (*tsentr*)[16] might control the entire output of social production . . . (p. 14).

Stalin takes it as axiomatic that there is a positive correlation, in the Soviet economy, between the degree of central control and the rate of "development of our productive forces": the present institutions which he condemns (for the long run) "act as a brake" on that "development" "inasmuch as they are creating obstacles to full coverage of the entire economy . . . by state planning" (p. 15).[17]

The fantasy of total power thus remains as dominant as ever in Stalin's mind[18] in this "first phase of the development of communist society."[19]

[16] Stalin reaffirms the forecast of the disappearance of the state: ". . . the state will not exist forever. With the expansion of . . . socialism in the majority of countries of the world, the state will wither away. . . . The state will disappear but society will remain. It follows that the recipient of public property will . . . no longer be the state, which will have disappeared, but society itself as represented by its central guiding economic agency" (p. 18).

[17] More specifically, Stalin says that the replacement of the present relations between the collective farms and the state by direct exchange, in which the kolkhozes deliver produce and receive certain assortments of industrial products in return, "will make it possible to include . . . the yield of collective farming in the general system of national planning" (p. 20). In usual fashion, Stalin additionally justifies these, as any other, economic changes by their alleged favorable impact on the "productive forces" (p. 15).

[18] It may be significant that, in contrast to Stalin's verbal orthodoxy about the goal (cf. note 16), Beria on one occasion at the Party Congress chose a formulation which might indicate a reduction of faith within the Politburo. He speaks of "the one great goal—the strengthening of the might of our Fatherland and the victory of communism."

[19] On one occasion Stalin seems to abolish in a fashion which is both spectacular and casual the dominant current description of the present phase as one in which the Soviet Union is engaged in a "movement on the road of gradual transition from socialism to communism," by speaking of "our present economic system, in the first phase of the development of communist society . . ." (p. 5).

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II

Stalin's article not only reflects upon his ability as a theoretician and his make-up as an intellectual, but also reveals certain patterns of thought current among the technical intelligentsia. These patterns deserve attention.

In condemning various opinions expressed by Soviet economists, Stalin acquaints us—by alleged paraphrase and even quotation—with dissenting moods in the intelligentsia.[20] According to Stalin's presentation, such moods are invariably expressed—whether the disguise be consciously or unconsciously adopted—through "left" enthusiasm[21] or through ostensibly innocuous divergences on technicalities; but Stalin seems to sense the discontent latent in the "preposterous balderdash" of some "harebrained 'Marxist' " (p. 15).[22]

Apparently discontented with the present state of affairs in the Soviet Union, some members of the intelligentsia seem to see the root of the trouble in the fact that the Party has not gone far enough toward "communism." For example, take the matter of "commodity production." This arrangement gives the officials of a kolkhoz a certain "property" right over the produce of the collective farm, a freedom of choice in disposing of this produce, even though the land and machinery of the kolkhoz are state property.[23] Proposing the abolition of this freedom—that is, the extension of the state "property rights" to cover the produce of

[20] The other leaders whose statements we are discussing and who often mention Stalin's article tend to be silent about this aspect of it, showing the late Stalinist aversion to acknowledging the existence of non-conformity. But Poskrëbyshev notes that Stalin discusses "the mistakes and anti-Marxist tendency of some economists."

[21] This enables Mikoyan to summarize Stalin's polemic as follows: "Comrade Stalin . . . poured cold water on those comrades who have let themselves be carried away, whom our great successes made dizzy."

[22] Stalin's use of such terms as "preposterous balderdash" in a technical-ideological discussion reveals a low opinion of his subordinates, often displayed in other ways (cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 1, section 4; and Leites and Bernaut, *op.cit.*, chs. 1-4). Elsewhere in his article Stalin states that, in the matter of setting certain prices, "Our managers and planners submitted a proposal which could only astonish the members of the Central Committee. . . . The authors of the proposal found nothing sensible to say to the remarks of members of the Central Committee. . . . As a result, the Central Committee had to take matters into its own hands . . ." (p. 5).

[23] Cf. Philip Mosely, "The Nineteenth Party Congress," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (January 1953), pp. 249-50, for another discussion of this particular point on agricultural economics.

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the kolkhoz as well—some members of the Soviet intelligentsia virtually expressed, in 1951, the view that the Party should never have replaced War Communism by the New Economic Policy thirty years before:

> Some persons assert that the Party acted wrongly in retaining commodity production after the Party assumed power and nationalized the means of production. . . . They consider that the Party should have abolished commodity production then and there. In saying this they cite Engels, who states:
>
> "Once society takes over the means of production, commodity production will be abolished . . ." (pp. 2-3).

And again:

> It is said that after the predominance of public ownership of the means of production was established . . . , commodity production . . . should have been abolished (p. 4).

The "left" Bolsheviks of 1951 also seem to take up another view of the "left" opponents of the NEP in 1921: they predict that the "sectors," or even the "remnants," of "commodity production" which are permitted to exist will grow out of control and lead to the "restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union.[24] According to Stalin, there are comrades

> who say that since socialist society [i.e., the Soviet Union today] does not liquidate the commodity forms of production, all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism—labor as a commodity, surplus value, capital, profit from capital . . . —must also be re-established in our country (p. 4).

That is,

> It is said that commodity production . . . must and necessarily will lead to capitalism under any circumstances whatsoever (p. 3).[25]

We will by now not be surprised to hear that the ultra-"lefts" of the early 1920's who affirmed that the party leadership had

[24] The existence of such views in the Party in the early 1950's seems to confirm the Bolshevik apprehension that remnants—in this case, of "oppositions"—will never die. (Cf. Leites *op.cit.*, ch. 18, section 3; and Leites and Bernaut, *op.cit.*, ch. 10.)

[25] In opposing the views which we have just indicated, Stalin takes up a position identical with that assumed by Lenin in 1921 when he defended the introduction of the New Economic Policy. Stalin denies in 1952, as Lenin did in 1921, that the introduction or retention of certain limited aspects of "capitalism" will inevitably lead to its full "restoration" in the Soviet Union, and that the presence of a certain degree of "commodity production" in the Soviet Union is a necessary concession to the peasantry.

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introduced "state capitalism" have found successors in the early 1950's; though, of course, these successors have to use conditional language[26] and may often manage to deceive themselves. According to Stalin, there are Bolshevik economists who apply to the Soviet economy

> notions which are borrowed from Marx' analysis of capitalism . . . such concepts as "necessary" and "surplus" labor, "necessary" and "surplus" goods, "necessary" and "surplus" time (p. 4).

—implying, as Stalin points out, that

> under our conditions the labor the workers give to society for expanding production, developing education and public health, organizing defense . . . [is] not just as necessary to the working class . . . as labor expended on satisfying the personal needs of the worker and his family (*ibid.*).

These party economists also "speak of labor as a commodity or labor 'for hire' " (*ibid.*). Since, and again Stalin points this out, it would be "absurd" to say of a "working class owning the means of production" that it is "hiring itself and selling its labor to itself," the implication is clear: in the USSR today, according to these economists, the workers do not "own the means of production"; they do not "hold power"; the bureaucrats do. And the interests of these bureaucrats (served by the workers' "surplus labor") and the interests of the workers do not coincide.

Similar views seem to be held by A. I. Notkin, the recipient of a published answer to an unpublished letter he had written to Stalin. To him Stalin says:

> From your arguments it follows that you regard the means of production . . . which are produced by our nationalized enterprises as commodities (p. 11).

—which, as Stalin indicates, would seem to imply that

> directors of [nationalized] enterprises which have obtained means of production from the state . . . become their owners . . . (*ibid.*).

That is, Notkin reaches the conclusion that "the economic categories of capitalism . . . preserve their validity in our economics" (*ibid.*).[27]

[26] Cf. Leites and Bernaut, *op.cit.*, ch. 3, section 2.

[27] Stalin replies in conventional Marxist fashion that, while the "forms" of "the old categories of capitalism" remain, their "content" or essence has been changed under socialism (p. 11).

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In the Bolshevik view, those who advocate a much more rapid tempo of advance toward "communism" than that adopted by the Party come up against the question of whether or not it is within the power of the "subjective factor" to do the great things which should be done; and they tend to answer this question affirmatively. This will in turn dispose them to qualify or deny the existence of an "objective" law of Soviet society which would limit the power of the Party leadership over events.[28] Malenkov makes explicit this connection between a desire to advance too quickly and an underestimation of the limiting role of social "laws": "Negation of the objective character of economic laws is the ideological basis of adventurism in economic policy . . ." (p. 8). To this we might add a point which is tabu in the statements we are analyzing, namely, that the inclination toward "adventurism" is often related to a more or less conscious disaffection with the existing state of affairs.[29] It is in this light that we might interpret, in part, the shocked conservative tone of Stalin's discussion[30] of the affirmation of the Promethean "lefts" that the Party leadership can create, modify, and destroy "economic laws."[31] According to Stalin,

> Some comrades deny the objective nature of . . . the laws of political economy under socialism. . . . In view of the special role allotted by history to the Soviet state, they hold, the Soviet state and its leaders can negate existing laws of political economy, can "establish" new laws, "make" new laws (p. 1).

[28] In opposing this attitude, Stalin brings forward the classical Bolshevik point that omnipotence fantasies make for impotence (cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 6): "Let us suppose for a minute that we took the point of view of the mistaken theory which . . . proclaims the possibility of 'creating' and 'changing' economic laws. Where would that lead? It would lead to finding ourselves in the realm of chaos and chance; we would find ourselves slavishly dependent on chance occurrences" (p. 18).

[29] In contrast, Stalin alleges about those who currently manifest "left" moods: ". . . young cadres . . . are amazed by the colossal achievements of the Soviet regime, their heads are turned by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system and they begin to imagine that the Soviet regime 'can do anything,' that 'everything is child's play' to it . . ." (p. 2).

[30] In other situations, Stalin's emphasis has been in the opposite direction: in the early 1930's he stressed the belief that "there are no fortresses which a Bolshevik cannot conquer." (Cf. Leites, *op.cit.*, ch. 1, section 4.)

[31] There is apparently also a corresponding "right" mood—only incidentally treated by Stalin—which affirms man's impotence in the face of scientific laws rather than his omnipotence: "It is said that economic laws are of a spontaneous nature, that their effects are unavoidable, that society is powerless against them" (p. 2).

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Stalin rejects not only this view, but also its weaker variant, according to which it is possible to "change" laws:

> It is said that certain economic laws which operate in our country under socialism . . . are "changed" or even "radically changed" [as against what they were under capitalism]. . . . This is also wrong. It is impossible to "change" laws, and "radically," at that. If it is possible to "change" them it is also possible to abolish them and substitute other laws.[32] The proposition that laws can be "changed" is an echo of the incorrect theory that they can be "negated" and "made". . . . It is possible to limit the scope of operation of various laws; . . . but the laws can neither be "changed" nor "abolished" (p. 2).

It seems likely that (whatever the degree, or lack, of consciousness on the part of the participants) the real issue is the desirability and possibility of "negating," "abolishing," "changing" the status quo, and "substituting," "establishing," "making" something else.[33]

While some members of the intelligentsia thus seem to seek a way out of the unsatisfactory present by a more rapid and radical application of the social principles of communism, others —in a "right" mood—appear to wish for a reduction or cessation of Bolshevik political interference with the job of production, which they seem to conceive in a "technocratic" manner. Thus,

> Comrade Yaroshenko . . . greatly exaggerates the role of the productive forces [the technical aspects of production], similarly excessively underrates the role of production relations [the social aspects of production] and caps matters by proclaiming production relations under socialism to be part of the productive forces.
>
> Comrade Yaroshenko is willing to grant something of a role to production relations under the circumstances of "antagonistic class contradictions" [*sic*]. . . . He limits this role, however, to a negative one, that of a factor retarding the development of productive forces, fettering their development.
>
> [According to Yaroshenko] "The main problem of the political economy of socialism therefore *is not* to study the production relations of the people of a socialist society *but is* to work out and develop a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces in social production. . . ."

[32] This is an instance of the Bolshevik lack of belief in the existence of middle views.

[33] Stalin also opposes what he views as excessive differentiations between "socialism-communism" on the one hand and "capitalism" on the other—possibly yet further disguises of a "left" discontent with the Soviet status quo.

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> . . . Comrade Yaroshenko is not interested in such economic questions of the socialist order as the existence of varied forms of property in our economy, commodity turnover, the law of value, and so on, considering them to be secondary questions entailing purely academic arguments. He states plainly that in his political economy of socialism "disputes over the role of this or that element in the political economy of socialism (value, commodity, money, credit, et al.)—disputes which, among us, frequently acquire a pedantic character—will be *replaced* by a common sense discussion of the rational organization of productive forces. . . ."
>
> . . . He bluntly declares that "under socialism the basic struggle in the establishment of a communist society consists only in the struggle for correct organization of the productive forces. . . ." Comrade Yaroshenko solemnly announces that "communism is the highest scientific organization of productive forces in social production" (p. 13).

Stalin comments:

> Our literature contains another definition, another formula for communism, namely, Lenin's formula: "Communism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whole country." Evidently Comrade Yaroshenko does not like Lenin's formula . . . (p. 14).

Evidently, indeed, Yaroshenko does not care as much for "Soviets" as for "electrification"; more generally, he does not care as much for politics as for production (or for consumption either). He goes so far as to disagree openly with Stalin's formulation of the "basic law of socialism," saying:

> Production is presented here [by Stalin] as a means for attaining this chief aim of satisfying needs. . . . your [Stalin's] formulation of the basic economic law of socialism is based not on the primacy of production but on the primacy of consumption (p. 16).

Stalin can thus comment:

> He [Yaroshenko] turns production from a means into a goal. . . . What we get, then, is production for growth of production, production as its own raison d'être . . . (p. 17).

Although disagreements and relatively free discussion among economists (within the confines of Soviet Marxism) have been known to exist before, this published account of them by Stalin acquaints us with a veiled dissatisfaction inherent in the debates. However, two points need to be made in connection with this disclosure:

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(1) The "right" religion of production and the "left" devotion to a system of complete state ownership of production means and yield may both, in part, be ways of protesting against Soviet reality. But it should be noted that this veiled dissatisfaction on the part of at least a segment of the intelligentsia probably exists *within* a fundamental acceptance of the regime and system, and not as a protest against them.

(2) The very fact, evident in this published exchange between Stalin and certain second-level economists, that these critics felt free to disagree with Stalin and apparently suffered no severe punishment is of considerable interest. It seems to suggest that in certain respects, Stalin felt a degree of security which hitherto had been only rarely and inconsistently in evidence.

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EASTERN EUROPE:
Developments in Social and Economic Structure

By GEORGE KEMÉNY

In Central and Eastern Europe, roughly ninety million people live in a political setting labeled as "People's Democracy." The area constitutes a bloc which stretches from the Elbe and the Baltic to the Black Sea and includes six countries: Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria.[1] According to official Communist interpretation, these countries are in a phase of transition toward socialism; they have not yet attained the "summit" of development as represented by the Soviet Union. While the People's Democracies are traveling along the road to the form of organization of society established by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the period of time within which complete adoption of the Soviet system is to be achieved has not been defined.

The Political System

The difference between the authentic Soviet organization and the structure of the People's Democracies is indicated superficially by the People's Democracies' apparent departure from the Russian one-party system. Their governments are composed of representatives of the so-called "National Fronts," which include some non-Communists who are supposed to represent the peasant population. In point of fact, the non-Communist cabinet members are not representative of any part of the population or shade of public opinion. They and the Council of Ministers in each satellite state are but instruments carrying out the policy determined by the Politburo, the true master of the country.

The organization of the governments of the People's Democracies virtually follows the Soviet pattern. The constitution imposed on the satellites is in all essentials a replica of the constitu-

[1] Albania, the seventh People's Democracy, is geographically isolated from the bloc and has little significance except from a strategic point of view.

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tion introduced by Stalin in Soviet Russia in December 1936, although its imposition has, for one reason or another, been retarded in some of them. In Poland, the common pattern was not adopted until last year. International considerations at first induced the Kremlin to refrain from converting Eastern Germany into a People's Democracy in a formal sense, but in mid-1952, as a reply to the integration of Western Germany with the Western world, decisive steps were taken to bring Eastern Germany's political and economic structure into line with that of the other captive countries. In the post-Stalin era somewhat milder methods have replaced the rigid implementation of this policy. However, amelioration of policy has been confined to social and economic matters; no political changes whatever seem to be intended.

Constitutional formalities have little relevance in the Soviet sphere of influence. It is the possession and use of power that matters. Nonetheless, imposition of the Stalin constitution is a symbol of definite incorporation into the Russian orbit. It is a way of incorporation that keeps up the pretense of independent national governments within the Soviet sphere.

Divergence in the Social Structure

Though the methods of government are similar in the USSR and the People's Democracies, essential differences exist in their social and economic structures. In both areas, large- and small-scale industry, wholesale trade, and banking are state-owned, but, in contrast to Russia, private property prevails in the agriculture of the People's Democracies, with the exception of Bulgaria. A portion of the satellites' retail trade is also still in the hands of private enterprise.

The relevant point is the divergence in the organization of agricultural production. In Poland 80 per cent of the agricultural area, in Czechoslovakia 50 per cent, and in Hungary 60 per cent is managed by peasants who are owners of the land. The farmers are tied by compulsory deliveries to the system of planned economy and, at the same time, these delivery schemes are used as instruments of class warfare. Discriminative practices

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are aimed at speeding up the collectivization of land. Though administrative and economic pressures are applied, governments have hitherto refrained from open violence. Obviously, the experience of the USSR during the early 1930's acts as a deterrent. The Russians want to avoid a collapse in agricultural production, but, as it is, the problem of the peasant will have to be tackled. The attitude of the peasants toward the regime is one of open distrust, approaching and sporadically growing into passive resistance. Though the peasants have not offered organized open resistance, the Communists' control over the rural areas is limited.

Recent events in Eastern Germany, as well as in Hungary, have brought the failure of the agricultural policies into the open. To avoid a complete breakdown in production, concessions to the private owners of land have been proclaimed. However, there is no indication of an abandonment of socialist agriculture; the pace of its development has merely been slowed down.

Industrialization and Growing Dependence on Russia

Outside the sphere of peasant economy, a fundamental change in the economic and social structure of the area under review is in progress. A massive industrialization is being undertaken which in the countries that had a predominately agricultural production—i.e., in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria—amounts to a second Industrial Revolution.

Industrialization is modeled on the Soviet Five-Year Plans, which implies complete government control over resources. Decisions on the level of consumption and the rate of capital accumulation are taken centrally, regardless of popular wishes. The dogma according to which in a socialist economic system heavy industry must predominate is faithfully followed. Consequently, high priority is given to the expansion of heavy industry,[2] which in semi-industrialized countries implies shifting manpower away from agriculture. For highly industrialized areas

[2] Heavy industry includes, besides iron, steel, and engineering, the production of building materials and of basic chemicals.

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such as Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, the Russian pattern of planning requires a shift of resources from consumer goods to heavy industry.

The scheme of industrialization as conceived by Lenin in the early period of the Russian Revolution gains special significance as applied to the satellite economies. For one thing, it shapes their industrial build-up in accordance with the dogma. For another, it ties Eastern Europe more closely to Russia's economy. The expansion of heavy industrial potential meets Russian needs. The requirements of the USSR in machinery, industrial equipment, and semi-finished products to feed her armament industry are almost unlimited. In the case of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, reshaping of the industrial structure entails severance of economic ties with the West. Hitherto, exports of their light industry went westward, while now the products of their heavy industry are being absorbed by Russia. The change-over in industry involves redirection of trade to the East, and hence growing dependence on Russia. Thus, dogmatic views and practical needs harmonize admirably.[3]

Features of Planning

In the early postwar years, economic reconstruction in Eastern Europe was carried out within the framework of two- or three-year plans. Planning in that period was on the whole based on a system of mixed economy, though nationalization of industry was carried out on a scale which varied by country. The usual pattern was that mining, the iron and steel industry, and electricity supply were brought under public control, while a wide range of industries was run by private enterprise. Generally speaking, industrial production was restored to the prewar level; for Czechoslovakia and Hungary this level was considerably below the wartime peak. However, these plans merely laid the foundation for further industrialization. In agriculture, reconstruction naturally was slower. The impact of war on crops and cattle-breeding was far from overcome by the time the first postwar economic plans came to an end.

[3] The U.S. "Battle Act" has speeded up this development.

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Starting in 1949-1950, proposals were drawn up in a changed political atmosphere, since Moscow's rule over Eastern Europe had been established unquestionably. They could now be based on complete nationalization of industry. At the beginning of 1951, each of the national plans underwent a revision, and the pace of industrialization was stepped up vigorously, obviously on a central directive. It was then decided that semi-industrialized countries like Poland and Hungary should definitely be transformed into industrial communities within a period of five or six years (a five-year plan is in force in Hungary and a six-year plan in Poland). Both countries, as well as Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, are to be converted into "areas of iron and steel."

INDEX NUMBERS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (total)
Prewar level = 100

	Plan period	Achievements 1950	1951	1952*	Provision for end of plan period
Poland	1950-1955	224	279	334	452
Czechoslovakia	1949-1953	146	167	197	215
Hungary	1950-1954	207	269	332	475
Rumania	1951-1955	157	202	—	383
Bulgaria	1949-1953	274	326	—	378

* Approximate figures

If the provisions of the economic plans are carried out, industrial production in Czechoslovakia will attain more than twofold of the prewar level, that of Poland and Hungary between four- and fivefold, and output in Rumania and Bulgaria almost fourfold. In the course of the plan period, total industrial production in Czechoslovakia should be doubled, while engineering production should attain about 350 per cent of the initial level. In Poland, total industrial production is planned to reach roughly 260 per cent of the original level, and engineering 350 per cent. In Hungary, industrial production is to be trebled in total volume and engineering output to reach a fivefold level. According to official statements, full realization of these targets is well under way, though this optimism is hardly consistent with developments in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In both of these

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countries, official complaints have been voiced repeatedly about results falling short of the plans, and shortcomings in production have given rise to serious political crises. As regards Poland and Hungary, statements on plan fulfillment were until recently in accordance with current reports on industrial progress.

To what extent are the indices of total industrial production reliable? There is no hope of penetrating into the secrets of Soviet-controlled index calculations insofar as they are based on recent evidence. The author tried to evaluate the index figures relating to industrial production under the Hungarian Three-Year Plan, i.e., for a period when statistical evidence was much more complete. This evaluation revealed that the index figures on industrial achievement were overstated by roughly 20 per cent.[4]

Even when discounting a certain percentage of industrial growth as reflected in official index figures, the achievements in the field of industrialization are unprecedented in Eastern Europe. Without question, there has been an astounding rate of expansion. Figures available on steel development appear more credible than indices on total production. Steel output of the Eastern European area (including Eastern Germany and excluding Yugoslavia) amounted to 6.45 million tons in 1937. In 1951, a steel output of 9.09 million tons was attained, and achievement in 1952 probably surpassed the 10 million mark. For 1954, a total production of about 16 million tons is being envisaged, the order of magnitude of the British steel industry.

An apprehension has dawned upon the Soviet leadership that the execution of this program is bound to overstrain resources. A recasting of the economic plans was recently announced by the East German government, as well as by the Hungarian government.[5] Heavy industrial expansion is to be slowed down and wider scope permitted for the development of light industries. Yet the basic principle of Soviet planning has not been reversed. The emphasis remains on heavy industrial development, with

[4] *Economic Planning in Hungary, 1947-1949*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1952, pp. 92-95.

[5] Written in July 1953.

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the possible reservation that targets for 1954 will be attained in 1955 or perhaps somewhat later.

Shortage of Manpower

For the majority of the countries of Eastern Europe, industrialization was intended to achieve full utilization of resources by providing employment for the surplus rural population. Under the early postwar plans, only a portion of the agricultural labor reserves was absorbed. Full employment was called for in the plans that followed, and they have fulfilled their objective. Even more, they have created overemployment.

This industrial expansion has depleted agricultural labor reserves. According to the statement of the Polish Communist leader Bierut,[6] during the postwar period the non-agricultural labor force in Poland has increased by 2.5 million. The Polish Six-Year Plan requires a yearly increase of 350,000 to 500,000 in non-agricultural occupations. In Rumania, non-agricultural employment rose by 210,000 during 1951. The Hungarian Five-Year Plan provides for a 650,000 increase of the industrial labor force. The story does not end with the drain on agricultural labor reserves. A continuous displacement of manpower is in progress, even in industrialized Czechoslovakia. As the center of gravity of production shifts toward heavy industry, the labor force in the light industries—textiles, ceramics, glass—has diminished by about 200,000, according to estimates.

In 1937, in Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary 5.5 million workers were engaged in mining and manufactures. In 1948 employment totaled 6.3 million. There is evidence that by mid-1952 the industrial labor force of these four countries attained or even exceeded 9 million. Displacement on this scale was effected under enormous strain. In agriculture a desperate labor shortage has developed, impeding farm production. In his recent speech, Bierut stated that the agricultural labor force in Poland had decreased by the astounding figure of 46 per cent during the postwar period. Along with

[6] In a report submitted to the Executive Committee of the Polish Workers' Party on June 15, 1952.

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this shortage, women have been drawn into industry in ever-increasing numbers. In Hungary, more than half of the increase in the labor force during the twelve-month period ending with July 1952 consisted of women. The manpower shortage has brought women workers into industry on a scale previously experienced only in a war economy.

Productivity and Pressure on Wages

The problem of manpower is related to the productivity of labor. Economic plans are necessarily conceived on preliminary estimates of labor force and productivity per head. Communist planners are extremely exacting as to achievements in industry. They prescribed a 92 per cent increase of productivity per head within the framework of the Hungarian Five-Year Plan. In Rumania, productivity per head is to be raised by 75 per cent in the course of five years; in the other countries, improvements of between 62 and 66 per cent are expected. A rise in labor productivity is to a certain extent a corollary of improved equipment, but this is only part of the story. Advances at the rates required depend to a considerable extent on the workers, who are expected to make increased efforts.

The economic plans were imposed on the satellite populations by force. The same applies to the decisions concerning a steep rise of productivity in industry. Decisions once taken have to be enforced by all means of propaganda and pressure. The methods used to obtain higher labor productivity, such as Stachanovism, work competitions, and the like, have been borrowed from Russia. The main instrument, however, has been the general introduction of piecework. The application of piece rates has never been popular among workers in Eastern Europe. They might become reconciled to that wage system if it worked out to their benefit, but exactly the opposite happens in the People's Democracies. Piece rates are used to enforce higher achievements without adequate reward. Along with the changing of the working norms, wage rates are being adjusted so that earnings can reach their previous level only if output is raised in proportion to the alteration of the norm. The worker is thus

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prevented from reaping the fruits of his increased efforts, a proceeding imaginable only in a totalitarian system.

This wage policy is backed by harsh coercive measures. The worker is tied to his place of work. Change of employment is no longer permitted without the consent of the factory management; transgressors run the risk of being sent to labor camps. In such an atmosphere, resistance against the imposition of revised norms appears not only futile but dangerous. It might be labeled as sabotage, entailing a heavy penalty.

There are a great many tensions in the economic and social life of the People's Democracies specifically connected with precipitate industrial expansion, but hardly any of them foster such embitterment as do the methods applied for improving efficiency. They poison the atmosphere in the pits and factories, as well as that of public life. Moreover, repeated manipulation of the norms robs the workers of the incentive to increase their achievement. The ordinary worker will be on his guard before raising his output, in order to avoid a revision of the norm. Precedents for manipulating the norms are created chiefly by Stachanovites and shock-workers, who are regarded as traitors by the rank and file. This whole procedure widens the gulf between leadership and workers.

Despite incessant efforts, productivity does not advance according to plan in Eastern Europe. It is evidently far behind schedule in Rumania. It is hard to imagine that investment programs, even though considerable in scale, could be pieced together in that country, with its traditionally inefficient and corrupt administration. Planned economy ought to have a better chance in the countries with more advanced methods of administration. It is significant, therefore, that in a nation with as high a level of industrial development and conduct of public affairs as Czechoslovakia plan fulfillment should be consistently unsatisfactory. Repeated bitter reproaches and exhortations on the part of the Communist leadership afford credible evidence of widespread passive resistance in Czechoslovakia. The outburst of unrest which reached a climax in the Slansky trial was by no means unrelated to the failure to realize the economic plan. This

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failure involved, in turn, an inability to discharge commitments toward the USSR, a shortcoming closely connected with the attitude of the workers. Czechoslovakia's deep-rooted democratic tradition may have something to do with these difficulties, obstructing the conversion of the industrial structure at the speed required.

In Poland and Hungary, the economic plans have been more up to schedule in the industrial sectors, but though production targets have generally been reached, productivity lags behind, particularly in Hungary. The overfulfillment of the expansion of the industrial labor force hides this fact. After the failure to attain the necessary level of productivity, a larger labor force was recruited in order to achieve the production program. This method of plan fulfillment is feasible only so long as labor reserves are available. Their exhaustion calls for more rigid adherence to the productivity targets, a requirement foreboding increasing tension.

Lately, signs of deterioration have been perceptible even in countries with hitherto successful records in planning. Light industrial production actually had to be reduced in Hungary and the housing program drastically curtailed in order to maintain expansion of heavy industry. This is a different picture from the one originally planned. The concept was, in point of fact, to extend the production of producer goods, as well as consumer goods, though with a marked difference in the rate of expansion in favor of the former category.

Disequilibrium in Permanence

A crucial problem for the economies in a state of transition behind the Iron Curtain is the low level of productivity in agriculture. Average yields appear to be extremely poor and organization of rural work is inefficient. After all, when planning for industrialization started, the rural population amounted to roughly 50 per cent of the total in Hungary, 75 per cent in Poland, and at least 80 per cent in Rumania (the situation differs in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany). Though dislocations in the course of the second plan periods have been con-

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siderable, the rural districts still hold a large proportion of the population. If Western techniques and methods of organization were used, the rural population might be large enough to provide food for the entire non-agricultural sector. The shortage of labor in agriculture is, in fact, a symptom of backwardness in farming methods and a sign of the inability of the governments concerned to overcome handicaps obstructing real progress.

Comparative figures on average crops published in the Report of the Economic Commission for Europe[7] disclose poor results in Eastern Europe:

AVERAGE YIELDS OF WHEAT, 1948-1952

	(100 kg. per hectare)
Western Europe	
Netherlands	36
Denmark	36
Belgium	32
United Kingdom	27
Western Germany	26
Eastern Europe	
Czechoslovakia	19
Hungary	13
Poland	12

Prospects in regard to further development are not promising. Communist agrarian policy has undermined private farming, while socialist agriculture has proved anything but a success. There are indications of chaotic conditions in a number of collective farms. These may be extreme cases, but it is worth noting that even progress in mechanization is slow. According to figures compiled for the *U. N. Yearbook* for 1951, one tractor per 23 hectares of arable land was in use in Great Britain, one per 25 hectares in Switzerland, and one per 48 hectares in the United States; while in Czechoslovakia only one tractor per 190 hectares of arable land was available, in Hungary one per 322 hectares, and in Poland one per 620 hectares. Agricultural investment is insufficient to effect a release in manpower at a scale meeting industrial requirements. As a result, fundamental disequilibrium is being constantly produced.

[7] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, Geneva, 1953, p. 176.

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In spite of promises recently made in Eastern Germany and Hungary to give more consideration to agricultural needs, it is hard to believe that a change toward a balanced development will take place. Undoubtedly, a firmer foundation for industrialization could be gained by taking a roundabout course. This would involve giving more ample scope to rural developments and slowing down industrial expansion, temporarily at least. Yet, to assume that a switch-over to a more rational method of industrialization might be practicable in the Soviet orbit would amount to disregarding political realities. Under Moscow's rule, economic plans are not conceived in terms of pure economics. They must achieve economic objectives by fighting and crushing "class enemies" and serve as instruments to strengthen the hold of the central authorities over the entire population.

Bilateralism vs. Integration

The Western world has given much thought to the central planning in the Soviet orbit which is meant to effect a rapid economic integration of the whole Russian-dominated area. A reconsideration of this complex appears justified. It is evident that the expansion of heavy industry in all the satellite countries is being carried out on central directives. In each of them, a heavy industrial capacity is being created which exceeds the needs of the economy concerned. The bulk of the surplus production is being shipped to Russia in exchange for raw materials. There is also, of course, an interchange of engineering products among the captive countries themselves. Moreover, Russia's trade with her satellites does not consist exclusively of machinery and kindred products on the one side, and of raw materials on the other. To a certain extent, Soviet industry provides the dominated countries with heavy equipment and, last but not least, with heavy armament. Yet the main current in trading between the Soviet Union and the satellites follows this pattern: exchange of capital goods for raw materials.

In this respect, a division of labor has developed among the satellites. Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany are the main suppliers of machine tools and heavy electrical equipment.

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Poland supplies other kinds of heavy equipment and railway cars. Hungary's deliveries consist mainly of railway engines, of light electrotechnical products, etc. However, beyond this point, no policy aiming at a division of labor on a broader regional scale is pursued. For the rest, each of the satellite governments is intent on building up industry along the line of self-sufficiency.

In view of rapid industrial expansion and the mechanization of agriculture, internal requirements for engineering products are of appreciable size. Under these circumstances, it would be reasonable for each of the satellite countries to specialize in a few types of engineering products and to provide the whole area with them. Nothing of the kind is perceivable. Production programs in each of the small- or medium-sized economies are unduly varied, with a view to providing the market with a wide range of home-made products. In this concept, considerations of the advantages of large-scale production are discarded. Government spokesmen boast of achievements that would be regarded as misconceptions if measured by standards of up-to-date industrial development. It appears that tractors, as well as agricultural combines, are being manufactured in almost all the countries concerned. Poland, Hungary, and Rumania have embarked on the manufacture of different machine tools for the engineering, textile, and building industries. Rumanian and Bulgarian industries have added the construction of commercial vehicles, diesel motors, electrical locomotives, and turbines to their production programs.

Industrial production in all the satellites is being geared to the economy of the USSR, but ties have also been established between individual countries. These ties do not involve a regional integration. As has been indicated, central planning by Moscow exists only in respect to the expansion of heavy industry. For the rest, doubts appear justified as to whether any central plan designed to promote an integration of the satellite economies has ever been drawn up. Certainly, there exists a central control resting with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow. But is it likely that duplication in output of a few thousand tractors or of a few hundred combines per year in

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Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria is the result of comprehensive planning?

As a matter of fact, economic plans in each of the captive countries largely follow a similar pattern. Along with Russia, all six of them are developing heavy industry on parallel lines and, by and large, light industry as well. Moscow interferes very little as to what proportion of one or another of the different branches of consumer goods industries is expanded within the slice left for this industrial sector. Decisions fall to the national governments as to whether they wish to give priority to the production of textiles or of other necessities. When deciding on these issues, the plan architects do not envisage a regional division of labor; they are inclined to think in terms of national self-sufficiency.[8]

Thus, six national plans emerge, all of them bent on an all-round industrial development. Of course, individual differences exist in the industrial build-up of the various countries, but the fundamental pattern of plan policy does not set out for regional integration. The interchange of goods among the satellites remains secondary in importance, the main flow of trade being directed toward Russia.

The Report of the Economic Commission for Europe holds the view that investments in the Russian-dominated countries are made according to coordinated national plans, while the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance acts as the coordinating agency. Getting down to facts, however, the Report admits that no integration in the proper sense is the outcome of this coordination. As it points out, "The planned increase in coal, steel and electric power is strikingly similar in all of these countries, in spite of big differences in their natural resources for

[8] The official organ of the Hungarian Workers' Party, *Szabad Nép*, recently admitted past adherence to a policy of economic nationalism. Under the heading, "Economic Cooperation of the Democratic Countries," the paper stated in its issue of August 3, 1953: "We did not rely on the strength of cooperation and instead allowed our economic plans to be influenced by tendencies toward autarky and by policies striving at economic isolation. . . . Disregarding requirements of economy, we embarked on the production of a wide range of goods with the sole objective of reducing imports. Obviously, it would have been more reasonable to import those goods and to manufacture other articles in exchange for them." It remains to be seen whether more than lip service will be paid to these sound principles in the future.

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such production."[9] Concerning manufacturing industry, it says: "There are some reports of attempts to have rolling mills specialize on certain lines of production, but on the other hand, many indications point to an endeavor by each country to develop its engineering industry on an all-round basis."[10]

Industrial costs are necessarily affected by these developments. The undiscriminating policy of the Kremlin is bound to create industrial high-cost areas. Heavy industry is required to be extended, regardless of cost considerations and location problems, as is shown in the case of Hungary. Scanty home supplies in iron ore and a complete lack of metallurgical coal should prevent the planning authorities from transforming Hungary into a country of iron and steel but, when faced with the dogma of the indispensability of a powerful heavy industry, economic calculations seem to lose their validity in the Russian orbit. In addition, the planners of the satellite countries forfeit the opportunities offered by large-scale production. Apart from satisfying Soviet needs, their plans are calculated to meet the requirements of limited national markets.

The lack of integration, in the sense of the formation of larger regional units, is rooted in the Soviet Union's political concept of domination over Eastern Europe. This concept is in accordance with the principle of *divide et impera*. Satellite governments are tied to Moscow on a strictly bilateral basis. A network of bilateral pacts of friendship and mutual assistance has been drawn up between Moscow and each of the satellites. A grouping of any kind is not tolerated: Moscow wishes to deal with small units. Any tendency toward forming a federation has been nipped in the bud in the past and will, apparently, be prevented in the future. This policy explains the lack of planning for the creation of complementary economies. Moscow obstructs all such tendencies. Agreements on the industrial cooperation of the border districts have been concluded between Czechoslovakia and Poland, and between Hungary and Rumania, but they have never been permitted to unfold into a comprehensive scheme of coordinated industrial activities.

[9] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, p. 205. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

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Moscow adheres rigidly to the principle of bilateralism in the economic field as well. She obviously assumes, and not without reason, that close economic cooperation on the part of the satellites would undoubtedly encourage federative tendencies.

Conclusions

The outstanding achievement of economic planning in Eastern Europe consists in the elimination of chronic underemployment. By now, conditions are completely reversed, as the pace of industrialization has produced overemployment. In the long run, the shortage of manpower may be combatted by replacing subsistence farming with collective cultivation of the land. Action in this direction is being retarded by apprehensions of a sudden breakdown of agricultural production, and these fears are strengthened by the fact that achievements on collective farms are not satisfactory. In the meantime, the mechanization of collective as well as of private farming should release manpower for industry. Though perceivable progress has been made in this field, the drive toward mechanization of agriculture does not match the requirements of manpower economy.

In the industrial field, the development of efficiency is hampered by an economic policy bordering on economic nationalism. It should be noted, however, that, measured by previous standards, productivity has been appreciably raised by the continuous expansion of equipment. On the other hand, owing to the policies described above, the young industry of Eastern Europe is at a definite disadvantage if contrasted with large-scale industry in the West.

The pressure on wages might be regarded as a means to counteract the high level of other costs, but this pressure acts as a boomerang. The manipulation of working norms causes the workers to refrain from improving their achievement. Low wages also serve to force women into industry, as average earnings do not cover the needs of a worker's family, even at an extremely moderate standard. Paradoxically, the shortage of labor appears to be combatted by keeping the wage level low, a method conceivable only in a totalitarian system.

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Wage policy, as practiced by the satellite governments, is at the same time intent on leveling earnings between Eastern Europe and the USSR in favor of the Russian worker. In point of fact, in the captive countries real wages, after a rise from a near-starvation level in the early postwar years, have hardly improved since 1948-1949. In Russia, on the other hand, real wages have been gradually increasing during the last four years.

The satellite governments have to fight against heavy odds. Their main difficulties arise from the overstraining of resources by the tasks set in the economic plans. The enforced pace of industrialization hampers a balanced development. In addition, the excessive rate of capital accumulation leaves no room for rewarding increased efforts and, in fact, obstructs a decisive rise of efficiency.

The wage policy might be reversed if its evil effects became more manifest. Such a change would involve alteration of the economic plans in their fundamental aspects. A reduction of capital goods output would then be needed to release resources for the production of consumer goods. Obviously, such a change of policy lies beyond the powers of the satellite governments. Even if, induced by increasing strain, Moscow proves to be more lenient than hitherto about this point, it may prove hard to overcome the frictions inherent in the industrial structure, once they have been created.

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Review Articles

CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN CHINESE COMMUNISM

By MORRIS WATNICK

Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, pp. 258. $4.00.

Conrad Brandt, Benjamin I. Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 552. $7.50.

Charles P. Fitzgerald, *Revolution in China*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger & Co., 1952, pp. 290. $4.50.

ONE of the beguiling assumptions to which many latter-day discussions of the problem of Communism have shown a special addiction has been the endowment of Marxist-Leninist theory with a pervasive sovereign power over the decisions of the Kremlin and of Communist leaders throughout the world. Seldom, if ever, formulated in rigorous terms, the general line of argument would have it that Communist leaders everywhere are captives of their own "ideology," committed to a belief in Marxism-Leninism as a body of generalized theoretical knowledge which can be made to yield apodictic answers to major problems of policy at home and abroad. With Marxist-Leninist theory thus invoked to banish the troublesome problem of the imputation of motives, the task of accounting for all the historic shifts in Soviet and Communist policy is reduced to one of compiling a catalogue of choice textual quotations which ring with the authentic doctrinal cadences.

Since it is manifestly impossible to establish a determinate relation between a general theory and a specific choice of policy, the usual expedient is to say that while Communist policy is dictated by considerations of more immediate urgency, it must nevertheless move within the "framework" of the theory. To say, however, that a theory or an ideology (the two terms are frequently used interchangeably) merely sets outer limits to

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action is to cast doubt on its heuristic value as an explanation of the specific motives for such action. The abstract terms of the theory then become sufficiently capacious to accommodate widely divergent policies, and the connection between Marxist-Leninist theory, taken in its positive sense, and Communist practice turns out to be purely contingent. The fact that Communists have rejected any contemplative role for theory, insisting instead that its purpose is purely instrumental, does not help matters in this regard. In actual practice, it has made theory a handmaiden of party apologetics and its dimensions as flexible as the Communist policies for which it is supposed to serve as a "framework."

As it happens, moreover, the widely held view of the relation between Communist theory and practice is open to an even more formidable objection. The argument achieves its specious plausibility by ignoring the distinction between the logical and the psychological dimensions of the problem. To prove that a given Communist policy is compatible with Marxist-Leninist theory is not to show that it was, in fact, adopted for that reason. A leader of a political movement or of a regime, *qua* leader, may respond to a multiplicity of motivating influences, many of them being of the purely fortuitous type. Among the other relevant data, his own doctrinal predilections may in some cases exercise some influence without necessarily playing the determining role. This being the case, it is impossible to reduce all Communist strategy to considerations of doctrinal consistency or even to assume without specific inquiry, as is frequently done, that major Communist decisions are always "guided" by a putative regard for theory. To the extent that a student is beguiled into this belief in the sway of theory over Communist action, he is victimized by the very subject-matter of his own study.

If we recognize, however, as we must, that Communist leadership is in some instances influenced in its decisions by a Marxist-Leninist style of thinking (especially in its expectations of how different social classes will behave in a given political situation), our insight is merely the beginning of a problem, not its solution. It still remains for detailed research to determine the historic

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cases in which doctrinal considerations did, in fact, demonstrably affect such decisions and the relative weight that can be assigned to the doctrinal element in relation to the other data.

I

It is precisely its keen regard for the complexities of the problem, coupled with a high level of scholarship and meticulous research, which stamps Benjamin Schwartz's study of the formative period of the Chinese Communist Party with a distinction reserved for few other works of its genre. If some of its conclusions are subject to reservation, his work does not go for naught on that account. Denied finalities, students of the subject can only welcome it for its meaningful questions and the light they throw on obscure issues of Communist strategy both in China and in other underdeveloped areas.

Dr. Schwartz's subject is the history of the Chinese Communist Party from its establishment as an urban political organization in 1921 to the transfer of its activities to the hinterland Chinese Soviet Republic in Kiangsi in 1931. His account is not structured as a history in the usual sense of the term, however, but as a running analysis of the central strategic issues with which Chinese Communists and Comintern leaders had to contend during the period. For this purpose, Dr. Schwartz put under tribute an impressive accumulation of documentary sources of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian origin in which these problems of political strategy come to the fore as they actually or seemingly presented themselves to minds immersed in the rubrics of Marxist-Leninist thinking. The result is a rewarding application of the method of *verstehende Soziologie* to a subject-matter where it is sorely needed today—the problem of Communism in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The key to the character of Communism in China is to be found in Dr. Schwartz's introductory chapter. Leninism came to a China seething with political unrest and intellectual ferment, but devoid of an industrial proletariat worthy of the name or resembling anything to which European Marxism looked for the mainstay of its strength. Accordingly, as Dr.

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Schwartz shows, Leninism exercised its original and greatest influence after 1917 among China's university-trained intellectuals, estranged from the traditional values of Chinese society and inspired by the chiliastic vision of a rationalized social order proclaimed in the new doctrine from the West. This "transvaluation of values" found political expression in 1921, when a small group of intellectuals constituted itself as a Communist Party under the leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsiu but guided for a decade thereafter by the Comintern, acting through a long succession of agents—Voitinsky, Maring, Galen, Borodin, Lominadze, Mif, Mandalian, Roy, Neumann, and others. With the wealth of documentary evidence made available in Dr. Schwartz's study, it is possible to recreate something of their general outlook and objectives as they planned the first major Communist venture in a "semi-colonial" area. To what extent, then, were they beholden to the precepts of Marxism-Lenism for the policies they followed?

As construed by Dr. Schwartz and amply borne out by the evidence, the "right" strategy imposed by the Comintern on Chinese Communist leadership until 1927 was clearly predicated on opportunistic considerations which had little, if any, relation to Marxist-Leninist theory. On the surmise that working within the Kuomintang would enable Communists the better to recruit a peasant and worker following of their own and ultimately to gain control of the Kuomintang *apparat* itself, the Comintern under Stalin's leadership decreed a special type of "collaboration from within" which required Chinese party members to join the Kuomintang as individuals and to subordinate party policy to Kuomintang objectives. To overcome the orthodox Marxist scruples of Ch'en Tu-hsiu that parties are uniquely related to "class interests," all the devices of logomachy were brought into play to vindicate the Kuomintang as a multi-class party representing the interests of workers, peasants, "petty" and "national bourgeoisie." Whatever its Marxian embellishments, the decision to collaborate "from within" was made in strictly organizational and manipulative terms based on misguided expectations of what Communists could do if they but persevered long

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enough within the Kuomintang. On this score, the weight of documentary evidence assembled in his monograph clearly warrants Dr. Schwartz's judgment that ". . . one is tempted to suspect that the theory concerning the 'class compositions' of the Kuomintang was deduced from the strategic desirability of cooperating with the Kuomintang rather than vice versa" (p. 71).

That the policy turned out to be a disastrous miscalculation, making it possible instead for Chiang Kai-shek to turn on his erstwhile Communist allies in 1927 and virtually demolish the entire "urban base" on which their own party strength rested, is now a twice-told tale. It was only then, according to Dr. Schwartz's analysis, that Marxist-Leninist theory reasserted itself as a guide to strategy. Ousted by the Kuomintang, Chinese Communists were forced to revert to a pure "class strategy" and, at Comintern direction, gave it a "left" orientation by putting sole reliance on urban workers for a program of armed insurrection in various cities. Notwithstanding Chiang's triumph, the ensuing destruction of the party's urban organizations, and the general disenchantment of urban workers with the Communist appeal, a tortured "theoretical" argument was advanced to sustain the view that China was then on the verge of another revolution, and new leaders—Ch'u Chiu-pai, Li Li-san, and Wang Ming—were installed in rapid succession to put the "left" strategy into effect. The new policy was, if anything, more of a failure than its predecessor, resulting only in futile uprisings in Nanchang and Canton in 1927 and an equally unsuccessful assault on Changsha in 1930 which virtually terminated the career of the Chinese Communist Party as an urban organization. That it survived at all, to emerge as a rival state in large sections of China and eventually to install itself as the government of the entire country, was the result of a successful "deviation" within the party itself, consummated during the very period when the Comintern and the official leaders of the party brought about its demise in China's cities.

Following Dr. Schwartz, it is possible to read the history of the party during these four years (1927-1931) as a contest for the basic orientation of Chinese Communism between two di-

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vergent schools of political strategy, both alike committed to a course of "armed struggle" but poles apart regarding the "correct social base" on which the party should rely for its principal source of support. The dominant group, determining the official "line" of the party with Moscow's full accord, took its cue, Dr. Schwartz believes, from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that leadership in a Communist-organized revolution—even in a predominantly agricultural country like China—is properly a function of the urban proletariat and that, conversely, the peasantry, however prepared it might be to follow the lead of urban workers, could not supersede them as the "main force" in the revolution owing to its lack of independent political initiative, its retarded sense of class cohesiveness, and its retrogressive mentality. Both the Comintern and the "proletarian"-biased Chinese leadership therefore insisted, as Dr. Schwartz takes great pains to show, that the party should locate the bulk of its organizational strength among industrial workers in the cities of China.

As matters turned out, however, it was the contrary strategy of Mao Tse-tung—that of organizing peasant-recruited armies operating without urban support—which ultimately prevailed and came to be identified as the *specifica differentia* of Chinese Communism. Dr. Schwartz traces the origins of that strategy to Mao's activities among the peasants of Hunan and Kiangsi in 1927, in the course of which Mao became convinced that the prospects of a Communist victory depended on the party's willingness to recognize and harness the revolutionary potential of China's peasantry. Thereafter, he proceeded, on his own initiative and without sanction from either the Comintern or his own party leaders, to organize the first peasant-recruited armies which gained control over large hinterland areas while Communist fortunes in the cities traveled a precipitous downward course. By 1931 the party had, in fact, lost all semblance of urban labor support, leaving its leaders with no recourse but to yield to Mao's pressure for the transfer of party authority from Shanghai to his newly established Soviet Republic in Kiangsi. Dr. Schwartz concludes, then, that the peasant supplanted the urban worker as the accepted mainstay of the Communist drive in

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China solely as a result of Mao's deviation from the Moscow-imposed urban "line" and in defiance of the prevailing reading of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Dr. Schwartz's researches leave little room for doubt that, as a matter of sheer historical fact, the principle of a Communist strategy in China based on armed peasant support was conceived and first given effect by Mao Tse-tung without regard for the strategy favored by Moscow and its Chinese party leaders. The date he assigns to Moscow's belated acceptance of the principle and to Mao's achievement of full control over the party (1931) is open to some doubt, but it does not call his principal conclusion into question. Yet, for all its merit in establishing the historical origin of Maoist strategy, Dr. Schwartz's contribution deserves equal consideration as an examination of some of the larger problems of Communist theory and practice in China, all the more so since they have a distinct relevance for other underdeveloped areas today.

The central problem at issue is the extent to which actual Communist strategy can part ways with what is generally regarded as an essential ingredient of Marxist-Leninist doctrine (in this case, the proposition that the party must derive its principal membership and support from the industrial proletariat) while still retaining its Leninist character and goals. In more specific terms, did Mao actually commit an act of heresy when he substituted peasants for workers as the primary strategic preoccupation of the Communist effort in China?[1] The problem here is of more than academic interest, because our judgment of what is and what is not possible in actual Communist practice is strongly influenced by a general conviction that Communism, as an organized movement, has given hostages to a body of substantive social theory which defines the limits beyond which its leadership will not go. Before considering Dr. Schwartz's

[1] Clearly, the answer to this question does not depend on the historical judgment as to whether or not Mao was the originator of this strategy, for historical priority is not necessarily an indication of a doctrinal deviation. If it could be established that his strategy merely applied in practice what is in any case entailed in the structure of Leninism (unlimited flexibility as a maxim of strategy), he would then emerge as a better Leninist than those less adept in translating Leninist principles into practice.

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final conclusions, therefore, it may be useful to point out certain elements of strategic choice which are not given their full due in his analysis of the shift in Chinese Communist strategy from 1927 to 1931 and which, when taken into account, would entail a modification of his general views of Maoist strategy and its place in the Leninist tradition.

The first of these concerns the elements of experience (personal and historical) and vested party interests which the Comintern and Chinese party leaders brought to bear on the situation in China during that period. Dr. Schwartz contends that the decision to resort to armed action in China's cities rather than in its hinterland areas was primarily a direct consequence of a belief in the superior revolutionary class consciousness which Marxism-Leninism assigns to the industrial proletariat. Yet the origin of the party and the social composition of its leadership and active membership justify a strong presumption that the explanation for their reliance on the proletariat lies elsewhere. Drawn largely from the urban intelligentsia of China, the official leaders of the party and their cadres cast their choice for the industrial workers not so much because of the proletariat's place in the Marxian scheme of things, but because, as urban dwellers, workers were within immediate range of the party's influence and therefore served as the most obvious source of manpower for armed insurrection or for any other purpose. Obviously, these two lines of motivation were not mutually exclusive, a consideration which would make their relative importance difficult to determine were it not for the fact, to be indicated presently, that Dr. Schwartz's derivation of the favored strategy from theory is open to objection on grounds of Marxist theory itself. If so, the various documents cited by him which call for greater effort to recruit a large following among urban workers (pp. 122, 125, 131) are accounted for more convincingly in terms of such immediate party interests than by the argument from doctrine.

Also excluded from the framework of Dr. Schwartz's analysis but of obvious relevance to the partiality of the Comintern leaders for a "proletarian base" in the cities of China is the fact that their own historical horizon and direct personal experience

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were limited to the classic models of European revolution, starting with that of France in 1789 and culminating with the Communist seizure of power in Russia in 1917, all of which were in a primary strategic sense urban uprisings with secondary repercussions in rural areas. In seeking to shape a revolution in China in the European image, they were therefore predisposed to favor urban action by misleading analogies—historical, geographic, military, and technical—none of which are exclusively or primarily attributable to the terms of Marxist-Leninist theory. Accordingly, if armed insurrection in China was to be patterned on the urban model derived from Europe, the obvious recourse for Chinese Communists was to recruit their following from the most suitable and largest section of the urban population, the wage earners. Read in this light, the numerous Communist pronouncements of the period lamenting the small "proletarian base" of the party and calling for its enlargement take on a somewhat different meaning from that assigned to them by Dr. Schwartz. That they also provided Moscow and the urban leaders in China with a doctrinal justification for their claim to full control of party activities in the face of Mao's growing power in Kiangsi is also obvious and, while Dr. Schwartz allows for this (pp. 137, 155, 168, 171), the main incidence of his discussion tends to exaggerate the influence of doctrine at the expense of elements such as these in shaping the political behavior pattern of Chinese Communists.

If further justification were required for these qualifications, it is to be found in certain elements of Marxist doctrine itself, particularly as Communists of that period read it in relation to conditions in China. It demands no great expertise in Marxism to discern its imprint on the method of analysis which entered into the strategic calculations of Chinese Communists, the central feature of which was the premise that classes and class responses are the basic data governing the configuration of political events. Beyond this, however, any resemblance to the practical political conclusions of European Marxism is more apparent than real, especially if the observer assumes that Chinese Communists, in applying the Marxian concept "proletariat" to the

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analysis of Chinese society in the period under consideration, construed the term to have the same real referent in the social structure of China as it has for him. There is ample reason to believe that this was not the case. On the contrary, for all the prominence given to them in the documents cited by Dr. Schwartz, the urban wage earners of China, as of all underdeveloped areas, were the despair of Communists, both Chinese and Russian, precisely because they did not and could not qualify as a "proletariat" in the full Marxian sense of the term. Modern industrial employment was still of recent origin in China and large numbers of workers in industrial occupations were merely employed seasonally; they were not, therefore, part of a disciplined and stable labor force which Marxism regards as an indispensable condition for the emergence of a "class for itself," that is, a social class capable of acting as a class on behalf of felt common interests. Communist leaders, given the Marxian cast of their thinking, were too keenly aware of this to miss its implications for their own political strategy. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, for example, in an article cited by Dr. Schwartz (p. 48), had no qualms about describing the situation in these terms. It was also given explicit official recognition in the theses on Communist strategy in "colonies and semi-colonies" adopted by the sixth congress of the Comintern in 1928, as well as in other pronouncements of the period. If, then, Chinese workers did not constitute a real "proletariat" as construed in Marxist theory, but were regarded instead as handicraftsmen and peasants temporarily engaged in urban wage labor but devoid of a "proletarian outlook," it follows that it was not primarily a regard for the Marxian preference for a worker-recruited movement which delayed the acceptance of Mao's peasant-based strategy. On such terms, a shift from urban insurrections to guerrilla warfare by mobile peasant armies would entail a geographic transfer of party authority, but not as violent a displacement of the social composition of the "mass base" of the Chinese Communist Party as Dr. Schwartz believes was the case. Greater weight than he concedes must therefore be assigned to the vested interests of the urban party bureaucracy and to Moscow's ultramontanism

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in accounting for the reluctance to recognize the efficacy of a peasant-based strategy.

The foregoing considerations also have a direct bearing on Dr. Schwartz's problem of reconciling Mao's peasant orientation with the Marxist-Leninist tradition. If actual workers are not the group referred to in various Communist pronouncements dilating on the theme of "proletarian hegemony" in the Chinese revolution (whether "bourgeois-democratic" or "socialist"), the term "proletariat" can only be construed as an eliptical reference to the leadership and cadres of the Communist Party itself. The real import of Leninism thus comes into its own in underdeveloped areas like China. The fewer the actual workers, the more it devolves upon the intelligentsia, organized as a revolutionary "vanguard" in a Communist Party, to take over the "historical mission" Marxism assigns to workers and to play the role of a proletariat by proxy. By the same token, the party "vanguard" becomes the repository of "proletarian class consciousness" to be transmitted to actual workers of the future when large-scale industrialization undertaken by a Communist regime brings them into existence. In this respect, Leninism marks a considerable departure from its Marxist forebear, which had to reckon with a permanent industrial proletariat already in existence in Western Europe whose immediate and subjective interests could be guided but not replaced by the socialist vision of the intellectuals. This transposition in the meaning of the term "proletariat" is better appreciated by Dr. Schwartz and his co-editors in *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* than anywhere in his own monograph:

> How . . . can one distinguish truly proletarian elements from non-proletarian elements in a party in which few actual proletarians are to be found? This can be done only by making a total inversion of certain Marxist presuppositions. Instead of deducing ideological tendencies from class affiliations, it now becomes necessary to deduce class affiliations from ideological tendencies. . . . Thus purity of belief becomes the criterion of class purity (p. 320).

The caution to be observed here is that this "inversion" was not an extraneous element introduced into Leninist doctrine by the Chinese Communists. It has always and everywhere been a

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distinctive attribute of Leninism. Capitalist industrialization in Western Europe gave pre-Leninist Marxism (as represented by Kautsky, for example) the hope that the course of economic development itself would sustain the efforts of intellectuals to infuse industrial workers with a socialist outlook. In the absence of such conditions in Russia, Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?* shifted the accent and goals of the movement overwhelmingly in favor of the "vanguard" intelligentsia of the party. The shift finds its most sophisticated philosophical expression in the work of the Hungarian Communist, Georg Lukacs, who, logical to the last, even refused to credit workers in advanced industrial countries with a "true" proletarian character, reserving it for the party "vanguard" alone until workers could assimilate it long after the revolution.[2]

In underdeveloped areas like China, the transfigured meaning of the doctrine is all the more obvious. Since Leninism is not of a piece with classical Marxism in insisting on a unique bond between party and "class interest," many of Dr. Schwartz's difficulties concerning the doctrinal legitimacy of Mao's innovation in Communist strategy are of his own making. As an outside observer analyzing Leninism as a datum, he is aware that no such connection exists in real terms (pp. 119-20, 191, 198-99). He recognizes that the Communist Party of China is an autonomous power of dedicated intellectuals, bent on undertaking drastic institutional changes "from above" to remold man and society in conformity with their own messianic vision. Yet he is reluctant to concede (p. 193) that the primacy of an autonomous party elite is embraced within the Leninist system itself, giving it a dimension of strategic flexibility free of any fixed "class" moorings. Hence the curious ambivalence of his conclusions. He acknowledges that Mao's strategy retained the crucial or "abiding" elements of Leninism; but he nevertheless thinks that "the general trend of Marxism in its Leninist form has been toward disintegration. . . . the Maoist heresy *in action*

[2] Georg Lukacs, *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Berlin, 1923, pp. 52-54, 63, 264-74. For an illuminating discussion of this and related matters, see Eduard Heimann, "Marxism and Underdeveloped Areas," *Social Research*, XIX (September 1952), pp. 322-45.

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on . . . the relation of party to class represents another major step in this process of disintegration" (p. 202).

Yet few things have been more characteristic than the ease and flexibility with which Communist strategy has been able to shift its "class base" in defiance of the formal lineaments of traditional Marxist doctrine. A movement which confers upon its party hierarchy sole guardianship of the "true class consciousness" of the proletariat and relegates the immediate and felt interests of actual workers to an order of secondary importance is, by its very nature, not an expression of workers' "class interests" as workers conceive them, and need not feel bound by them in its political strategy except insofar as they enter the range of strategic calculations as data. But data are data and there is no inherent reason to prevent Communist leaders from substituting the aspirations of the peasantry or even of the "bourgeoisie" for those of workers as the prime objects of manipulation, if circumstances of time and place make this strategically expedient. Mao's initiative in shifting the strategic direction of Communist effort in China from the workers to the peasants, far from being a "heresy," was in reality a manifestation of Leninism come of age. By the same token, the Communists of India, southeast Asia, and Japan are today completely in line with the tradition in taking their guidance from Mao's *New Democracy* to make an open and direct bid for a following among the "national bourgeoisie" of these areas. From the standpoint of traditional Marxism, their posture as spokesmen of a "bloc of four classes" (peasants, workers, "petty bourgeoisie," and "national bourgeoisie") is, if anything, more of a doctrinal monstrosity than Stalin's attribution of that role to the Kuomintang in the 1920's. It is nonetheless the gravamen of Communist strategy in these areas today, enjoying the full sanction of Peiping and Moscow alike. If Mao's *New Democracy* of 1940 is an aberrant wanderer from the fold of traditional Marxism, it is yet of a kind with his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* of 1927 in observing the political rules of Leninism.

Dissent from certain of Dr. Schwartz's conclusions should not

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obscure the fact that they are the result of a meaningful research and close reflection on a subject notorious for its emotional involvements and intellectual pitfalls. It is therefore all the more to Dr. Schwartz's credit that he had made Spinoza's purpose his own—"neither to weep nor to rejoice but to understand"—and withal demonstrated that it is still possible to resist the rival temptations of a jejune empiricism and the extravaganzas of fancy which so often make the study of Communism an intellectual wasteland.

II

In *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, published under the auspices of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, Messrs. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank have provided students of the subject with an indispensable source book, valuable alike for the forty documents assembled and for the illuminating editorial commentaries which give them continuity. In effect, therefore, their collection is not a narrative of cabbages and kings but a truly coherent account of the history of Chinese Communism from its formative period and ill-starred collaboration with the Kuomintang to its eventual accession to power in 1949.

Like Dr. Schwartz in his own study, the editors of the present volume are beset by the problem of reconciling Maoist strategy with what they conceive to be the Leninist tradition. Without altogether discarding the reading of the problem which links it with the European Marxist partiality for the urban worker, they tend to give greater accent to Leninism itself as essentially a recasting of the parental doctrine to take account of a different class structure in backward areas. Political power in China, they hold, has always rested on two groups in the population, the peasantry and the students. To have recognized this and its implications for Communist strategy did not make Mao the less a Leninist, if Leninism itself is divested of its non-essential formal Marxian trappings:

> . . . Leninism is more than a dogma: it is also a way of seizing and holding power under any particular conditions. As such it demands singleness of purpose and multiplicity of means . . . a keen perception of the

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> "objective" realities which the "subjective" will of the Party bends toward its own ends. In this sense Mao is a Leninist in the best tradition; and his *Report* [*on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, February 1927] is a classic of Chinese Leninism (p. 79).

The documents printed in this volume fully sustain the point made by Dr. Schwartz in his own study that, during the first decade of its existence, the Chinese Communist Party was not structured as an urban worker organization. Despite numerous exhortations to the party to establish a foothold in urban enterprises, a report by Chou En-lai in 1930 was forced to concede that, of a total of 120,000 enrolled members, the party could number only some 2,000 industrial workers among them. Though Maoist strategy accepted Chinese realities for what they were, it contrived to find an honorific place for the fiction of the "proletarian" character of the party by simulating the existence of an urban proletariat in its Kiangsi and later in its Shensi strongholds. Thus, labor legislation, weighted representation in favor of "workers," and other devices of concealment also mentioned by Dr. Schwartz in his own study were a regular feature of Communist enactments in these hinterland regions. For the editors, these are evidences of the lingering hold which Marxism-Leninism continued to exercise over the party leaders, causing them to conjure up an urban proletariat where none existed. Yet to a greater extent than is evident in Dr. Schwartz's study, the editors of the present volume, as already noted above, show a perceptive appreciation of the novel elements which differentiate Leninism from European Marxism. Among the most important of these was the drastic redefinition of the term "proletariat" by which political consciousness and volitional commitment supplanted "objective" social status as qualifications for inclusion among the "vanguard" elements of the "proletariat." Its specific implications for Communist strategy are clearly delineated by the editors:

> . . . a Communist Party is a political instrument which derives its dynamism not from any organic tie with the industrial proletariat, but from the fact that it is a tightly organized, highly disciplined community—or élite corps—of believers which bases itself and rises to power on the dynamism of mass discontent. The mass base of the

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> movement can be furnished by the peasantry just as effectively as by the industrial proletariat (p. 320).

And, in fact, it would be difficult to find anywhere in Communist literature a more revealing insight into the total involvement, physical and spiritual, required of members of the "true proletariat" than is afforded in the excerpts from various documents included by the editors to illustrate the party's indoctrination program and the "Cheng-feng movement" of the early 1940's to eradicate unorthodoxies among party members (pp. 322-419). Liu Shao-chi's more recent *On the Party*, if read in conjunction with these extracts, gives pointed emphasis to the essentially tutorial attitude which defines the relation of the Communist Party to the "masses."

Were the elevation of the party's intelligentsia to the role of a "proletarian vanguard" the sum total of Communism's power of attraction for China's educated and professional groups, the prospects would be grim enough. As matters stand, however, the Communist program, particularly in its post-1940 guise of the *New Democracy*, has inducements far beyond the confines of party membership. Just as the program of agrarian reform helped the Communists to recruit peasants for their armies, so the program of industrialization envisioned in Mao's *New Democracy, On Coalition Government*, and *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship* (of which extensive excerpts are reprinted in this volume) has a special appeal for large numbers of China's intellectuals who have no formal ties with the party. The editors of this volume believe (pp. 476-77) that most Chinese intellectuals are, at least for the time being, willing to give the Communist regime a full measure of their cooperation. Even if the mounting rigors of the regime have driven many of them into exile since 1950, when this volume was completed, the greater number who remain to participate in and base their careers on the Communist program bear out the essential truth of the editors' judgment. To ignore this support or to misconstrue what it contributes to the regime's chances for survival is to do so at our own peril.

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III

The thesis that China's peasants and intellectual elite support the present Communist regime, thus giving it its source of endurance, is also maintained by Charles P. Fitzgerald in his *Revolution in China.* A product of his long preoccupation with the history and culture of China, his book is distinguished by an engaging urbanity and a sweep of historical synthesis not to be found in more specialized studies. But, to a degree which detracts from its other merits as an interpretive study, it is also marred by a lack of circumspection in its method of analysis and in its treatment of the data. In large measure, these shortcomings result from an injudicious use of historical analogies, of which his appraisal of the Communist revolution within China itself is a notable, though by no means the sole, instance.

Professor Fitzgerald is persuaded by his reading of China's political history that the victory of the Chinese Communist Party marks but the culmination of the latest cycle in a recurrent pattern of political change, the main outlines of which are discernible alike in China's dynastic past and in its subsequent forty years of miscarried republicanism. The social structure of China being what it is and always has been, no regime, whatever its road to power, has ever been able to sustain itself for long unless it commanded the support of China's peasants and scholars. This it could do only by demonstrating a capacity to govern effectively, preserve intact the traditional hierarchical distribution of functions, and regulate all aspects of social life according to the dictates of an all-embracing ideology. The Kuomintang failed, on this interpretation, not because it was remiss in preparing China for a political democracy neither known to nor sought by China's peasants and scholars, but because it could not retrieve these traditional *desiderata* in its actual exercise of power and, accordingly, forfeited the allegiance of both groups to the Chinese Communists. Undeterred by the somewhat oblique consequences of his own reasoning, Professor Fitzgerald is rigorously logical in drawing the conclusion that Communists rule China today because, at bottom, they conform to the eternal rhythm of Chi-

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nese history, their People's Republic being merely the Chinese Empire *redivivus*, their totalitarianism supplanting that of the dynastic emperors, their party cadres replacing the Confucian Mandarins, and Leninism inheriting the ubiquitous role of Confucianism. "As ever in China, form does not matter, but content is all important" (p. 118).

Unfortunately for the symmetry of his dialectic, form does matter no less than content—if indeed the distinction is a meaningful one at all—whether it be in China or elsewhere. Unless one is prepared to reduce all political knowledge to the mere proposition that power is always compounded of force and consent or to believe that history produces no genuine novelties, Professor Fitzgerald's reflections in this respect are not very helpful as a guide to the specific changes that Communism has brought about or may bring about in the historic fabric of Chinese society. Much more is gained, in fact, by assuming to the contrary that, save on the most formalistic of constructions, Chinese Communism represents a real break with the past rather than a restoration of the timeless values of an ancient civilization. What, for example, is achieved by calling Chinese Communism a modernized version of the "totalitarianism" of the Empire (p. 117) when few, if any, of the attributes of imperial rule warrant that description in its specific contemporary connotation? Even more crucial to the problem under consideration is Professor Fitzgerald's willingness to assign identical functional meanings to Leninism and Confucianism merely because they are structurally isomorphic in their respective political systems. Yet the historical meaning of Leninism points to the opposite conclusion; it has made its greatest strides in underdeveloped areas like China because, among other things, its basic value system is different in meaning and intent from that of their own religious systems. The Leninist vision of modern industrial technology as the supreme end of organized social effort directed by the party-state endows it with a quality of messianic dynamism unknown in the static universe of Confucianism and accounts, in large measure, for its appeal to large numbers of China's intellectuals who bulk so large—and justi-

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fiably so—in Professor Fitzgerald's thinking. As such, its imposition on China, if successful, would completely disrupt the internal balance of the Confucian system—or what remains of it—where all other European influences, Christianity included, have been of little avail.

Of all this Professor Fitzgerald is fortunately too well aware to be completely the victim of his own historical scheme. In a more realistic vein, he recognizes the impact of Communism on Chinese society for what it is:

> It is [the] Messianic quality, the striving toward a distant goal, that differentiates Communist totalitarianism from its Chinese predecessor, the Confucian Empire.
>
> It may well be that therein lies the greatest contribution which contact with Western Europe has brought to China, the reversal of the ancient backward-looking philosophy which made stability its aim. . . . Neither the religion nor the political system of the West could find a secure lodging-place in the Chinese mind, but the idea of progress . . . this very Western idea has taken root in China and become the inspiration of the new regime (pp. 146-47).

It should be remarked in passing that Professor Fitzgerald's accounting of Christianity's failure to make any real and lasting impression where Communism achieved success is among the most illuminating of his contributions to the subject.

A like differentiation of judgment must be reserved for other portions of his book. The chapter on the "New Democracy" is a notable case in point. First promulgated by Mao in the late "united front" period, the program of the New Democracy is today not only the guiding principle of the Communist regime in China itself but has also assumed, as Professor Fitzgerald emphasizes, a wider international significance as the model strategy of Communist parties elsewhere in Asia. Under its terms, the simple undifferentiated peasant orientation of the earlier Maoist program has now been superseded by a multiclass appeal designed to make Communist parties the sole claimants to the mobilization of anti-Western nationalist sentiment among workers, peasants, "petty" and "national bourgeoisie," and to ease the transitional period of preliminary industrialization when a Communist regime embarks on that course. For

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China this has meant that the Communist Party, controlling all the levers of power while dissimulating participation in a bloc regime, regards the present period of its dictatorship as a Chinese version of the NEP, during which drastic economic collectivization must be held in abeyance in the interests of increased production. In the rural areas, therefore, agrarian reform has not gone appreciably beyond the redistribution of land titles, with the preservation of the differential status of the "middle" and "rich" peasants and the organization of "mutual aid teams" and producers' cooperatives serving as the principal means of increasing output. Similarly, the regime's policy toward the "national bourgeoisie" has sought—mainly through the penalties of its "anti-corruption" campaign and the like—to terrorize recalcitrants, actual and anticipated, into conformity but not to eliminate the ownership and managerial function of this section of the population. Professor Fitzgerald is convinced, in fact, that most "national capitalists" in China have fared relatively well through accommodation to the Communist regime, with some even anticipating their own eventual absorption by the managerial sections of the state bureaucracy when thoroughgoing nationalization supersedes the present policy. So, too, their present interests as well as the proliferation of career opportunities that they anticipate from the industrialization program have aligned China's intellectuals with the Communists, thus adding their support to that of the peasantry, both of which, in the author's judgment, are indispensable to the continued existence of the regime.

These are indeed the discernible contours of the anomalous "bourgeois-democratic" revolution now under way in China under Communist direction, but they do not add up to the conclusion that Chinese Communist policy is designed to create a welfare state or even that an emergent welfare state is in the offing as an unintended by-product of the New Democracy. Yet the author, manifestly swayed in his judgment of the Communist regime by his recollection of the failings of the Kuomintang, misconstrues the intent of the former in precisely such terms and, in so doing, falls victim to various lapses of omission and

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commission that verge on political naïveté. The Communist program of taxation, for example, is described in benevolent accents as an attempt to finance a public welfare program (pp. 178-79), in disregard of the dictum strongly emphasized in Communist economic literature that a program of forced industrialization in a backward area requires that taxation be employed as one of the principal sources of "primary capital accumulation." Given the slender resources of the Chinese economy and the guiding spirit of the party elite, there is little likelihood that Communist fiscal policy, even under the New Democracy, would sacrifice future industrial potential for present public welfare. Or again, rightly regarding large-scale land collectivization as quite improbable for the foreseeable future, Professor Fitzgerald nevertheless encourages the erroneous belief that Communist leadership is not giving it any consideration at the present. His statement that "no suggestion of future collectivization . . . is ever allowed into print" (p. 173) must come as something of a surprise to anyone familiar with various recent discussions in the Chinese Communist press or with pronouncements on the subject by Kao Kang and others. Communist policy toward intellectuals is likewise a subject on which Professor Fitzgerald's guidance falters. That vested career interests take precedence over freedom of thought for large numbers of technical and professional people in China and other underdeveloped areas (as elsewhere in the world) and endow the Communist program with a special appeal for them is undoubtedly one of those distasteful truths now made all too plain to ignore. Yet it is equally clear that no Communist regime will for long rely solely on spontaneous support and tolerate dissent, even if it be the dissent of a small minority. Professor Fitzgerald's certainty that outright Communist persecution of university professors is not likely (p. 187), though qualified by his recognition that academic freedom has in any case been banished, is nevertheless quite beside the point; it ignores the subtle blending of terror and positive indoctrination by which the "ideological remolding" drives of Chinese Communists seek to stamp out the very possibility of critical reflection. Nor will readers who reject Professor Fitzgerald's prem-

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ise that the Empire was based on a totalitarian system find comfort in his judgment that "it cannot be said, on the evidence of past Chinese history, that a totalitarian regime cramps the genius of the Chinese people" (p. 190).

If forebodings of a "managerial revolution" in the West have not carried conviction, it would be folly to deny that the underdeveloped areas of the world today provide favorable opportunities for the emergence of their own brand of that phenomenon. Communism in China indicates one of the directions this trend may take, and the three volumes here reviewed serve to underscore, each in its own way, the crucial role the intelligentsia, organized as a party, has already played in furthering that trend. No more useful purpose could be served by research and reflection than to explore the propensities of the intelligentsia elsewhere in Asia for making the Chinese course its own archetype of a "revolution from above."

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BRITISH LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY

By LEON D. EPSTEIN

Elaine Windrich, *British Labour's Foreign Policy*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 268. $5.00.

M. A. Fitzsimons, *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government: 1945-1951*, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1953, pp. 182. $3.25.

Denis Healey, "Power Politics and the Labour Party," in *New Fabian Essays*, ed. by R. H. S. Crossman, London, Turnstile Press, 1952, pp. 161-79.

R. H. S. Crossman, "Britain and the Outside World," *Political Quarterly*, XXIV (January-March 1953), pp. 28-38.

For American students of politics, the British Labour Party has been a popular subject, but until recently it was the party's domestic program that attracted most of the interest. Research into Labour's foreign policy conceptions is, like the general field of political opinion in relation to international issues, relatively new.[1] The books by Professor Windrich and by Professor Fitzsimons, both published in the last year, represent the beginning of a scholarly concern that should increase in response to the growing prominence of socialist criticism of American foreign policy.

I

Despite the similarity of titles, Windrich and Fitzsimons have written about the same subject only in the very broadest sense. Miss Windrich has undertaken a review, over a fifty-year period, of international pronouncements by the Labour Party's official and unofficial spokesmen. Professor Fitzsimons, on the other hand, has studied the policies of the postwar Labour government as reflected in its actual diplomatic record. The two works meet and clash at the point of discussing the relationship of postwar policy to previous party pronouncements.

[1] A pioneering study which includes detailed analyses of Labour attitudes, as well as those of the rest of the British community, to the Sino-Japanese dispute of 1931-1933 has been written by R. Bassett, *Democracy and Foreign Policy*, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1952.

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Professor Windrich counts Labour's foreign policy between 1945 and 1951 largely as the fulfillment of the program to which socialists had committed themselves during their years of opposition. Her theme is "the continuity of British Labour's international policy—a continuity unbroken from the formation of the party at the beginning of the century to the accession to power of the party at mid-century" (p. vii). It is this kind of continuity that Fitzsimons emphatically denies. He insists that the real continuity is to be found in the pursuit of the British national interest. "The question of a Socialist foreign policy," Fitzsimons declares, "arose only to become absurd. The continuity of British foreign policy prevailed because British interests remained the same and the suspicion of state for state survived" (p. 179).

Since his book appeared shortly after Professor Windrich's, Fitzsimons was able to append a brief note acknowledging the disagreement. Rather charitably, Fitzsimons explains that Windrich's point of view might be accounted for by her "almost exclusive concentration on the statements of principles by the Labour leaders and in the Labour Party's publications" (p. 180 n). This, he adds, constitutes an "abstract approach" in contrast to his own method of studying actual policies. Or, put more bluntly, Fitzsimons presumably means that Windrich maintains her thesis of continuity on the basis of party pronouncements that were at odds with the diplomatic performance of the Labour government.

This line of criticism may be elucidated by a closer look at Professor Windrich's study and at what she describes as "Labour's international policy." In her preface, Miss Windrich writes confidently of certain principles forming the basis for "a Labour, or Socialist, as distinct from a Conservative or a Liberal, foreign policy," and in her subsequent discussion she frequently appears to accept the Labour Party's claim to a policy both unique and virtuous in comparison with Conservative opponents. But what are Labour's distinctive principles in international affairs? Miss Windrich clearly rejects the extreme left-wing contention that a socialist foreign policy must be predicated upon class warfare

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and implacable hostility to capitalist nations, and she seems also (though largely by inference) to discount any of the more watered-down Marxist components in Labour's international outlook. For Miss Windrich, the content of a socialist foreign policy is really the loose humanitarian internationalism that did, in fact, dominate Labour's official line during most of the last fifty years.

Thus the fundamentals of the party's policy, which Professor Windrich finds enunciated as early as 1914, are described as follows: "In place of the old, traditional approach to foreign affairs with its emphasis on secret diplomacy, balance-of-power politics, militarism, and imperialism, Labour offered a new world order. Labour would strive for a policy of international co-operation based upon the practices of open diplomacy, pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament, and collective security against aggression" (p. 9). Plainly, this is more Wilsonian than Marxist-Leninist, and the word "socialist" has to be stretched if it is to describe what looks like a widespread form of early twentieth-century utopianism. To be sure, Labour did add a special socialist fervor to the attack on imperialism, but otherwise there is little to distinguish the program summarized by Professor Windrich from that advocated by large numbers of non-socialist liberals, in America as well as Britain, throughout most of the interwar period.

Yet perhaps in one sense Professor Windrich has a point in identifying the Labour Party with the old internationalist position. British socialists have championed it in such large numbers and over such a long period of time that they do now appear to have been especially susceptible to the Wilsonian type of allurement. Miss Windrich's volume contains a mass of depressing testimony to the continued faith in formulae of internationalism as substitutes for traditional methods of protecting the national interest. This evidence, gathered from a prodigious number of party manifestos, pamphlets, books, and speeches, convinced the author that in 1950, as in 1914 or 1918, "Labour has consistently opposed the balance of power, secret diplomacy, alliances and ententes, militarism, and imperialism" (p. 258).

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By such a statement, Miss Windrich seems to mean not only that members of the Labour Party continued even after 1945 to talk in terms of the old internationalist slogans; her thesis also suggests that the Labour government sought to practice the principles of foreign policy proclaimed by the party. Although Miss Windrich does admit, both in general and in such a particular as Britain's postwar relations with Spain, that a fully socialist foreign policy could not always be carried out, the impression conveyed by her book is that the diplomatic record of 1945-1951 was in accord with the party's established aspirations.

Whether that was the case depends upon what Labour aspirations one is talking about. Surely the signing of the Atlantic Pact (and the necessity for doing so) made nonsense out of the long-standing socialist rejection of military alliances. On the other hand, the Atlantic Pact could be said to square with the party's commitment to collective security, and it is under this heading that Miss Windrich evidently considers the pact as well as the other measures which the Labour government undertook for the protection of British interests. Miss Windrich is untroubled by the fact that a meaningful form of collective security like the Atlantic Pact resembles the methods of power politics supposedly rejected by the party. Consequently, the effect of her book is to give Labour's policy, from opposition days through the period of postwar office-holding, an appearance of consistency, coherence, and righteousness that only the most extravagant propagandist would ordinarily claim for his own party.

Professor Windrich's picture is favorable not only because she glosses over the difficulties of reconciling the Labour government's policies with the slogans of opposition. Even when confining her discussion to the party's prewar program, she is almost completely uncritical of the practical difficulties of Labour's advocacy. The most glaring example is to be found in the 1930's, when the party became officially committed to collective security against aggression but delayed supporting rearmament until 1937 and refused to back conscription before the outbreak of World War II. Not only does Miss Windrich fail to make clear the incompatibility of Labour's simultaneous devotion to

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disarmament and security, but she also misses, as a result, the full significance of the party's reversal of its historic position on defense in the late 1930's.[2] The support of rearmament was not a culmination of a policy implicit in British socialist thinking; it represented a change in that thinking.

II

There is no idealization of the Labour Party in the work of Professor Fitzsimons. Rather than approaching British socialism in the admiring spirit characteristic of a great many American scholars (of whom Professor Windrich is an extreme example), Fitzsimons displays an unsympathetic objectivity. But while he stands outside the realm of socialist doctrine, it is not an animosity to the doctrine as such that appears to determine his position. Undoubtedly Fitzsimons would regard any other ideological approach to international issues as critically as he does that of the socialists.

Professor Fitzsimons' discussion of "socialist foreign policy" is really tangential to his exposition of the policy of the Labour government. Early in his volume he notes the idealism of the party's pre-1945 international statements, but he does not consider that the Labour leadership was thereby seriously committed to any departure from the traditional norms of international relations. Attlee and Bevin, in particular, he treats as ready to pursue the same British policies for which they had already assumed a large measure of responsibility as members of the wartime coalition under Winston Churchill. It was, in Fitzsimons' view, a dissident left wing of the party which perpetuated the old belief in a distinctive socialist foreign policy (although it is admitted that the party leaders continued to talk as though they too accepted the popular aspirations of opposition days). In identifying a "socialist foreign policy" with the postwar advocacy of the Left, Fitzsimons attributes to it a somewhat

[2] The debate and the vote on the decision to support the Chamberlain government's rearmament program are contained in the *37th Annual Report* of the Labour Party London, 1937, pp. 195-212. In some respects, the discussion furnishes a parallel to the more recent conflicts over rearmament in the Labour Party. Aneurin Bevan, incidentally, was among the speakers who opposed the party's decision of 1937.

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more particular content than that which characterized Miss Windrich's use of the term. What the Left wanted was an international policy that actively fostered socialism. If this could not be accomplished in conjunction with the Soviet Union, as soon became evident after the war, then it was to be pursued by the social democracies, under Britain's leadership, and apart from the influence of capitalist America. This line is so obviously different from the policy actually pursued by the postwar Labour government that Professor Fitzsimons does not have to devote much space to making that point.

In describing the diplomacy of 1945-1951 Fitzsimons is necessarily limited by the close range at which he has had to work. Many of the ordinary documentary materials for a diplomatic history of so recent a period must still be unavailable, and at least partly for this reason the book is much less than a definitive record. Yet, despite a treatment of events that is sometimes too brief, Professor Fitzsimons does sketch the main policies of the postwar years with skill and realism. He takes into account the basic weaknesses of Britain's postwar situation which compelled the Labour government, as it would have compelled any other, to be dependent upon a close alliance with American power—a point long appreciated in official circles. "Britain was now," Fitzsimons remarks apropos of 1945, "a power with world interests, not a world power" (p. 29). Thus the policy of the next six years became one of reducing commitments in such a way as to minimize the adverse effects on British interests. While on this score Fitzsimons does not believe that the British government had any appreciable area of choice, he does indicate that the policy might, in other than Labour hands, have been more adroitly practiced. Churchill, it is hinted, might have been more clever than Bevin in concealing Britain's weaknesses and so have been able to strike better terms with the rising nationalist forces within the Empire's sphere of influence.

Such a suggestion runs counter to one of the most cherished of Labour beliefs. Since holding office, party spokesmen have been virtually unanimous in proclaiming the special advantages of their government's policy toward former colonial and semi-

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colonial areas (though much more is said about India, Ceylon, and Burma than about Iran, Egypt, and Palestine). It is the Labour contention that only its administration, animated by socialist understanding, could have pursued a policy of withdrawal from India, in particular, so as to secure a measure of good will for Britain. Even the left wing of the party, while convinced that the Labour government's foreign policy was generally conceived along Tory lines, is firm in believing that the Commonwealth policy of 1945 to 1951 represented a welcome departure from traditional precepts of empire. Although this claim is supported by reference to Churchill's criticism of the manner of the withdrawal from India, it is doubtful, as Fitzsimons indicates, whether a Conservative government would have had any substantive alternative during the critical postwar years. Still, if a case is to be made at all for the distinctiveness of Labour's external policy, it would be more plausible with respect to India than in any of the strictly international, non-Commonwealth areas (to which Professor Windrich confined her attention).

Professor Fitzsimons, in discussing the efforts of the British government to come to terms with Asian nationalism, adheres to the view that here as elsewhere Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was trying to save as much as he could with the limited means at his disposal. The motivation was the protection of the standard of national life—or, as Bevin put it, of the livelihood of the British workingman who was dependent on his nation's overseas connections.

In no significant respect is Professor Fitzsimons inclined to credit the Labour Party's pre-1945 position with a decisive influence on the foreign policy determinations of the Labour government. Indeed, he regards most of the party's international statements, made during its opposition years, to have been out of touch with the realities of international relations. The belief in a departure from the continuity of British foreign policy he calls "the impractical product of naively benevolent thinking" (p. 25). And, broadly, Fitzsimons is convinced of the "shallow irresponsibility of Labour's thinking on foreign affairs" (p. 81).

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III

It is striking that Denis Healey, writing as a contemporary Labour analyst of international affairs, should be much closer to Fitzsimons' critical judgments than to the flattery of Miss Windrich. Healey, now a Member of Parliament, but for most of the postwar period employed in an influential "backroom" capacity in Labour's central organization, is in a unique position to conduct a re-examination of the party's foreign policy. As a young intellectual, he had himself been a proponent of the pre-1945 "socialist foreign policy," and had subsequently gone through a process of disillusionment during Labour's postwar period of responsible office-holding. Healey's efforts have since been given to the still unrewarding task of instructing the Labour Party in the realities of power politics. His brief contribution to the *New Fabian Essays* is illustrative, although it does also contain some routine apologia for recent Labour policy.

Healey aims his critique of Labour's previous international programs at the very principles which Professor Windrich found so admirable. "Because the Party as a whole lacks any systematic theory of world affairs," Healey declares, "it has too often fallen victim to the besetting sin of all progressive opposition movements—utopianism. In particular, it tends to discount the power element in politics, seeing it as a specific evil of the existing system rather than a generic characteristic of politics as such" (pp. 161-62). The Labour thinking which results—"high-blown formulas which quickly lose their relevance"—Healey speaks of almost as harshly as Professor Fitzsimons.

For example, Healey calls attention to the emptiness of a prewar position that combined the belief that capitalism was the cause of war with a faith in achieving collective security through the League of Nations. In Healey's view, the Marxist-minded distrust of the motives of capitalist nations was ill-suited to the simultaneous expectancy of altruistic conduct by the very same capitalist nations when acting in international concert. But Healey is less concerned with a criticism of this illogical combination of Marxist and liberal notions than he is with attack-

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ing separately the party's belief in the peculiar wickedness of capitalist nations, and its exaggerated optimism about the value of international organization. Healey urges his fellow socialists to accept the clash of national interests as one of the facts of life, instead of believing that it is the result of institutional imperfections subject to facile solutions. The nation state, Healey asserts, is "by far the most important political entity in world affairs" (p. 168) and the protection of its interests the legitimate concern of any government. Supreme among these interests in Britain's case is "unity with the United States" (p. 179).

Such a straight out-and-out justification of the American alliance on the grounds of the national interest seems to reject altogether the belief in a "socialist foreign policy." Healey's argument would satisfy neither the left-wing critics of an alliance with capitalist America nor the moderates whose ideological preferences have been loose enough to make the Attlee-Bevin policy acceptable. To ignore, as Healey mainly does, the idea of a distinctive Labour approach to international affairs is to defy a long-standing tradition in the party. As a matter of practical politics, it seems unlikely that the term "socialist foreign policy" can be abandoned. The idea of applying to international affairs the same broad principles of justice which Labour assumes it applies in domestic matters has a strong hold on the socialist mind.[3]

While the reorientation of Labour's basic thinking along the lines of Healey's essay has not progressed deeply among the rank-and-file, there is no doubt that it is under way at the level of the party leadership.[4] This new realism about international politics is related, in some respects, to the increased attention Labour is

[3] This is recognized, for instance, in a moderate and serious editorial, "A Socialist Foreign Policy?", *Socialist Commentary*, XVI (October 1952), pp. 217-19. Members of the Labour Party are said to be looking in vain for a unique social foreign policy, but it is urged that socialists can, along with others, pursue a policy consistent with their general humanitarian beliefs. Probably this point of view is accepted by many at the Right and Center of the party.

[4] The Labour Party's discussion pamphlet, *Problems of Foreign Policy* (London, 1952), represented an attempt to encourage a reorientation among the constituency parties, among whom the pamphlet was circulated before the 1952 party conference. However, the resolutions subsequently presented by the constituency parties bore little evidence of the central organization's new point of view.

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giving to the problems of international trade. Britain's external economic relations had, before World War II, attracted little more serious attention from the Labour Party than had the actual problems of Britain's foreign policy. But the Labour government's six years of painful experience with the dollar gap caused a radical break from the insularity previously characteristic of socialist economic thinking. The failure to solve Britain's balance-of-payments problem in the postwar period has given the Labour Party, in opposition, its major intellectual chore.

Here, roughly, there are two schools of thought—more or less conforming to the party's internal division concerning foreign policy. There is the group, of which Hugh Gaitskell, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, is the most prominent representative, that looks to continued collaboration with the United States. Although convinced, as is everyone in the party, of the need to fortify the British economy for the shock of an American recession, this right-wing group is basing its hopes both on the continuation of American defense aid, where necessary, and on the prospect of increasing trade with the dollar area. At an extreme, there is even an advocacy of an Atlantic Union. On the other side are the Bevanites, who regard close relations with the United States either as unlikely to produce any remedy for Britain's balance-of-payments problems, or as undesirable for political reasons even if a purely economic solution did lie in that direction. This is the left-wing socialist outlook which is seeking, sometimes through greater East-West trade and sometimes through a Commonwealth development program, an external economic policy "in place of dollars."

An example of the latter brand of thinking is provided by R. H. S. Crossman's contribution to the *Political Quarterly's* special issue devoted to the Labour Party. Crossman, the most sophisticated though the least consistent of the left wing's foreign policy advocates, is not so brash as to urge an immediate break with the United States.[5] He is now willing to admit that Britain's power position vis-à-vis Russia would permit no abrupt de-

[5] Crossman's various ideas about international affairs are also reflected in the *New Statesman,* for which he writes regularly.

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parture from the American alliance. But Crossman does contend that Britain must become economically independent of the United States so as to be able to adopt a foreign policy which could then be pressed on America. "Before we can play the independent role of which we are still capable in world affairs," Crossman declares, "we must set about earning our own living out of our own resources" (p. 38). That, he believes, is the only way in which Britain could resist American foreign policies with which she disagrees. This vision of Britain's future influence is, in Crossman's case, curiously linked to the insistence that the nation must reduce its overseas commitments as one measure in the direction of gaining economic viability—neatly overlooking the diminution of British influence that would follow any drastic reduction of military strength.

The Bevanite appeal for independence from America is a strenuous re-echo of the original left-wing antipathy to the postwar alliance. That antipathy was largely quiescent during the years of the Marshall Plan, but it rose again to new heights with the American-sponsored rearmament program and with the disagreement over Far Eastern issues. For over two years now, the terms of the Anglo-American alliance have provided a major line of battle within the Labour Party. The political components of this struggle, which were outside the primary concern of both Professor Windrich and Professor Fitzsimons, are worth some attention.[6]

IV

What must be said in the beginning is that the recent dissatisfaction with Britain's postwar relationship with the United States has not been limited to the Labour Party. Although it is only within socialist ranks (and there largely on the left wing) that dissatisfaction has emerged as an organized movement of opinion, the entire British political community has displayed a growing uneasiness over the national status within the Anglo-American alliance. The consciousness of occupying an inferior

[6] A discussion of the interplay of politics and foreign policy, as it affects Anglo-American relations, is undertaken by Henry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson, *Britain and the United States*, New York, 1953, ch. 2.

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position in that relationship cannot be happily accepted by a nation so long accustomed to the acknowledgment of its own pre-eminence and skill in diplomatic relations. Dislike of a particular American policy, as that relating to China, brings to the fore a fear that American forces, over which Britain feels she can exercise no control, will operate so as to commit the nation to large-scale war which British statesmen would have known how to avoid. "No annihilation without representation" expresses the widespread British wariness of the leadership of the United States.

Organized discontent did take shape within the Labour Party, rather than elsewhere, because many socialists started with deep-seated ideological objections to the American connection. The sources of these objections are to be found in the perpetuation of Labour's pre-1945 thinking about foreign policy—in fact, in the very elements of that thinking which Denis Healey has criticized. One of these elements was the pacifism or quasi-pacifism which was submerged but not by any means obliterated during the late 1930's and the war years. It was not so long ago that the Parliamentary Labour Party was led (1931-1935) by an absolute pacifist, George Lansbury, and while there remained after 1945 only a few who still asserted an uncompromising commitment like Lansbury's, there were important residues of the old faith which survived in a persistent minority opposition to the Labour government's postwar conscription program as well as in an undercurrent of opposition, even before Bevan's revolt, to large-scale rearmament.

More important, especially because not so evidently fading in strength, is the anti-capitalist ingredient of the foreign-policy thinking in the Labour Party. As recently as 1944 the party had officially endorsed the proposition that the cause of war lies in the nature of capitalist society.[7] And, unquestionably, left-wing socialists not only took this literally but, as a consequence, entered the postwar period prepared to believe the worst about the policies of the United States as the world's greatest capitalist nation. The further left one moves in the Labour Party the

[7] Labour Party, *The International Post-War Settlement*, London, 1944.

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greater the distrust of the United States. At an extreme position, even the evidently benign nature of the Marshall Plan was suspect. In general, however, the Labour Left has not been so dogmatic as to condemn every American policy. Instead it has nursed a suspicion that becomes operative when the United States acts contrary to socialist, or perhaps to general British, inclinations in international affairs. The important point is that the left-wing socialist does not merely disagree with American policies; he readily fits them into a pattern that he has long believed characteristic of a strong capitalist power.

Closely related to the Labour Party's tradition of anti-capitalism is its long-standing sympathy for the Soviet Union. Only recently has this become the monopoly of the party fringe. Until the postwar period, even among many of the socialists who bitterly contested the organizing efforts of the British Communist Party there remained an attachment to the cause of the Soviet Union which had its roots in British Labour's originally favorable response to the Russian Revolution. The idea that the Soviet Union was more sinned against than sinning had a firm hold on the consciousness of British Labour, and it took an impressive array of hostile Russian acts in the postwar period to dissipate the view that Soviet aggression was merely a defensive reaction to capitalist unfriendliness. As a matter of fact, the tendency to charitable interpretations of Soviet conduct never vanished so completely as to be incapable of revival, especially on the Left, with each new Communist peace offensive.

Altogether, it is apparent that much of Labour's doctrinal outlook is uncongenial to the military alliance with the United States. Yet the left wing of the party, representing this outlook, remains an unsuccessful minority in its efforts to modify the main lines of postwar foreign policy. In this respect, it is important to appreciate that what the Left is opposing is a policy adopted while Labour was in office. At that time, particularly from 1946 to 1949 when the crucial links with America were established, Labour's program was really determined by the cabinet (with the support of the Parliamentary Labour Party) rather than by resolutions of a party conference or statements of the party ex-

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ecutive. The rank-and-file was presented with a *fait accompli.* There were protests, both from an articulate minority of the Parliamentary Party and from a similar group in the party conference, but in the circumstances they were condemned to futility. Once established, the foreign policy of the Labour government could claim the loyalty of a movement ordinarily devoted to the support of its established leadership. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was ideally cast for the role of appealing to this loyalty, and at successive party conferences he rested his case less on an exposition of his policy than on his claim to the backing of the working-class from which he had come and which he had so long represented.

Still, it is not only loyalty to the party leadership which has been drawn upon to support Labour's postwar foreign policy. Now that the party is out of power (and Bevin dead), it is more apparent than ever that the real bulwark in the way of the left opposition is the massed strength of the largest trade unions, which have both the votes and the finances to determine Labour policy. Most of the unions have never been heavily permeated either by pacifism or doctrinal anti-capitalism, and their views (as reflected by pronouncements of the Trades Union Congress) have displayed an awareness of the realities of both economic and political power which has hardly been characteristic of left-wing socialist thought. British unions have a good claim to consistency in this respect. In the 1930's it was their strength, marshaled incidentally by Ernest Bevin, which was chiefly responsible for committing the Labour Party to rearmament as well as collective security.

In the last two years, the unions have had to withstand a much more sustained attack on the party's official policy than any which took place between 1945 and 1951. Once the party went out of office, in the fall of 1951, dissatisfaction could be more readily expressed. And the rallying point was already prepared by Aneurin Bevan's resignation of April 1951. By making rearmament the immediate issue, the Bevanite revolt was able to draw both on those who only objected to the size of the newly enlarged program, and on those who objected to the whole Ameri-

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can relationship from which rearmament seemed to stem. The Bevanites succeeded, in 1952, in gathering the socialist zealots of the constituency Labour parties in such numbers that, when joined by a few unions of similar complexion and by a few more under Communist control, they had an impressive minority voting strength at the annual conference. Straight Bevanite resolutions on defense and foreign policy were still defeated mainly by the bloc votes of the large unions, but the margin was not overwhelming.[8] At the very least, the Bevanites demonstrated on the voting for resolutions, as well as on the election of members of the party executive, that they had the support of the rank-and-file activists in the constituency organizations.

Following the 1952 party conference, there were two factors which began to operate to the advantage of the Bevanite foreign policy advocacy though not necessarily to that of Aneurin Bevan's own bid for power in the party. First, it now seemed, on the basis of by-election results, that Labour would be out of office for a considerably longer period than was originally anticipated after the very narrow defeat in the General Election of October 1951. Without the prospect of an early return to governmental responsibility, there exists a greater temptation to return to something like the old oppositionist-minded outlook that characterized Labour pronouncements in the years before 1945. Holding the party to the government's foreign policy is likely to become more difficult, politically and psychologically, for the former Labour ministers and their trade union backers as that policy is inevitably associated more and more with Conservatives.

The second factor exercising an influence on Labour thinking is the change in American administrations. Previously, when the Democrats were in office, the United States was presented by the moderates in the Labour Party as a suitable ideological ally on the ground that the Fair Deal was kindred in spirit, if not in substance, to socialist Britain, and that at any rate the Truman administration was supported by American unions. While Leftists were only rather briefly attracted to this attempt to transform capitalist America into a quasi-socialist ally, the Labour moder-

[8] *51st Annual Report* of the Labour Party, London, 1952, p. 154.

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ates, even as late as 1952, attached considerable importance to the ideological affinity—perhaps because they were not really so far from the Fair Deal brand of thinking themselves. But the ground was cut out from under this defense of the alliance by the Republican victory in the 1952 Presidential election.

These circumstances, plus, of course, the opportunities for further exacerbation of Anglo-American differences, may very well mean that the Labour Party will become more openly critical of the leadership of the United States and insistent on a policy of "standing up to America" where British preferences clash with those of the United States. Although this approach would not imply anything like a threat to withdraw from the alliance, nevertheless by breathing defiance of the United States the Labour Party could so cater to the electorate's pent-up desire for "independence" as to create political difficulties for the British government in its dealings with the American administration. Even without the immediate fear, as in the analogous American problem, of Congressional reactions to Presidential policy, a British government must generally take into account the shifting currents of popular desires which influence election results. The United States is not the only country where domestic political forces may affect foreign policy.

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THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS*

By BARRINGTON MOORE, Jr.

Paul Kecskemeti, *Meaning, Communication, and Value*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952, pp. viii, 349. $8.50.

Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. xvii, 584. $6.00.

I

It seems to be impossible to make any set of connected assertions about human behavior without taking a position on two questions. One of these is the relative weight to be given to empirical fact-gathering and to formal deductive logic, the elaboration of analytical categories and their relationship to one another. The other question concerns the moral position of the scientist in relationship to his subject matter, a question that does not arise except in the study of human beings. Opinions here range from a thoroughgoing relativism and ethical neutrality to an equally straightforward moral absolutism, though there can of course be numerous varieties of the latter position. In the major nineteenth- and twentieth-century writings on human affairs that pretend to scientific status, however, one can usually discern in any given writer an emphasis in the direction of two answers out of the four that are possible in taking a stand on these two questions. For the sake of convenience, we may call these emphases empiricism, deductive formalism, ethical relativism, and moral absolutism. I shall argue that any one of these when pushed to an extreme blinds the understanding, and comment upon certain contemporary forms that this extremism takes. Any such classification is of course partly arbitrary, and through its crude mesh many important points will escape. If

* The atmosphere of interdisciplinary cooperation at Harvard's Russian Research Center and Department of Social Relations has provided an important part of the background for this appraisal, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge my debt to them. Professors Clyde M. Kluckhohn and Talcott Parsons have been kind enough to comment on this article, but they do not of course bear any responsibility for the interpretations in it.

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it brings others to the surface, it will have served its purpose and can be discarded.

One combination of emphases that has prevailed rather widely is a stress on the empirical and inductive tradition, along with the claim of complete ethical neutrality. Sumner's *Folkways* is a good example. The major assumption of this combination is that man is a part of nature and can be profitably studied, with modifications tailored to the subject matter, by the same means as the rest of nature. Essentially, the procedure involves the collection and classification of facts, and their ordering by appropriate hypotheses into a coherent logical scheme, subject to modification by further hypothesis. Deduction and formal logical treatment is therefore by no means entirely ruled out of court. But it is subject to considerable distrust, to be checked at every possible point by reference to empirical observation. According to this view, grand deductive schemes definitely should not be the starting point of concrete research. Scientific growth from this standpoint resembles the action of a spider spinning a web. The scientist may allow several strands of inference to wave in the wind, but until they attach themselves securely to facts that set the pattern for the web, he will be wary about trusting himself to the structure.

Throughout the investigation the scientist studying human beings is supposed to maintain the same detachment from his material as, let us say, the biologist dissecting a worm. His conclusions should not tell us what he wishes to discover, but only what he actually did discover. That this is a counsel of perfection all adherents of this view recognize clearly. At the same time, they would point to what they regard as substantial achievements gained in this fashion. The study of politics has been poorer in such achievements beyond the level of straightforward description than have other fields in the social sciences, for reasons that cannot be examined here. Nevertheless, many pages from the writings of Mosca, Michels, and some of Lasswell's earlier works, might be advanced by the empiricists and ethical relativists as examples of what can be done from this standpoint.

Those who hold this view seldom push the point of ethical

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neutrality to the point of asserting that social science has nothing to do with human welfare. Ordinarily they merely claim that ethical and political predilections have no place in the process of scientific inquiry as such. But they usually hold that the results of this inquiry will somehow be beneficial to mankind. In its more naïve and superficial form, the empirical-neutral position frequently embodies the following diagnosis of our time: what is wrong with the world today is that the skills of the natural scientists have outrun those of the social scientists, as the atom bomb supposedly "proves." What is necessary, therefore, is for the social sciences to copy the natural sciences and overtake them. As soon as man has adequate knowledge of himself, he will be the master of his own fate.

The criticism of this diagnosis is at least moderately familiar and need not delay us long. Without being guided by some purposes and values that transcend such a narrow and technical view of disciplined inquiry into human affairs, it is argued, correctly I believe, that social scientists will rapidly become mere technicians selling their skills to any unscrupulous power-seekers who want to manipulate society for their own ends. I would be more disturbed about this problem if I were convinced that the social scientists already had in their hands powerful intellectual tools that could do the damage that is sometimes feared. So far we don't seem to know enough to be very dangerous.

Another variety of technical degeneration in the empiricist-relativist tradition may be more serious. The view is fairly widespread that the only problems that can be studied in a disciplined and scientific fashion are those that can be made to yield quantitative and measurable results. Its adherents therefore seek to break all problems into units for which quantification is—or at least superficially seems—appropriate. The rationale is that by getting positive answers to a series of small problems we will wake up some fine day with a conclusive answer to the big problems. This hope can be a realistic one only so long as some connection between the little problems and the big ones is kept clearly in mind. When this connection disappears in the search

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for easy problems with conclusive answers, the result is merely the piling up of disconnected trivialities.

There is also a certain pseudo-certainty about figures that exercises a dangerous fascination for Americans. Very crude and questionable facts are often submitted to overrefined and precise statistical manipulation. Not long ago a younger social scientist said to me that the best guarantee of scientific objectivity was a test of statistical significance. Such a position seems almost incredible. Tests for statistical significance indicate whether or not numerical findings on a large number of cases might be the result of chance. The meaning of "chance" results cannot be the same for any kind of investigation, and indeed in some types of research the concept of chance may be totally inapplicable.[1] To speak of chance results in the rise or fall of any political leader, for example, would require very careful explication of a theory of historical causation. Many who use tests of statistical significance and similar instruments in the search for objectivity have only a dim awareness of the reasoning behind their use.

The basic source of this overemphasis on technique seems to lie in the belief that it is possible to find technical routines and machines that will do *all* of our thinking for us. Instead of using old-fashioned and arduous methods of appraising the evidence, one can invent a piece of statistical litmus paper. Now, within limits, this viewpoint is quite correct. Technique can extend our powers of observation enormously, and aid us in uncovering errors in logic, while at the same time it opens up new areas of investigation. But technique alone cannot define what is scientifically worth investigating. Larger problems of the social milieu and, ultimately, of philosophy enter into any defensible judgment of scientifically significant problems. Ill at ease in such questions, many technicians search for pseudo-security in a form of pseudo-precision.

This search for pseudo-security seems to me to be on the increase among the younger generation of scholars, now in their

[1] A logician, such as Hans Reichenbach, however, argues that any proposition is a probability statement and thus comes to the opposite conclusion that some form of the notion of chance has universal applicability. See his *Experience and Prediction*, Chicago, 1938.

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graduate school apprenticeship. Harassed by financial and family worries, they are anxious to learn a technique that is just mysterious enough so that a businessman or government administrator won't quite know what to make of it. In this way they can acquire a professional label and get on with the task of making a living. The diffusion of the simpler stereotypes and the intellectual small change from the empiricist and rationalist tradition among influential sections of the lay population also encourages this trend. The practical businessman, the college president, and the foundation head readily give financial and administrative support to "projects" with a heavy emphasis on narrow technical results under the rationalization that some day it will "pay off" in greater understanding and welfare. These sociological factors re-enforce the intellectual ones to produce the possibility that the social sciences may sterilize themselves. Fortunately, competing intellectual traditions and social forces may prevent such an outcome.

Among these competing traditions is the one I have provisionally labeled moral absolutism, which displays numerous signs of a revival, partly as a reaction to the more extreme technicism that has grown up within the empiricist and relativist position. Absolutism is in a way an unfair label to pin on the writers I have in mind, though one of the authors whose work is the occasion of this essay, Paul Kecskemeti, accepts it gladly. The simple word "moralist" would be better if it did not carry an overtone of preachiness. The position taken is not absolutist in the sense of dogmatic intellectual rigidity. Rather it is one of seeking with an open mind a well worked-out moral position as a standpoint for appraising human behavior generally and political behavior in particular, without giving up the attempt at explanation. Those who hold this position do not regard the task of disciplined inquiry as finished when the scientist has explained things as they are or have been. Instead, they also display a systematic interest in human affairs as they might be.

The moralist position has long been a strong one in political science and the source of jibes from those in neighboring disciplines who have believed in the essential neutrality of science.

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Since the war, however, there have been signs of movement toward the moralist position in the other disciplines. It has extended even into anthropology, hitherto the source of attacks on almost any moral position as a form of "culture bound," ethical provincialism and "ethnocentrism." I suspect that the change has a good deal to do with the discovery that the relativist and objective position leads to the conclusion that the social practices of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia cannot be condemned any more than cross-cousin marriage and the couvade. Some have stuck to their relativist guns and accepted the conclusion. Others have apparently been shocked into the search for a new intellectual position that would both explain these phenomena and provide a basis for negative appraisal. Much, though by no means all, of the postwar work by anthropologists on values, cultural themes, and national character owes its impetus, I think, to this recent experience. For several generations anthropologists have been interested in the variety of moral beliefs and practices exhibited by human beings and have sought to explain them within one or another strictly naturalistic framework. For that matter, very few serious scholars have ever argued that values do not belong to science, in the sense that they could not be the subject matter of detached scientific investigation. What is new is the idea that the scientist can have something to say about values and moral preferences that goes beyond a naturalistic explanation of their origin and relationship to other aspects of social behavior.

Since the actual and potential weaknesses of the search for moral absolutes have become familiar through the relativist critique, little need be said here. There is always the danger of confusing one's own historically limited moral climate with some universal principle that is somehow felt to be necessary for all of humanity at all times. There is also, to my mind at least, a tendency among many writers interested in this problem to become overly preoccupied with the philosophical implications of a particular doctrine and to neglect whatever relationship it may possess to the way people actually live, with the consequence

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that the stuff of human behavior becomes lost in a cloud of empty abstractions.

Like the search for valid ethical appraisals, the use of formal deductive methods in the study of social behavior has a venerable and respectable intellectual history. The recent return to a quasi-scholastic formalism is also partly a negative reaction to certain extremes in the empiricist tradition, particularly its older assumption that facts, once gathered, would somehow tell their own story. The story, so the deductive criticism runs, is always imposed upon the "facts" by the implicit or explicit analytical categories and hypotheses used by the investigator. Therefore, it is better to make these categories and hypotheses as explicit and logically water-tight as possible at the outset of the inquiry, in order to force the data to yield a clear-cut decision in respect to the tenability of the theory. This doctrine has gained considerable force in recent years, to the point where the old-fashioned naturalist, the scientist who is chiefly a "good observer" of social behavior, has a difficult time in justifying his scientific status. A theory that is derived from careful examination of a body of facts is liable to be dismissed with the epithet of mere *ad hoc* explanation.

The pursuit of this doctrine to the exclusion of other considerations also leads to its own special form of exaggeration, exemplified in certain aspects of the work of Talcott Parsons and some of his students. It characterizes much of the volume by Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society*, the other immediate occasion for this essay. I shall comment on this work in somewhat more detail shortly, but wish to set out first what seem to me some of the general difficulties inherent in this emphasis. As indicated by the appearance of Lasswell and Kaplan's *Power and Society* and Parsons' *The Social System* in 1950 and 1951 respectively, this neo-scholasticism is no isolated phenomenon, but represents a major intellectual trend among those professionally concerned with the study of human behavior.

In the first place, the development of abstract categories evidently has a seductive attraction in its own right, whether or not they are useful in ordering data. Though the formalists

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assert that the ultimate purpose of the development of categories is the manipulation of data, their assertion strikes me as being mostly a pious hope.[2] The actual procedure is primarily one of splitting verbal hairs with an axe. What emerges from the undertaking is a collection of verbal categories, empty file drawers, as it were, that are arranged in a neat and, at first glance, imposing pattern. All that remains, supposedly, is to fill some of the file drawers with facts, and the others will spring open with predictions. This would be quite true, and a tremendous achievement, if the relationship between the file drawers actually existed in the facts of social behavior. To permit valid inferences from one body of facts to another is the goal of any scientific theory. But in the case of the neo-scholastics, I submit, the relationship does not derive from the objective materials examined, but for the most part from the verbal symbols alone. And, for that matter, very few propositions, on the order of "if A is true, then B is also true," have come out of these reflections. In the Lasswell and Kaplan study there are a few, but they are usually so broad as to be quite meaningless. Opening this book at random I read, "PROP: Ruling practices are limited by the social order"; and "PROP: The rulers alter the regime whenever conformity to it is expected by them to constitute a significant deprivation."[3] The second one I don't think is true, and the first one can mean anything. In Parsons' work, despite the richly suggestive paragraphs that are scattered in many parts of the study, there are fewer propositions, or hypotheses as such, than in Lasswell and Kaplan.

Even though a very high proportion of the formalists' work remains so far little more than a verbal juggling act, certain aspects of this approach have at least potential value. The emphasis on theory can serve as a healthy corrective to the mere accumulation of observations, without any reflection on their import. Furthermore, a system of categories or, more likely,

[2] The reader may wish to judge for himself by examining some of the formalist writings that attempt empirical application, i.e., particularly the last three essays on political matters in Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied*, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, or Levy, *The Family Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1949.

[3] *Power and Society*, New Haven, 1950, pp. 190-91.

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fragments from such a system can frequently suggest new ways of looking at factual raw materials and become the source of hypotheses, even if they are not hypotheses themselves. While the great systems of the past now seem desolate intellectual ruins, important fragments from them are incorporated into what one may hope is a growing and at least partly cumulative intellectual tradition. Finally, it is certainly necessary to attempt the organization of conclusions derived from limited observations, scattered insights, and hunches into a more coherent whole that may often serve as a springboard for fruitful inquiry. It may even be argued that a set of verbal symbols can display some power to generate further symbols and ideas, as in mathematics, that eventually find their counterpart in the world of observable social behavior. Some such rationale seems to be behind much of the work now being done within the framework of the formalist and deductive tradition. At the same time, I believe that much more attention could and should be paid to the ways in which this counterpart is to be discovered, as well as to the question of whether the aspects of social behavior to be explained in this fashion are significant on other grounds. Almost any concept can be "illustrated" somehow or other, and facts picked up off the table and put into pigeonholes. This activity does not necessarily represent scientific progress.

II

The purpose of the set of categories developed by Levy in the course of 500-odd pages in *The Structure of Society* is "to construct from present knowledge of empirical materials on different societies a general conceptual scheme and theoretical system for beginning the comparative analysis of societies" (p. vii). As the author notes further along in his preface, the task of "determining by empirical research in what respects, if any, the system of analysis tentatively developed on a highly abstract level can be shown to offer useful concepts and relatively tenable theories" remains an undertaking for the future. What these rather elaborate preparations will amount to, in other words, remains to be seen.

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There has already been a very substantial amount of comparative work done by anthropologists on preliterate societies, but relatively little on the more complex civilizations. The latter type of studies raises some new problems. Levy's book is presented primarily as a means for comparative analysis of seven recent or contemporary complex societies, the United States, Russia, China, Japan, France, England, and possibly Germany, though the author states that at least one non-literate society will be included. Except for a remark or two about the differential impact of industrialization, nothing is said about any concrete problems that are to be examined through this comparison. Just what purpose the comparison is supposed to achieve, other than as a test of the categories, is not clear. If it is merely intended to test the classification scheme, some degree of success is more or less automatically guaranteed, since the facts can be classified by this system, or by a hundred other ways. If it is also intended to test hypotheses, as the author asserts, in an attempt to construct a theory applicable to any and all societies, then it might be better strategy to use a much wider range of data.

Though Levy's work is considerably more concrete than that of Parsons, from which it derives, what hypotheses there are tend to become buried beneath an avalanche of definitions. In the chapter on politics, for example, I am able to find only two (pp. 492 and 502). Both refer to problems that have been the subject of much discussion and research in political science and economics. In addition, they are too broadly and loosely formulated to serve as starting points for any inquiry. The more specific of the two asserts that if the economic structure of society is of the capitalist type, "definite limits are placed on the degree and types of power that can be institutionalized for predominantly politically oriented structures in the society" (p. 492). Without specification of what the "definite limits" are, it is difficult to see how this hypothesis could be tested.

The key to the system of categories, the theoretical backbone of the book, is now fairly widely known under the name of structural-functional analysis. Levy gives one of the best of the recent expositions of this view. In somewhat simplified and

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slightly inaccurate translation, this form of analysis requires asking two types of questions about any set of social institutions that is being examined. The first question is: what activities must take place if this social system is to continue to exist? Such a question can be asked about an army, a monastery, a club, or a whole society, such as the United States. The other question is: how must these activities be carried on? For an army engaged in combat, part of the answer to the first question is that it must carry on the activity of killing the enemy, and part of the answer to the second question is that in order to do this it must have a certain type of command structure, a certain organization of supplies, etc. In this manner, one establishes the so-called functional imperatives of a certain type of social system.

As Levy stresses over and over again, the identification of these functional imperatives does not yet tell us anything about the life expectancy of the institution under analysis. Marxists and others have declared that the structural-functional approach is incapable of handling problems of change, because it merely tells us what is necessary for the maintenance of a particular type of status quo.[4] Levy regards this charge as unfounded. The establishment of the conditions necessary for the maintenance of a system implies neither an interest in its survival, nor an assertion that it will continue. The necessary conditions, i.e., the imperatives, may not be met, for a wide variety of reasons. History, as Levy remarks, is full of the wreckage of social systems that could not meet the requisites for their continuation. He maintains, however, as do others in this tradition, that to determine the necessary conditions of a particular set of social arrangements can be one of the most powerful first steps toward indicating the sources of internal strain in an institution and the lines of potential change.

With all of the above, I am in general agreement. In concrete research on Soviet society I have often found it useful, as a means for locating potential foci of change, to ask myself what conditions seem to be required to keep parts of this system going.

[4] In this connection, see W. W. Rostow, "Toward a General Theory of Action," *World Politics*, v (July 1953), pp. 538-43.

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It is, incidentally, a much easier question to ask than to answer, since rather complex reasoning and considerable empirical evidence may be needed to establish that one social phenomenon is really the necessary counterpart of another. Can one prove that war industry is, or is not, an essential element in present-day American prosperity?

After establishing the validity of the functional approach, this school proceeds by an attempt to draw up a list of the imperatives, first for any type of society, and then for specific types of society. Though the procedure rapidly gets into terminological complexities that need not to be pursued here, the endeavor is often suggestive. Where it goes astray, I think, is in seeking too high a level of generality. As Levy admits, it is impossible so far to point to any kind of concrete social arrangement that is demonstrably necessary for *any* kind of social system. Likewise, I am very skeptical of Talcott Parsons' attempt to classify all forms of human action as necessarily falling under one of five pairs of alternative forms. There are perhaps a few illuminating statements that can be made about *any* kind of human behavior, but most of them are likely to be banal. There is also some usefulness in an effort to encompass the whole spectrum of social and political behavior in one intellectual *tour de force,* as it were, with the aim of locating specific manifestations at their appropriate points on the spectrum. This is perhaps the strongest argument that can be made for the very high level of generality and abstraction that characterizes much of the structural-functional discourse. Until it can prove its utility on much more concrete materials, where only fragments of the scheme are likely to be applicable, the over-all system will continue to resemble a theology more than a system of scientific discourse.

At the level of specific contributions to the understanding of politics, one aspect of the structural-functional scheme has been helpful in assessing the significance of personality factors in politics. Studies of "culture and personality" or of "national character" have attracted considerable attention in recent years.

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Parsons,[5] however, points out that social systems, of which an army may again serve as a useful example, require people to behave in certain regular and predictable ways that clearly have nothing to do with either individual personality or culture. The relationships of command and obedience and the hierarchy of authority show many similarities in the Spartan and American armies that can scarcely be attributed to the personalities of the individuals concerned, or to the nature of contemporary American or ancient Greek culture. But they are readily understandable in terms of what armies have to do and the way people have to be organized to carry on these activities.

Personality and cultural factors, along with others, may on the other hand be absolutely necessary in explaining why a particular individual or group of people refuses to adapt to the imperatives of a specific social system or situation. Hitler's behavior certainly cannot be entirely explained in terms of the pressures upon him generated either in German society or in the larger system of world politics.

In general, social scientists are not quite sure whether the terms culture, society, and personality merely represent different ways of looking at the same body of facts, or whether, despite a vague area of overlap, they draw attention to phenomena that are genuinely distinct. Troubled by this state of confusion, Levy pleads for more precise usage of these terms and sets forth at length the bases for his analytical differentiation of society and culture (pp. 144-48). While the terminology itself is an insignificant issue, I think he underemphasizes the partial autonomy of various fields of human behavior loosely covered by these terms. For example, in language, an area of culture that has been subject to the most precise and formal treatment so far, certain types of linguistic change can to a great extent be accounted for without reference to society or personality.[6] Phenomena display-

[5] "Personality and Social Structure," in A. H. Stanton and S. E. Perry, eds., *Personality and Political Crisis*, Glencoe, Ill., 1951.

[6] For a convenient summary of varying viewpoints, see A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Papers of the Peabody Museum, Harvard University, XLVII, No. 1 (1952), pp. 115-24.

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ing a similar degree of autonomy can probably be found in the development of the human personality.

III

Meaning, Communication, and Value, by Paul Kecskemeti, is also largely formal and deductive. But where Levy adheres to the tradition that science is neutral in ethical questions, Kecskemeti's problem is simultaneously a scientific and moral one. Recognizing that some adherence to a common set of values is a necessary basis for any form of group life, he asks whether rational consensus is possible among human beings on any grounds other than strictly scientific ones. Though I am not prepared to say that his affirmative answer carries conviction beyond any possibility of doubt, the steps through which he reaches it constitute in many respects a profound and original treatment of a question with vital contemporary political implications. It also challenges a wide variety of received doctrines in nearly every field of social science.

Kecskemeti's major conclusion is that it is possible to make meaningful statements about values—that is, statements whose acceptance or rejection is not an arbitrary matter—dependent upon non-rational factors such as instinct and suggestion. His conclusion rests heavily upon a rather special definition of meaning: "The meaning of an object *A* consists in determining which response is 'good' (or 'bad') in the situation in which *A* is present. 'Good' and 'bad' are taken here in the most general sense possible; *any* standard by which the result of a response may be judged satisfactory may define meanings" (p. 5). This definition leads him to the position, familiar in some German writings around the turn of the century, that the sciences dealing with the study of man cannot maintain a completely detached neutrality toward their subject matter. Since the organism puts certain demands upon its environment, the scientist in order to understand the meaning of the organism's behavior must apply, to some extent, the same standards as the organism itself. This argument does not imply that the scientist must accept the same standards himself; one need not be anti-Semitic

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in order to understand Hitler. It does imply that the search for completely value-neutral categories in the explanation of human behavior, as in some forms of experimental psychology, is unlikely to be very profitable. Kecskemeti rejects the possibility of explaining human behavior purely in terms of automatic responses to situations, as for that matter do many psychologists, and argues that complete prediction of human behavior is not feasible in principle (p. 120). Free of determinist bias, his intellectual system permits much greater freedom for fruitful reflection on what can be achieved in concrete political circumstances.

Since group life cannot be ordered by empirical science alone, he argues in one of his most telling passages, the confinement of rational discussion to strictly demonstrable scientific matters implies either a forced consensus in the totalitarian manner, or else a willingness to permit each individual to go his own way arbitrarily, to the destruction of all social life. The way out of this dilemma, the author proposes, is a systematic ordering of the manners of discourse that are appropriate to different types of values. Values he defines not according to the usual usage of something considered desirable, but as a method of ranking possible goals or objects of desire in terms of possible conflicts among these desires. Thus "decency" is not something desirable in itself. It is, as he puts it, a basis for preferring one way of behaving over another. From this standpoint he develops a classification of values and a method of systematic discourse appropriate to each. I shall not do violence to the technical and complex argument by which these conclusions are reached, and hope instead that those who read these lines will wish to appraise his argument for themselves. It is enough to draw attention to the key to the argument: those who discuss the "higher" values, such as truth, beauty, justice, and the like, accept certain postulates that provide a framework for subsequent discourse. Though the rejection of the postulate cannot be shown to involve either a logical contradiction or a factual error, the rejection itself has the "*stringent* consequence" that the rejecters can no longer

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participate in the type of social situation that the standard defines.

A tough-minded realist might argue on two grounds that Kecskemeti's solution is no solution at all. First, it merely pushes the point of arbitrary and undebatable assumptions back one step further, to the value postulates. Secondly, the exclusion from the social situation that the standard defines is unrealistic. Did Stalin ever count himself out of an argument about beauty or science or truth because he rejected certain postulates that the rest of the scientific or artistic community accepted? Nevertheless, such a criticism does not touch the heart of Kecskemeti's argument. All he tries to demonstrate is that it is *possible* to achieve a consensus on the "higher" values by rational discussion, even if the discussion cannot be as closely checked by rational considerations as in purely scientific discourse.

IV

The newer disciplines in the social sciences, anthropology, psychology, and sociology, have been frequently attacked as being nothing more than an elaborate intellectual smoke screen that our society has thrown up to conceal from itself its own problems. Any statement of the major problems of the twentieth century is bound to be somewhat arbitrary and a trifle pretentious. But there would probably be widespread agreement on the importance of these three: the retreat and modification of the capitalist order, the threat to constitutional democracy along with the rise of totalitarian regimes, and the colonial revolution. The contribution of the behavioral scientists toward the understanding of these problems is indeed modest and greatly overshadowed by the work of the historian, the economist, and the political scientist. To a considerable extent, as indicated in the two works reviewed here, the behavioral scientists are more preoccupied with ways of thinking about problems than in actually working on them. At times their work recalls A. G. Keller's gibe about the man who is endlessly packing a suitcase for a journey that never takes place. As I have tried to indicate in the body of this essay, the fault does not lie altogether in the

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relative newness of these disciplines, but, partly at least, in the intellectual freight they carry with them, especially the tendency to run certain lines of thought, such as empiricism or deductive formalism, to the point of absurdity.

Nevertheless, I do not think that the charge of a deliberate or unconscious smoke screen can be maintained. The justification of the behavioral sciences is that they are trying to break through an intellectual "sound barrier" to find fundamentally new ways of analyzing human behavior. In turn these new ways of thinking will, their advocates assert, be powerful tools in handling the somewhat practical problems I have suggested as the chief ones of our time, as well as a host of others. Some of the reasons for a skeptical attitude toward these claims have already been indicated. However, the possibility of their eventual realization cannot be flatly denied in advance. With some shifts in emphasis, the behavioral sciences may yet make outstanding contributions.

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NON-RUSSIANS IN THE USSR

By WALDEMAR GURIAN

Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1952, pp. 335. $6.00.

Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Co., 1952, pp. 474. $5.00 (paper binding); $6.00 (cloth).

John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 363. $5.00.

Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1951, pp. 380. $5.00.

I

THE cold war which dominates the world politics of our time has increased interest in the non-Russian peoples living in USSR, for it is widely believed that they can be used to weaken and to disintegrate Soviet power. Such views are quite contrary to those of a few years ago, which assumed that Soviet policies had successfully dealt with the national problem.

W. Kolarz's book on Russia and her colonies will be very helpful for the students of the various nationalities in the USSR. Its 320 pages contain a wealth of geographic, economic, historical, and political information. The author does not limit himself to comparatively well-known national groups like the Ukrainians, but also describes such splinter groups as the Lapps, Karachey, and Ingush. Moreover, Kolarz's forthright rejection of Soviet totalitarianism does not lead him to neglect a careful analysis of concrete and unique situations. At the same time, he emphasizes the similarity of the methods used in the various parts of the Soviet Union.

Despite all variations and changes in practice, the basic scheme of Soviet policies toward the nationalities is quite simple. In the first years after the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, the national movements that developed with the dissolution of the Russian empire were apparently favored, that is, utilized to gain power and political sympathy as well as to play potentially hostile

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groups off against each other. The Soviet regime seemed to have broken completely with the old Russification attempts, and to be prepared to bring about a rise in national cultural consciousness among the various non-Russian groups. In the early twenties a policy of Ukrainization was carried out, going so far as to accept the return to the Soviet Ukraine of such non-Bolshevik nationalists as Hrushevesky. But then a change developed and centralizing tendencies became predominant. Soviet policy no longer pictured Great Russian chauvinism as the enemy. The new enemy was local separatist nationalism, which allegedly had permeated even the Communist leadership of the various national groups. This centralism was identical with the increased emphasis upon Russian leadership.

But this victory of Muscovite domination which, because of its new totalitarian character, is much more ruthless and systematic than that of Tsarist times, also involves the claim that Soviet policies realize all the aspirations of the various national groups. Only bourgeois nationalists, Trotskyites, and the like, it is said, are eliminated. The Russian people is presented as the elder brother anxiously solicitous for the welfare of his younger relatives. "Historical" writings and propaganda emphasize that all non-Russian groups have greatly benefited from their link with the Russians.

However, apart from some improvements in external cultural machinery, the desires of the various peoples have not been a determining influence in the Soviet policy. New national republics—as, for instance, Moldavia—are created for propaganda purposes abroad; peoples are judged, favored, punished, and liquidated according to their usefulness to the Moscow regime. Crimean Tartars, Volga Germans, and Kalmyks—to cite only three examples—are deported, though at first they were highly praised for their loyalty. Economic planning does not take local needs into consideration and often results in radical changes of the national composition of the population. Not the wishes of national groups but the requirements of Moscow's imperial policies are decisive. As a result of these policies, the Russians are regarded as the leading people, and a hierarchy of the na-

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tional groups has been established; the Slavic peoples—the Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelo-Russians—come at the top. Characteristic expressions of this development are the rewriting of history in order to show the identity of socialism and liberation with Russian hegemony in the USSR, and the linguistic policy. Non-Russian languages are Russified; the Latin alphabet, originally imposed on non-Russian languages, is replaced by the Russian one.

Kolarz hopes that the Soviet imperialism with its sham federalism will be replaced by a truly federalistic Russia. He is of the opinion that Byelo-Russia, Ukraine, and Great Russia ought to live together in political unity. He advocates the inclusion of the Caucasus and Central Asia in this ideal Russian commonwealth of the future, although he believes that the Baltic states must become independent.

II

Whereas Kolarz, despite all his denunciations of the brutalities of Russification, argues for a Russian federation, Professor Smal-Stocki advocates without any limitation the right of self-determination in Eastern Europe. He belongs to those students of Russian history who believe that the Soviet Union presents only a new form of that limitless expansionism characteristic of "Eternal Russia." His book gives valuable descriptions of the desperate plight of Ukrainians under the Soviet regime.

Unfortunately, however, the book is marred by highly emotional polemics against scholars whose views Professor Smal-Stocki regards as favorable to a Great Russian domination, and by suggestions that opponents of the dismemberment of the Russian empire must be linked to or influenced by Stalinism. The surprising assertion that practically all representatives of Russian literature from Pushkin to Dostoevski and from Lermontov to Turgenev were non-Russians will surely not help the cause for which Professor Smal-Stocki is fighting. Nevertheless, his book ought to be carefully studied, not only for its interesting material (the remarks on Engels' and Marx's "hierarchy of nations" are very suggestive), but as a testimony to the in-

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tense feelings which the rise and the methods of the Russian empire have provoked. Utilitarian arguments and appeals to moderation cannot destroy such feelings, which may play a decisive role in the future of Eastern Europe. After 1917 they were first skillfully exploited and then politically defeated by the Soviet regime.

III

The book by J. Reshetar proves that it is possible to write about the explosive Ukrainian problem with restraint. He describes the Ukrainian bid for independent statehood which "commenced in 1917 and ended in failure in 1920." The complicated story of this attempt is masterfully disentangled. The various factors involved—the innumerable Ukrainian political tendencies, from conservatism to combinations of nationalism and socialism—are analyzed with the same objectivity as the intervening non-Ukrainian factors (Soviet Russia, Poland, Germany, and the Allies). The decisive role of intellectuals in the formation of a conscious Ukrainian nationalism, the lack of this national consciousness among the peasants, and the absence of a strong middle class, causing the failure of the bid for independence, are stressed.

Reshetar realizes the weakness of the Ukrainian national revolution after 1917, but he also emphasizes that Ukrainian nationalism, as it continues to develop and to grow, must be regarded as a most important factor in Eastern Europe. The time is past when it was possible to believe that the Ukrainians were simply a group belonging of necessity to the Russian empire. The development of the Soviet Ukraine, particularly after World War II—today it includes all Ukrainian inhabited territories, having incorporated Eastern Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine—has surely strengthened tendencies which are opposed to any link with Russia. On the one hand, Russians are made responsible for the sufferings imposed by the Soviet regime; on the other hand, Western Ukrainians who formerly lived under Polish or Czech rule are inclined to emphasize that the Ukraine does not belong to the East and ought to be an integral part of

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the Western world. Only the future can tell if Ukrainian nationalism will be overcome by the mixing of various national groups which has accompanied the industrialization of the Soviet Union.

IV

The fate of the Jews in the Soviet Union (and in the East European territories under its control) has been so widely discussed that the book by S. M. Schwarz, published in 1951, will attract much attention. It gives a careful, detailed description of the Soviet theories about and policies toward the Jews and avoids hasty generalizations as well as unwarranted sensational conclusions.

Schwarz correctly emphasizes the tactical approach of Soviet leaders to nationality problems. Lenin was originally a centralist. Only slowly did he realize the importance for revolutionary purposes of the longings of various national groups. The author impressively describes how the right of self-determination became subordinated to the requirements of Communist power. In this achievement he ably uses Stalin's statements, particularly the latter's formula demanding a culture national in form but socialist in content. The "socialist content" has more and more become identical with a Soviet policy emphasizing Russian leadership. The Jews were originally regarded by Lenin and Stalin not as a nation but as a group destined to disappear under the impact of industrialization. They would be swallowed up by other peoples. The fact that they had no specific territorial basis deprived them, according to the Bolshevik "classics," of the claim to be a nation. Thus, Communist doctrine, opposing Tsarist anti-Semitism, regarded membership in a particular class (and not racial or historical-religious criteria) as decisive, and at the same time it rejected the demands of the Jews in Eastern Europe that they should form a national group, for instance, a particular organization in the socialist movement. After the seizure of power, the latter part of the Communist doctrine was not fully applied. Even the Jewish Communist organizations established by the party were looked upon as instruments to de-

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stroy independent Jewish life. They disappeared in the early thirties, and in the late thirties their Jewish Communist leaders became victims of the Great Purge. The attempt to create a Jewish territory in Birobidzhan was not energetically supported and was probably designed only for propaganda purposes; the care of the Soviet regime for the Jews had to be demonstrated. However, anti-Semitism was opposed by the government, for it was an expression of hostility to the Soviets.

Contrary to the doctrine, the Jews survived as a distinct group. As Schwarz emphasizes, anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union became much more popular than in Tsarist Russia, where it was "deliberately instigated" by the administration. The existence of anti-Semitic feelings among the masses—which identified the Jews with Communism and overlooked the fact that the prominent Communist leaders of Jewish origin regarded themselves as completely assimilated Russians—provided great opportunities for Nazi propaganda. In response, a beginning was made in the elimination of the Jews from visible and representative positions; the Nazi persecutions were played down in the Soviet press—manifestly in order to avoid the spread of sympathy for Hitler among anti-Semitic groups of the Soviet population. The steady rise of a Russian-determined Soviet nationalism utilized the original Communist "denial of the existence of a Jewish nationality." Jews living in the Soviet Union were traitors if they considered themselves as linked with Jews outside its frontiers or sympathized with Israel (though Israel's rise was favored by the Soviet government in order to create difficulties for British imperialism).

"For the rulers of the Soviet Union the Jewish people is once more a vestige and anachronism," writes Schwarz (p. 215). And, it may be added, an "anachronism" which can be used to provide an outlet for the prejudices of the masses. The measures against the Jews as "cosmopolitan," and imperialist Zionist agents, prevent the identification of the Soviet regime with the unpopular Jews, and provide other groups with chances for advancement and promotion. The fact that (contrary to the doctrine) the Jews did not disappear is used against them. Their

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efforts to be completely assimilated, for instance, by accepting Russian names, do not necessarily help them. They are denounced as hiding their anti-Soviet character behind a misleading mask. Racial anti-Semitism is officially rejected—which permits policy reversals such as that after Stalin's death in the case of the Jewish doctors accused of murdering party leaders—but the identification of the Jews with a doomed bourgeois-capitalist world permits the regime to pursue what amount to anti-Semitic policies whenever they are regarded as politically useful.

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